Original Article
Political parties and immigration in Greece: Between consensus and competition Lena Karamanidou
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Department of Sociology, City University London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK. E-mail:
[email protected]
Abstract The article examines the immigration policy agendas of two Greek mainstream
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parties, centre right New Democracy (ND) and centre left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) since 2000. Drawing on the analysis of parliamentary proceedings and key political texts, it first analyses areas of consensus and disagreement on the mainstream parties’ positions in relation to immigration control and citizenship. Second, it considers the impact of far right parties, namely, of the radical right Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos and the extreme right Golden Dawn, on the immigration agendas and positions of the two mainstream parties in the context of the Greek austerity crisis. The article argues that despite a decline of trust, suggested by the recent electoral successes of the far right and other ‘fringe’ parties, and despite internal ideological strains, PASOK and ND did not ignore or divert attention away from the ‘immigration issue’. In contrast, they co-opted the far right agenda. Acta Politica advance online publication, 19 September 2014; doi:10.1057/ap.2014.31 Keywords: immigration policy; political parties; immigration discourse; far right; Greece
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In the introduction to this edited volume, Odmalm and Bale (2014) propose three hypotheses: that mainstream parties will stress their ability to deal with the immigration issue if there is inter-party consensus on the overall direction of immigration and integration policies (Hypothesis 1); they will downplay it if voters trust is lower than for the other party (Hypothesis 2) or if they are unable to resolve ideological tensions stemming from it (Hypothesis 3). The article examines these hypotheses in relation to the immigration policy positions of two Greek mainstream parties, centre right New Democracy (hereafter ND) and centre left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). Owing to the increasing politicisation of migration in a profoundly changing political landscape, the Greek context constitutes an interesting case study. One of the effects of the economic and political crisis in Greece was the electoral decline of the mainstream parties, who failed to form a majority government in the 2012 national elections, and the emergence of a fragmented system where small parties of both the left and right significantly increased their vote share (Ellinas, 2013). In this context, the reasons for the success of the far right1 parties, notably the radical right2 LAOS © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica www.palgrave-journals.com/ap/
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(Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos – National Orthodox Rally), elected to the parliament in 2007 and 2009, and the extreme right Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn), elected in 2012, are complex and varied – disappointment with the mainstream parties and their handling of the crisis, insecurity over the economic conditions in Greece, growing unemployment and poverty – but their positions on immigration also played a significant part (Georgiadou and Rori, 2012; Ellinas, 2013). Their anti-immigration agendas also had a considerable impact of the immigration agendas of the mainstream parties. The article argues that despite a decline of trust, suggested by the recent electoral successes of the far right and other ‘fringe’ parties, and despite internal ideological strains, PASOK and ND did not ignore or divert attention away from the ‘immigration issue’. In contrast, they ‘adopted’ (Bale et al, 2010) the far right agenda, a response that refutes rather than supports the second and third hypotheses by the editors. This represents a shift from patterns of competition over competence and blame-shifting, consistent with Hypothesis 1, which dominated during the two party majority period. The article begins by outlining immigration patterns and policy responses in Greece, before discussing the main parties and their positions on immigration. It then proceeds in three parts. First, it analyses areas of consensus and disagreement on the mainstream parties’ positions in relation to immigration control and citizenship. These two aspects correspond to Hammar’s (1985) distinction between immigration control and immigrant policy as the two key dimensions in immigration policy, and are analytically useful in exploring party positions and ideological tensions around immigration (Lahav, 2004; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008). Second, the article considers patterns of competition over the ability to deal with immigration; and, finally, it discusses the recent political developments in relation to the immigration policy positions of the mainstream parties, before drawing some conclusions relating the Greek case study to the editors’ hypotheses. The article’s findings are based on the analysis of parliamentary proceedings and key political texts such as speeches, press releases, press conferences and electoral programmes. For reasons of space and analytical focus, the article is concerned with the period since 2000, and in particular with developments towards the end of this decade; significant developments in the 1990s are discussed in the background section.
