European Management Journal Vol. 24, Nos. 2–3, pp. 206–213, 2006 Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 0263-2373 $32.00
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2006.03.010
A Conceptual Model of Value-Transparency in Supply RICHARD LAMMING, University of Southampton NIGEL CALDWELL, University of Bath WENDY PHILLIPS, University of Bath This paper presents a model of how organisations might employ Value-Transparency (V-T) as a resource within supply relationships. The model refutes classical models of buyer-supplier relationships which assume a hierarchy wherein customers specify and demand suppliers to conform or acquiesce. V-T is presented as a potent resource for exploiting and expanding the innovative capabilities of inter-organisational working. The selective application of V-T, within a delineated project framework, is proposed as an alternative to the traditional customer-supplier hierarchy and its institution-based processes. It is proposed that V-T might represent a new resource or innovative capability for customers and suppliers. Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
changes in their external selection environment) with technologies that are complex and dynamic. To meet these turbulent conditions firms frequently need to access diverse sets of capabilities and resources that lie beyond their own asset base. As Dyer & Singh, (1998:661) put it, ‘Firms who combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over competing firms who are unable to do so. Thus, idiosyncratic inter-firm linkage may be a source of relational rents and competitive advantage’’. As a result, the competencies and assets held by suppliers of goods, services, materials and components, (or, more accurately, the supply relationships connecting such firms with their customers) have assumed a new significance, presenting an opportunity for firms to access alternative knowledge pools and skill sets.
Keywords: Value-transparency, Innovation, Knowledge, Business case, Champions
In the traditional model, in which a firm would develop all its key competencies in-house, supply relationships would be of importance only as the context surrounding the artefact or service provided – probably to a specification laid down by the customer. In the extreme form (characterised by mass production purchasing) such specification would be idiosyncratic and dogmatic, to commoditize the items supplied, so that the customer might buy on price alone. As end-markets develop, so formerly distinct technological fields converge and products become increasingly multi-technological (Cantwell and Fai, 1999, Grandstand et al., 1997). Inevitably, given the high costs of gaining and maintaining investments and expertise in many product and service technologies, the in-house or internal capabilities of any one organisation cannot sustainably supply all the necessary capabilities. (The emphasis on the sustainability of a firm’s market offering reflects both the heightened pace and pressure of markets and the conceptual complexity that must be addressed).
Background Traditionally, firms have been able, as a core attribute, to control in-house the design, delivery and distribution of products or services (see Quinn, 1999). Over the last decade, observers have noted a shift in power from producers to customers in several sectors. The combined effects of globalisation of operations, greatly increased availability of market information (facilitated by the internet, what is termed ‘reach’ (Erridge, Fee and McIlroy, 1998), and the emergence of ‘choice’ as a basic customer requirement, have led in mature industries to the demise of the producer-driven, mass production paradigm. Recognition has grown of the need for firms to respond to the emerging market conditions (i.e.