Immigration in Greece Greece has been transformed from a country of immigration into a receiving country in the 1990s, following the collapse of communist regimes (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Kasimis, 2012). Along with the ethnic ‘returnees’ came migrants who were not of Greek ethnicity, partly drawn by better work and life prospects and partly fleeing political and economic instability in the former Eastern bloc countries (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Maroukis, 2010). These migrants, 2
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Albanian in their majority, satisfied demands for unskilled labour in sectors such as agriculture, construction, hospitality and domestic care (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Kasimis, 2012). Migration patterns became increasingly varied in the 2000s as Greece became a point of entry, a transit country and a country of asylum for migrants leaving countries affected by conflict and instability such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; Maroukis, 2010). This population is reflected in the number of apprehensions of irregular migrants (Table 1), while the comparatively low number of asylum applications (Table 2) reflects the long standing deficiencies of the Greek asylum system (Karamanidou and Schuster, 2012). The estimated legally resident foreign population during the period of the austerity crisis has fallen from 906 400 in 2011 to 862 381 in 2013 (Table 3). Albanian migrants are by far the largest nationality group (Maroukis, 2010). The estimated number of irregular migrants, according to one source, has risen from 280 446 in 2007 to 391 478 in 2011 (Maroukis, 2012). Policy responses to migration have privileged control. Law 1975/1991, introduced by a New Democracy government in response to the new migration flows following the collapse of communist regimes, was aimed at preventing entry through border controls and a restrictive work permits regime, and at facilitating deportation (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Baldwin-Edwards, 2009). Law 2910 introduced in 2001 by a PASOK government, and Law 3386, introduced in 2005 by a ND government, maintained the emphasis on preventing entry, while policies such as the establishment of border guard body, the 2001 readmission agreement with Turkey, and arrest and deport operations indicate the continuing emphasis Greek policymakers have placed on strengthening internal and external controls (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). In addition, the geographical location of Greece as a country with external borders and on the routes of migration flows to Europe, and European Union (EU) policies such as the Dublin II regulation have generated a considerable burden in managing migration flows into the EU (Karamanidou and Schuster, 2012; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). Public and media discourses since the 1990s have constructed migration as a threat to national identity, security Table 1: Apprehensions of irregular migrants Nationality
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Albania Afghanistan Pakistan Iraq Somalia Algeria Syria
72 454 25 577 5512 15 940 6713 224 451
63 563 17 828 4854 7662 7710 310 440
50 175 28 299 8830 4968 6525 7336 N/A
11 773 28 528 19 974 2863 2238 5298 1522
10 602 16 584 11 136 2212 1765 4606 7927
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Table 2: Asylum applications Year
Number of applications
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
19 884 15 928 10 273 9311 9577
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Source: Hellenic police.
Table 3: Migrant population in Greece 2008–2013a 2009
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Total population in Greece 11 213 785 11 260 402 11 305 118 11 309 885 11 290 067 11062508 906 400e 929 530 954 784 956 007 975 374 862 381 Foreign populationb Foreign born population N/A 1 246 973 1 256 015 1 255 180 1 259 908 1 235 426 a
Includes legally resident migrant population. Excludes those with dual Greek/other citizenship. e: estimate. Source: Eurostat, Maroukis (2012).
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and public order and were both shaped by policies emphasising control as well as used for their justification (Maroukis, 2010; Karyotis, 2012). Equally, policy responses approached immigration as a temporary phenomenon primarily serving the economic needs of the country and neglected issues of longterm settlement (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2009). The entry and presence of immigrants has been regulated by a legal framework based on the issuance and renewal of short-term work and residence permits, supplemented by ad hoc regularisation programmes in 1998, 2001 and 2007 (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; Maroukis, 2010). Despite some improvements made with the 2001 and 2005 laws, this system has been criticised for being out of touch with both the economic needs of the economy and the capacities of the administrative sector (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Kasimis, 2012). The short-term granting of permits, largely dependent on employment and social contributions, afforded little security for migrants and often resulted in illegality (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008; Maroukis, 2010). Long-term integration has also been inhibited by dominant constructions of identity which define the Greek nation in terms of common culture, descent and consciousness. These informed a citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis which privileged ethnically Greek immigrants, and rendered the 4
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acquisition of long-term residence status and citizenship difficult for those with no claim to Greek ethnicity (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009; Konsta and Lazaridis, 2011). The experience of immigration had engendered more inclusive conceptions of citizenship in the last decade, which were to an extent evidenced in the naturalisation provisions for second generation migrants of the 2010 Citizenship Law introduced by PASOK (Konsta and Lazaridis, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Kouki, 2013). However, the economic crisis has reinforced nationalist attitudes and intolerance, especially towards Muslim migrants from Asian and African countries (Triandafyllidou and Kouki, 2013).
Political Parties and Positions on Immigration
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While the article will focus on the two mainstream parties, an account of the political orientation and immigration positions of smaller parties is helpful in understanding the broader dynamics of electoral competition. In the left of the political spectrum, KKE (Kommounistiko Komma Ellados – Greek Communist Party) is a traditional communist party, firmly anti-EU and anti-capitalist (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012; Verney, 2012). Perceiving immigration primarily as a matter of labour relations, it supports an agenda of equality and non-discrimination, advocating the regularisation of immigrants’ status and the recognition social, political and religious rights (KKE, 2007). It opposed, however, the extension of birthright citizenship to immigrant children, arguing that it reflects the ‘cosmopolitanism of capital’ (KKE, 2010). The Alliance of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos), a pro-European, modernising left party founded in 1989 was absorbed in 2004 into the now well-known SYRIZA (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras), which advocates more state control in the economy, further social justice policies and has been moderately in favour of EU membership although not supportive of its market friendly economic policies (Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Verney, 2012). Generally opposing securitarian migration policies, in its 2012 electoral programme, SYRIZA (2012) advocated easier legalisation and naturalisation procedures and a greater level of social rights for immigrants. The SYRIZA splinter Democratiki Aristera (Democratic Left) founded in 2010 and currently a junior partner in the coalition government, adopted a less radical position on immigration than the other two left parties, although it emphasises integration and the protection of human and social rights (Demokratiki Left, 2012). At the other end of the political spectrum, LAOS, founded in 2000 by MPs dissatisfied with the modernisation trends in ND is an anti-establishment, ultranationalist party that considered immigration as a cause of unemployment and increased criminality, a threat to cultural identity and advocated tougher border and internal controls (LAOS, 2007; Georgiadou, 2008). While it failed to get elected in 2012 because of its pro-memorandum position, its successor, the now notorious Chrysi Avgi (2013) shares LAOS’ anti-establishment tendencies but is more extreme © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
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Table 4: Greek national elections and governments Government Party
1990–1993 1993–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2007 2007–2009 2009–2011 2011 (Nov)–2012 (May) 2012–
New Democracy PASOK PASOK PASOK New Democracy New Democracy PASOK Interim Coalition Government (PASOK, New Democracy, LAOS) Coalition Government (New Democracy, PASOK, Democratic Left)
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Source: Ministry of the Interior, Hellenic Parliament.
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in its ideological rejection of democratic structures and open admiration of Nazism (Ellinas, 2013). Like LAOS, it perceives immigration as an existential threat to the nation and shares its constructions of threat; unlike LAOS, it has been openly violent against immigrants (Chrysi Avgi, 2013; Ellinas, 2013). The mainstream parties have alternated in government from 1993 until 2012 (Table 4). PASOK, founded in 1974, was originally a social democratic party with populist, nationalist, anti-American and anti-western views but since the late 1990s it abandoned these positions in favour of centrist, market friendly economic policies, a technocratic approach and a European orientation, while maintaining its commitment to social equality (PASOK, 2007, 2009; Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Verney, 2012). ND, founded in 1974, represents a broad spectrum of right wing positions. While having a European orientation – it was under their tenure that Greece joined the EC/EU – and adopting modernising economic policies, it was also authoritarian and nationalist (Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Verney, 2012). Under the leadership of the founder’s nephew, K. Karamanlis, it adopted neo-liberal economic policies and a greater commitment to civil liberties and human rights but a more conservative turn has been observed under the leadership of A. Samaras (Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). There are both similarities and differences in the positions ND and PASOK have adopted on immigration. First, both parties securitised immigration since the 1990s (Triandafyllidou et al, 2008). A 2001 PASOK position document addressed immigration in a section entitled ‘migration flows and citizen security’ and in the context of globalised security threats and criminality (PASOK, 2001a, 2004a, 2007), although it moderated its securitisation framing while in opposition (PASOK, 2008). Similarly, ND has consistently framed immigration as a public order issue and a cause of the rise of criminality in Greece (ND, 2000a, 2004a, 2007a, b, 2012a). Since the 2009 elections, criminality and public order in Athens become key immigration agendas for both parties (ND, 2009a, b, 2012a, b; PASOK, 2009, 2012a, b, c), 6