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Use of concurrent engineering and other time-based strategies differs from a purely ‘in-house strategy’ in recognising that it is not just the scale but the pace of innovation that promotes collective or combinatorial working (Spanner et al., 1993; Coombs and Metcalfe, 2002). However, if it were the case that accelerating a particular product innovation could sustain competitive advantage, then the in-house model might suffice (i.e. if all a firm has to do is to speed up its internal processes, new product development could be conducted entirely in-house). The first order adaptation of the in-house model would then be selective and limited outsourcing, identifying technologies which might be delegated to other firms on a case-by-case basis. It may also be that the exploitation (and therefore commercial recovery) of technologies in which the firm does invest is reliant upon sharing it with others, so that it may be ‘‘beneficially exhausted’’ before it becomes redundant (i.e. technology rents may be redefined in terms of complementary assets or shared competencies). In fact, the preponderance of technologies and their propensity for short-term exploitation presents a more complex challenge: it is necessary to accelerate development processes in order to meet the necessary and externally driven market timing and to embrace the broad and complex array of technologies that lie beyond the immediate understanding or competence of the firm. To support this, rather than outsourcing from a ‘vantage point’ (Lamming, 1996), the firm must begin with the assumption that the suppliers whose offerings make up the product or service to be supplied to the end-market have potential and critically important technological inputs to make beyond those associated with current contracts. Thus, it becomes apparent that to sustain a competitive position firms must collaborate with suppliers in new ways; rather than simply the sources of artefacts, suppliers become sources of knowledge, skills and expertise, or innovation capabilities, in addition to the core offering of artefacts. Within inter-organisational relationships, the process of learning may simply be the exchange of knowledge or it may be a formally co-ordinated process such as a joint venture. Although each firm may still have its own set of firm-specific capabilities, it cannot be assumed that these capabilities are acquired solely through an independent learning process within the firm. What are being considered here are complementary assets (Teece, 1986) or ‘cross-firm capabilities’ (Coombs and Metcalfe, 2002). The pre-selection, or scanning, of technological opportunities is influential in determining the level of cooperation that a firm is willing to undertake before commencing with an inter-organisational relationship. Although the market is ultimately the overall selection device, there is a multitude of different actors shaping a firm’s technological pathway (regula-
tors, consumers, competitors). However, in order to avoid the risk related to the launch of a new product or process, intra-firm pre-selection and testing procedures still play a fundamental role. Thus, although the firm’s external selection environment helps to define technical and economic opportunities, it remains the responsibility of the firm to search, identify and exploit these opportunities (McKelvey, 1997). According to Dosi et al. (1990), the firm scans by trial and error as it proposes and selects from all the available alternatives, its final selection being determined first by the firm’s internal selection environment, in terms of its competencies, routines and past experiences and, second, by the nature of its external interactions. The lesson here is that for a firm to remain stable and solvent its technological autonomy is essential. Accessing external technologies must be seen as a vital but essentially supportive imperative. Although, both firms may increase their range of technological opportunities, through expanding their complementary and core knowledge bases (McKelvey, 1997) the parties to a supply relationship must first weigh up the benefits of innovating in isolation against those arising through collective action. Classic studies suggested that firms tended to pursue technologies that related to their existing knowledge bases (Teece, 1988). However, the increasing complexity and diversity of modern technologies suggests that firms may be forced to access new, unrelated knowledge pools (Cavusgil et al., 2003; Spekman et al., 1998; Prahalad, 1998). The fact that a supplier may be in an entirely different sector from that of the customer (e.g. a microelectronics components producer supplying a vehicle assembler, or a caterer supplying an airline) means that the richness of shared selection environments may be immediate and extensive. (The UK’s Ministry of Defence Logistics Organisation refers to the result of such overlapping scanning as ‘shared working environments.’) The necessity, and urgency, of leveraging cross-firm capabilities has led to the development of the conceptual model proposed in this paper. So far the paper has proposed that inter-organisational relationships increasingly provide highly creative relationships. These, we define as supply relationships that contain inimitable shared competencies, going well beyond the requirements of extant contracts, which may be redefined in terms of complementary assets or shared competencies. For the customer, this raises the issue of dealing with technology-rich suppliers in a manner that creates a shared asset (e.g. knowledge or way of working) that another customer of that supplier would find difficult to replicate; this is a new perspective for traditional purchasing. However we are not suggesting that technology-creative means ‘high technology;’ nor does it imply large size or extensive R&D activity. Suppliers may hold quite simple knowledge that can unlock potential in a customer within a creative relationship.