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reflecting both the worsening social conditions in the centre of Athens and electoral pressures from LAOS and Chrysi Avgi. Second, corresponding to the securitisation frame, both parties have emphasised the need for control measures aimed especially at the prevention of unauthorised entry in order to curtail the negative consequences of irregular migration (PASOK, 2001a, 2004b, 2007, 2009, 2011a; ND, 2000a, 2007a, b, 2009a, b, 2011a, 2012a). Third, until the mid-2000s both parties viewed immigration as primarily economic phenomenon serving the labour needs of the country (Triandafillydou et al, 2008). A PASOK (2003) policy document states that ‘immigration policy, at this point in time, is focused on the labour market’, and both parties support the stronger regulation of the labour market in order to prevent illegal employment and protect migrants’ labour rights (PASOK, 2000, 2001a, 2003, 2004a, 2007; ND, 2000b, 2004b, 2007b). This economic framing also shapes both parties’ position on integration which, from the 1990s to the mid2000s, is predominantly conceptualised in terms of integration into the labour market (ND, 2004b; PASOK, 2000, 2003; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009). However, positions on integration have diverged from 2004 onwards. While both parties supported the social integration of migrants and the respect of cultural difference and migrants’ rights (PASOK, 2004b, 2007, 2009; ND, 2007a, b), PASOK as an opposition party adopted a position in favour of voting rights and acquisition of citizenship for immigrant children (PASOK, 2004b, 2007, 2008, 2009). In contrast to PASOK, ND (2007b) opposed the naturalisation of immigrants – unless of ethnically Greek origin – and explicitly rejected the 2010 Citizenship law (ND, 2010, 2011a, b). In short, both parties securitise migration – although ND more strongly than PASOK – and both take positions in favour of strong controls; however, PASOK adopts a more open position in what concerns citizenship and integration. Similarly to other centre right and centre left parties in Europe, their positions on immigration are difficult to integrate with their placement on either the left/right or GAL/TAN axis (Odmalm and Bale, 2014). The following sections examine the two parties’ positions on control and citizenship, and their contradictions, in more detail.
Controlling Migration Both parties see border controls as a policy priority. Between 2000 and 2004, the PASOK government introduced a number of policies aimed at strengthening immigration controls such as the establishment of border guard units, a readmission agreement with Turkey and the regular detention of unauthorised migrants, as well as a new law (2910/2001) regulating entry and residence. In statements following a cabinet meeting in 2001, the PM claimed ‘immigration must be controlled and legal’ and that the government ‘will not allow Greece to become a fenceless vine’ (PASOK, 2001a b). The ‘fenceless vine’ metaphor, a popular Greek expression, is used extensively in the © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
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political discourse of migration to signify loss of control. This commitment remains constant in the rhetoric of PASOK when they return to government in 2009. PASOK’s (2009) programme includes ‘border control, deterrence of unlawful entry of migrants, guaranteeing of public order through combating illegal activities by migrants […]’ (p. 78) as key policy priorities; the ‘combating irregular migration flows’ is likewise presented as a key aim in a 2011 policy document (PASOK, 2011a). Conversely, while ND as the majority opposition party often criticised legislative proposals by PASOK, they did not doubt the necessity of controlling migration arguing, for example, that ‘the precondition for lawful, efficient measures for a state such as the Greek one is for it to guard its borders’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2001a, p. 5635). The 2005 immigration law introduced by ND was argued to ‘send a clear message of respect for the law and of effective border control’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2005a, p. 650), a goal reiterated in policy documents during the Karamanlis government (ND, 2007a, b). Similarly, policy documents during Samaras presidency in opposition (2009–2011) present border control and prevent irregular migration as key priorities (ND, 2010, 2011a, b). In short, both parties are in favour of strong control policies throughout the period of interest. The control rhetoric, however, is moderated, first, by recognising the necessity of migration as a source of labour. The Minister of the Interior of the 2000–2004 PASOK administration remarked in debates on the 2001 Immigration law that ‘the complete banning of immigration is not a viable solution […] Today there are in Greece thousands of jobs that Greeks refuse to take up’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2001b, p. 5602). Likewise, a ND minister argued that the aim of the 2005 Immigration law was to ensure the ‘equal participation of migrants in economic development’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2005a, p. 650). Second, the rhetoric of control of both parties is counterbalanced by an apparent commitment to human and refugee rights. PASOK’s (2009) manifesto stated that the ‘respect of human rights that are guaranteed in Greek and international legislation and the protection of humanitarian values’ is as important aims as border control, and was linked to the socialist identity of PASOK (p. 78). The rhetorical commitment to human rights also served in distancing PASOK from a ND administration during a period when the country came under severe criticism over its treatment of migrants and refugees (Hammarberg, 2008). On its part, ND has also repeatedly expressed its own commitment to rights. Responding to an oral question on irregular migration, the Foreign Minister stated that measures combating irregular migration are always taken ‘under conditions of completely safeguarding human rights’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2008, p. 4197). Similarly, the Minister of Interior of the next ND government stated, following an EU Home Affairs meeting that ‘Greece sees it [immigration] primarily as a human rights issue, of protection of human dignity’ (Prime Minister’s Press Office, 2008). In a sense the opposite ‘pulls’, suggested in the editors’ introduction, of a strong state – indicated by the commitment to control – and of a commitment to market principles and human are present in the policy preferences of both parties, despite their 8
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differing placement of both the Left-–Right and GAL/TAN dimensions. Nevertheless, they should not be perceived as producing irresolvable internal ideological tensions. As Boswell and Geddes (2010, p. 81) argue, governments can overcome contradictory policy aims if they ‘juggle’ interests and ‘decouple their rhetoric from practice’. In the Greek context, both controlling irregular migration and accepting lawful economic migration, for example, have been presented as serving the national interest, while human rights commitments act as useful rhetorical devices in the legitimation of policies. Instead, the consensus on immigration positions, as the next section will demonstrate, resulted in the two parties competing over their ability to deal with immigration.
Consensus and Competition
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In keeping with the special issue’s first hypothesis, the argumentation patterns between the two parties suggest that the extent of the consensus over policy pushes them towards attempts to prove their competence in the dealing with ‘the migration issue’, especially in the period before the rise of the far right. Three kinds of argumentation strategies can be discerned. First, both parties blame the opponent for the alleged uncontrolled nature of migration in the country and other failures of migration policy. For example, in the debates on the 2001 Immigration Law, a ND MP countered the accusation by the Minister of the Interior that the ‘mass entry of migrants was proven to be an unviable solution by the unsuccessful policy of ND in the period 1990–1993’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2001b, p. 5604) by stating the ‘fenceless vine was your (PASOK’s) construction between 1994 up to 2001’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2001b, p. 5607). Conversely, in a press release issued in 2011, PASOK criticised ND for its policy failures, declaring that it had ‘rendered Greece a fenceless vine at the whim of smugglers and target of harsh criticism for the deficient protection of human rights’ while similar accusations are made by ND before the 2012 elections (PASOK, 2011b; ND 2012c, d). Second, parties attempt to display their competence in migration policy by claiming successes in dealing with migration control, in particular in the context of EU policies. For instance, both parties claim that the deployment of FRONTEX, which they assess as successful, was their initiative. A PASOK minister argued, for example, that ‘the deployment of FRONTEX […] is due to the assiduous efforts of the [PASOK] Government’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2010a, p. 2880) while a ND MP claimed that it ‘was an initiative of the previous [ND] Karamanlis government’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2011a, p. 3702). Third, failures at the EU level – in terms of not serving the national interest – are also used to discredit the opponent. Antonis Samaras, the current prime minister, stressed in 2010 that ‘Dublin II was signed by a PASOK government’, claiming its effect was that ‘legal immigrants in member states from the south are prevented from going to European countries of the North’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2010b, p. 4772). © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
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Although the above statement betrays a somewhat shaky grasp of the Dublin regulation, the patterns of blaming (perceived) failures to the opponent party and claiming successes (however imaginary) as their own should be seen as a strategy to stress competence in controlling migration, a policy position characterised by consensus. As the timing of quotations above indicates, these patterns have persisted in the 2009–2012 period. However, the most significant fall-outs over immigration policy occurred in an policy area characterised by disagreement between the two parties, that of citizenship, and was also influenced by the new configurations of the Greek political landscape.