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Although there are many recorded approaches to leveraging cross-firm capabilities (for example joint ventures, alliances, partnerships), the approach taken here is to develop another: that of Value-Transparency (V-T). Having shown the need for firms to embrace the exchange of technological (and with it, commercial) data and knowledge, and after presenting an interpretation of the complexity of selection environments that firms face, we now turn to the development of a conceptual model for Value-Transparency. This model is intended both to establish the characteristics and basic mechanics of the concept, and to serve as the basis for practical application of the concept, via decision-making support tools for managers. The conceptual model has been developed through collaboration with four UK high technology manufacturing companies, using a participative action research approach, since the aim of the research was to improve, in partnership with the firms, specific and tangible aspects of inter-organisational working. Practitioners (in the participating firms) were encouraged to provide input and feedback throughout the duration of the project, specifically through the use of search style conferences (following Gustaven, 2001). Consequently, the conceptual model was shaped not only by the perceptions of the researchers but also by the practitioners in the context of their own perceptions and their own working environment. This is in line with Kemmis, who highlights that: ‘Practical action researchers aim just as much at understanding and changing themselves as the subjects of a practice (as practitioners) as changing the outcomes of their practice.’ (Kemmis, 2001, p. 92).
Value-Transparency If our identification of a fundamental basis for a concept of V-T lies in the implications of technological imperatives and theoretical models of the firm, its development is grounded in both observed and studied practices and contingencies within real firms. Previously, we have contended that traditional business practices tend to block or corrupt cross-firm capabilities (Lamming et al., 2005b); even what may be perceived as more recent practices or modern practices continue these effects. (For a comparison of open book negotiation see Lamming et al., 2005b.) Previous research has suggested that concentration upon leveraging the vantage points of customer or supplier (Lamming 1996), as opposed to concentrating upon leveraging the potential of the relationship, appears endemic to supply relationships (Lamming et al., 1996). The term ‘Value-Transparency’ is a development of ‘cost transparency’ as originally proposed by Lamming (1993:214). Reflecting the issues of commercial 208
survival and technological imperatives discussed above, the concept of V-T is proposed as one potential mode of operation within an inter-organisational relationship in a supply network. Specifically it addresses the need for uncorrupted exchange or sharing of sensitive information and knowledge between a customer organisation and its supplier. Conceived as a two-way process, it represents managed risk for both parties, with identifiable additional returns that may be associated with that risk. The development of the term reflects the observation that both the nature of the knowledge or information exchanged and the result of its mutual exploitation relate to potential value that may accrue within both parties to the relationship. It is concerned with the creation, nurture and delivery of value for the benefit, and thus continued existence of both parties (Lamming et al., 2005a). Thus, the focus of V-T is not about improving relationships per se, but on specific working practices that relate to both parties’ survival and competitiveness. It is based in theories of managing technology, grounded in criticism of established practices, and aimed at practices related to the survival and success of firms within supply networks.
The Choice of Value-Transparency Modes To characterise the concept of V-T between two organisations, we employ a metaphor taken from geology. It has the inherent limits of all metaphors (Ramsay and Caldwell 2002) but is used here only after extensive trialing with industry where it has been enthusiastically received. (For a more extensive discussion of the use of this metaphor see Lamming et al., 2004.) Exploring the notion of transparency with practitioners has led us to adopting a categorisation taken from geology: that of the characteristics of minerals in terms of the amount of light that can pass through them (see Table 1, which applies the metaphor to supply relationships). We use the behaviour of light as an analogy for the transfer of information or knowledge in relationships; as a metaphor for various states of transparency (and non-transparency) within which we identify Value-Transparency: This ‘device’ suggests that V-T is a dynamic (and thus manageable) property of a relationship, not a characteristic or attribute: it does not need to be in action all the time. In our metaphor, the light is analogous to information or knowledge in a supply relationship, since it must be transferred if the proposed mutual benefits are to arise. Pragmatically, rather than exhibiting simply ‘opaqueness’, ‘translucency’ or ‘clarity’ in a pure form, supply relationships are likely to contain elements of all three characteristics, in a variety of