Citizenship and Migrant Rights
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The positions of the two parties on the issue of citizenship and integration differ considerably. PASOK has adopted a more liberal position in favour of naturalisation of long term and second generation migrants while ND, although not against measures regulating residence and integration, has been reluctant to expand citizenship provision. PASOK did not initially focus on long-term immigration policy, and in debates on the 2001 Immigration Law, voices in favour of a more inclusive regime coexist with those of MPs who adopted a position in favour of assimilation and a nationalist discourse based on perceptions of cultural threat (Hellenic Parliament, 2001a, b). A similar ambivalence is evident in a 2003 document that refers to both ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ (PASOK, 2003). However, following a change of leadership and its shift to opposition in 2004, PASOK started to include migrants in its party committees and adopted positions in favour of greater social inclusion, voting rights and an extension of citizenship to second generation immigrants (PASOK, 2004a, 2008; Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2011). These positions were included in the 2009 electoral programme that proposed the ‘granting of citizenship to children of immigrants who live in our country for a minimum number of years, and who have been born in Greece’ as well as ‘after the completion of three years in Greek education’ (PASOK, 2009, pp. 78–79). Upon election, the PASOK government introduced the 2010 Citizenship Law, albeit with the limitation of applying only to legal immigrants (Government Gazette, 2011). In the parliament, the majority speaker justified the law by appealing to both the social participation of immigrants who ‘work, pay their taxes and social insurance contributions, […] have families, children who go to school here’ but also by claiming that the ‘denial of orderly and complete incorporation leads them to isolation. The denial of creating rules for the way they are integrated in our country, in our society, is what creates lawlessness, corruption and bitterness’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2010b, p. 4721). The reference to rules and order is, on the one hand, an indirect criticism to the ND 2004–2009 administration that PASOK’s prime minister had attacked in a previous debate for the lack of rationality in its policy and for the abusive granting of citizenship (Hellenic Parliament, 2010c); on the other, it suggests 10
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a more conservative approach to diversity than the unquestioning support of multiculturalism PASOK has been accused of by parties on the right. While in government between 2004 and 2009, ND adopted a number of policies regulating the long-term stay of immigrants and incorporated relevant EU legislation into Greek law (ND, 2007b). However, it did not extend naturalisation to nonethnically Greek immigrants or supporting the granting of voting rights to them. The reluctance to do so should be attributed to the party’s conservative and nationalist values that underpin its adherence to an ethnic citizenship model. In the debates on the introduction for Law 3386/2005, the party’s parliament spokesperson argued against the broadening of Greek citizenship because
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Although the reference to legal reasons for not legislating on citizenship is a strange one – since the executive does have such powers, albeit subject to constitutional limitations – the appeal to morality alludes to the dominance of an ethnic definition of citizenship and constructs any deviation from this model as a threat to the nation itself. Similar arguments pertaining to threats to national and cultural cohesion were employed against the 2010 Citizenship Law (Hellenic Parliament, 2010b, pp. 4725– 4726; Hellenic Parliament, 2010d). In these debates, the ND leader argued against the naturalisation of immigrants whose culture ‘cannot coexist with our own’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2010c, p. 3216), reflecting perceptions of cultural threat associated with the predominantly Muslim and non-European migration flows. In addition, ND rejected the law because it would undermine the objective of controlling immigration (Hellenic Parliament, 2010b; ND, 2012d) The diverging positions on citizenship should be attributed to both ideological differences and electoral pressures. PASOK’s increasing commitment to a more liberal citizenship regime when in opposition is consistent with their ideological commitment to social equality and human rights of a party to the left of the GAL/ TAN scale. However, the shift to less radical positions when introducing the 2010 citizenship law as a governing party