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Table 1
Manageable Modes of Exchange in Value-Transparency as Derived from a Geological Metaphor Opaqueness
Translucency
Clarity
Geology: light shining on or through a piece of mineral
Light cannot penetrate the surfaces nor pass through the structure of the substance
Light enters and exits the surfaces of the substance and passes through its structure without alteration
In supply management: (information existing in or shared between two organisations)
For any of a variety of reasons, information cannot be shared by party with the other between the parties on this subject but this constraint is acknowledged by both parties
Light can enter and exit the surfaces the substance and pass through its structure, but is distorted or partly obscured in the passage Restricted information on this subject may be shared, e.g. but interface conditions or partial data. Used in Value-Transparency this is positive but limited collaboration. If used tactically, it may be akin to ‘cheating’
locations at different times (or stages in a project). These three characteristics are likely to be distributed over the range of interface processes, e.g. purchase manager with sales manager; design engineer with design engineer; operations manager with operations manager; director with director. In drawing a continuum from ‘opaqueness’ in relationships (no knowledge on either side) to ‘clarity’ in relationships (full but time bound knowledge of a ‘localised’ topic) we are not suggesting that there is a ‘designed path’ or ‘mandated route’ for supply relationships, from opaque to transparent. In practice, we acknowledge, the matter is not iterative, and is more complex. For example, (following the metaphor), a fundamentally non-transparent relationship could develop ‘fissures’ of total V-T from a long-term relationship between boundary-spanning personnel in the two organisations. Our relationship modes are therefore limited to a typology for discussing V-T in supply relationships. A first approach might be to portray relationships as combining points on the continuum from opaque, where neither party knows anything about the other [or a subject area], to transparent, where information is freely shared (e.g. a common database or shared intranet). We use ‘information’ as an initial proxy for value being added (for one or both parties) through the relationship interface. From our recent research, we have identified three manageable and two unmanageable states of exchange for sensitive information. Working with these in a project plan, we suggest it should be possible to decide jointly (i.e. supplier and customer together in a boundary-spanning project team) what type of sharing is necessary and possible at which stage of the project. The first state is ‘‘Clarity’’, the situation in which costs, forward volumes and other operating details can be entirely open. Where this is not possible or necessary, we suggest ‘‘Translucency’’ might be employed; partial V-T where customer or supplier is able to ‘ring fence’ some factors and it is agreed that this is necessary. The final manageable state we
Information regarding this subject is shared candidly, on a selective and justified basis. Development of information may lead to shared knowledge and collaborative abilities
suggest is ’’Opaqueness’’ where there is a ‘‘no-go’’ area, the information pertinent to the stage of the project cannot be shared and other ways of working must be found. Removing the pressure to reveal such data should, we suggest, remove many ‘hidden’ costs associated with protection, deception and concealment. We have also identified two peripheral states that appear unmanageable, at least in relationship terms. The first is ‘‘Dazzle’’, beyond Value-Transparency, where too much data is presented and the receiver cannot effectively deal with it (this may be accidental or deliberate). The last is ‘‘Black Hole’’, where the factors are so deeply buried or complex it is not possible to explain or share them. By employing this range of types we avoid the propensity to dub a specific relationship ‘transparent’ or otherwise. Rather, we suggest that a relationship may contain one, several, or all of these types and that the mix and consistency may vary, or be altered deliberately, over time (possibly in a very dynamic manner). Our contingency approach, we suggest, lends a robustness and practicality to the concept.
A Conceptual Model for Value-Transparency in Supply Relationships The conceptual model depicted in Figure 1 aims to explain how V-T might exist and be employed within a dyadic supply relationship and thus, eventually, within the supply network. The two parties to the dyad, A and B are shown to the left and the right of the diagram. The relationship between them, for this specific encounter (development or delivery of a product or service), is the elliptical area bounded by the heavy, broken line. Note that it is assumed that many such relationships may exist between A and B simultaneously, with different complexions, i.e. a productive, congenial and collaborative relationship may be associated with one product or
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Figure 1 A Conceptual Model for Value-Transparency in Supply
service while a quite different, adversarial, secretive and corrupted affair might characterise the supply or development of another. Logically, therefore, it is not meaningful to speak of ‘the relationship’ between the two parties in a homogeneous sense, other than as an amalgam or ganglion of diverse relationships that might be bundled together to form it. This view relates to Nelson and Winters’ (1982) market and non-market oriented selection environment. Reflecting its origins in innovation and technological imperatives, the model of V-T begins with the external selection environments of the two parties. These contain structural, regulatory and legislative factors, the strengths and weakness of competitors, technologies (in the widest sense) market demands and unfulfilled needs, and so on (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The coincidence of potential for radical development lies in each of the two environments (which neither party can exploit alone) and provides the spark of originality for the relationship. The potential value for both parties lies in the differences between the two environments (i.e. one would not otherwise contain, or perhaps even be aware of, the other). These overlapping environments are represented by four sets of two-way arrows. The upper pair shows the interplay between the internal decision making (the neo-classical focus) and the external environment before the relationship (or the interruption to it that is represented by the new input from the overlap) operates. The lower two sets of arrows show the same process during and after the relationship interlude. In both cases the flows represented by the arrows are the result of inward reflection and 210
outward scanning by the two parties. In the latter case, however, ‘outward’ refers to the relationship, rather than the external environment. We have depicted the coalescent formation of an idea or a proposal as a whirlpool, metaphorically collecting ideas from the external environment that may be understood and exploited by A & B only through collaboration. The whirlpool descends into the relationship as a proposal for a new product variant, service development, process improvement and so on. To give the proposal life, the two parties plan a project of implementation, represented by the circular arrows within the relationship space. Note that the ellipse overlaps with both organisations, representing the notion of a dynamic operating space that is partly in ‘no mans’ land, ‘owned’ jointly by both parties but secured into each through boundary-spanning teams. The composition, commitment and co-ordination of these teams has been a critical issue that we have explored with our industrial partners, leading us to focus on the need for the identification of a ‘champion’ within each of the partners. Markham has observed that the role of champion is one in which ‘an individual strongly advocates a research and development (R&D) project and generates positive behavioural support for it or work on its behalf’ (Markham, 2000, p. 430). Markham suggests that one aspect of champions in R&D projects is that their role is perceived as a political one. Given both the interorganisational nature of V-T and its emphasis upon opportunities rather than assets, the role of project champion in implementing V-T is both wider (in that it crosses the firms’ boundaries) and narrower (in
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that the ‘evangelical’ behaviour required is limited). The nature of the champion role is aligned to that of the project generally. Since inter-organisational collaboration tends to be fragile, especially when coupled with the need to sustain intra-organisational support, projects that seek to introduce radical concepts must be planned with bounded aims and time-frames. The champions assume an overall responsibility not just for a business case for introducing Value-Transparency, but what one industrial collaborator called a ‘case for business’. The first stage of implementation, or exploitation, is the identification of the expected returns to both parties (the basis for an internal business case in each party, to justify the investment about to be made, and a joint case referring to the success of the relationship based upon this project). This is the Concept stage; the parties discuss the idea and prioritise actions. It is at the Concept stage, for instance, that the allocation of intellectual property rights would be discussed and possibly pre-collaboration agreements might be drawn up lodging what each party already knows about the issue (both standard practices in pre-competitive collaborative product development). If the cases are sound (and approved by the necessary processes in each firm) the Concept develops into a Purpose, the mission statement for the project that will deliver the benefits of the Concept. This process is a mutual identification of an opportunity in the supply market which might lead to business benefits for both parties. Note that benefits need not be symmetric nor simultaneous for the Purpose to make sense to the parties. It is unlikely but not impossible to imagine that one party would invest in a Purpose that benefited only the other. Once a proposal has passed through a formal preparation (including risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, skills audit, etc.) stage, the extent and nature of V-T required for each stage of the project may be planned. This includes the choice of V-T modes that are to be employed at each stage of the project in order to deliver the purpose. Thus, for example, knowledge of a factor that must remain opaque for one side in the first stage may be required in, say, the third stage. This could be accommodated by phasing the exchange to avoid delays or guesswork on one side and, on the other side, embarrassment or the need to hedge risks by corrupting data. By planning the V-T as a variable, manageable resource for the project, both sides are able to reduce the surprises and conflicts that might normally impede such work, precipitating a return of the costs of ‘cloak and dagger working’. The processes of V-T Selection, Intent and Planning may be expected to overlap and assume an iterative nature. Following their completion, the project of exploitation takes place, generating the knowledge flows referred to above, in addition to its central purpose. At the final review of the project, the decision
might be made to end the engagement or to extend the concept to new purposes. This might be inward consolidation (installing the concept as a feature of the organisation, represented by the inward spiral) or the reverse, taking the concept to a greater purpose, perhaps with expanded expectations.
Conclusions We have consciously and deliberately proposed that the relationship within which V-T is to be employed will be only one of the many that may exist between the firms concerned. Furthermore, the application of V-T must be for a specific purpose in order to make the effort, and risk, justifiable for both sides. Accordingly, the conceptual model takes the form of a project management approach. In order to manage the project with V-T and deliver to the Purpose, we suggest that the firms will need to ‘freeze’ the dynamics of this relationship for a period in which any relevant variable can be held constant. The length of this freeze is directly linked to the technology or product life; it would not make sense to be engaging in confidentiality on matters which will either become exposed (e.g. by competitors launching new products) or redundant (by such products moving the technological competition to new dimensions) in the meantime. Thus, we hypothesis that the bounded relationship to which V-T would be applicable will relate to technological and commercial aspects that could be ‘frozen’ for long enough for something to be done (i.e. V-T used for commercial benefits) but short enough not to impede progress along a technological trajectory. V-T is not proposed as a philosophy or an abstraction but as the deliberate, strategic agreement by two firms to share information on a specific project in pursuit of a specific and agreed end goal. The radical nature of some goals might mean that the end result is not always a ‘success;’ the experimental nature of the process includes at its heart the possibility of failure. Here the objective is not met and both parties may have to settle for having learned valuable lessons. It is, however, the opportunity for generating better value capture mechanisms which may be expected to drive both parties. V-T in supply is principally about generating mutual capabilities to improve rather than securing a particular proprietary asset (although such an opportunity might be welcome as a short-term gain). Thus, for those who will have to implement the V-T process there are some mandatory responsibilities, some of which reflect the realities of dealing with external organisations, some with dealing with the vagaries of internal organisation. Against a backdrop of a shift in developed economies, from assets and proprietary skills to knowledge management and capabilities, we have
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proposed V-T as a critical resource embedded in supply relationships. The paper has presented a conceptual model relating to relationships within supply networks, in which V-T becomes a shared competence, created through the knowledge flows of a rich relationship, representing an inimitable competence for the dyad.
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RICHARD LAMMING, School of Management, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton S017 1BJ. E-mail: r.c.lamming@ southampton.ac.uk Richard Lamming is Professor of Management and Director of the School of Management at the University of Southampton. He published the principles of lean production in 1993 as an application of creative destruction in process innovation in supply chain relationships. Since then, he has been developing theories within the lean supply paradigm, and pursuing their implementation in several industries.
WENDY PHILLIPS, Centre for Research in Purchasing and Supply (CRiSPS), University of Bath School of Management, Bath BA2 7AY. E-mail:
[email protected] Wendy Phillips is Research Fellow at CRiSPS, University of Bath. She joined CRiSPS in 2001, working on an ESPRC IMRC Project investigating transparency in supply networks. Currently, she is involved in an ‘Innovation in Supply Networks’ project.
NIGEL CALDWELL, Centre for Research in Purchasing and Supply (CRiSPS), University of Bath School of Management, Bath BA2 7AY. E-mail:
[email protected] Nigel Caldwell is Research Fellow at CRiSPS, University of Bath, working currently on the ‘Technology Insertion’ and ‘Innovation in Supply Networks’ projects.
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