suggests internal ideological strains between social equality on the one hand and maintaining restrictions on the other, and the resistance to jus soli citizenship within the Greek social and political context (Bale, 2008b; Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2011; Odmalm and Bale, 2014). ND’s position reflects the conservative and nationalist ideological tradition within the party and its positioning on the right in terms of the socio-cultural dimension. However, it also reflects the pressures it received at the time from LAOS, a party also representing the nationalist political space. The competition from this party, and later Chrysi Avgi and the ND splinter Independent Greeks, influenced greatly the fate of the 2010 Citizenship Law, as well as the mainstream parties’ immigration policies. © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
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The New Political Landscape, Mainstream Parties and Immigration
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The end of the decade brought significant changes in terms of party dynamics and electoral competition in Greece, triggered by the economic crisis. The success of far right parties has been significant in terms of vote share, with LAOS rising from 3.8 per cent in 2007 to 5.63 per cent in 2009. While its support for the memorandum resulted in its electoral defeat in 2012, Chrysi Avgi took 5.29 per cent of the vote in the municipal elections of 2010 and was successfully elected to the parliament in the 2012 May and June national elections with 6.72 and 6.92 per cent of the vote, respectively (Ministry of the Interior, 2013). These results are relatively impressive for minor extreme right parties, given their prior electoral insignificance and marginal role of smaller parties in previous elections (Georgiadou, 2011; Ellinas, 2013). Both LAOS and Chrysi Avgi made immigration a key issue of their political agendas and electoral campaigns (Georgiadou, 2008; Kovras, 2010; Ellinas, 2013). LAOS advocated the deportation of irregular migrants, stronger border controls, a hard line on what they see as immigrant criminality particularly in areas of Athens, and opposed the 2010 Citizenship law and the 2011 Asylum Law on the grounds that they undermined national interests and identity (Hellenic Parliament, 2010b, c, d; Hellenic Parliament, 2011a, b). Having its own media, and given airtime by established media outlets helped promulgate these views (Ellinas, 2012). Following on these developments, Chrysi Avgi’s successfully mobilised support for their anti-immigration agenda in areas of Athens such as Aghios Panteleimonas, which have a comparatively high immigrant population, and also relatively high levels of social disadvantage and marginalisation. This breakthrough was followed by their success in the national elections (Ellinas, 2013). While the electoral successes of LAOS and Chrysi Avgi can also be attributed to their populist anti-elite and anti-corruption agenda also appealed to crisis-hit Greeks, there is evidence to suggest that their anti-immigration views were a significant factor in attracting votes (Georgiadou, 2011; Georgiadou and Rori, 2012; Ellinas, 2013). Immigration thus became a far more significant issue in electoral competition, having been largely absent from the campaigns of the mainstream parties until 2009 (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2011; Ellinas, 2013). The rise of the far right had a considerable impact on the mainstream parties that was expressed in their policy priorities and rhetoric in the run-up to the 2012 elections. Measures adopted by the Ministry of Citizen protection under the interim government in the months before the election included the prosecution of landlords housing irregular migrants in order to protect ‘Greek and migrant families’ from the ‘public health bomb’ of irregular living conditions (MCP, 2012a, b); the criminalisation of street trade, an economic activity often undertaken by undocumented migrants (MCP, 2012a); the creation of detention centres to facilitate deportation (MCP, 2012c, d). It is worth noting that the areas these measures were aimed at – threats to health, street trade, urban crime – were largely ‘owned’ by LAOS in the previous years, having often been raised by its MPs in the parliament, and later by Chrysi 12
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Avgi. In some instances, such measures are presented as attempts to contain the rise of Chrysi Avgi: ‘what’s happening’ states the junior MCP (2012c, d) minister ‘hatches the snake’s egg’, using another popular expression to denote the rise of racism and fascism (PASOK, 2012b). Equally, the PASOK-affiliated minister’s statements mirror both the rhetoric of threat as well as adopting its agenda of crime and public order. ‘Our position is that Greek society should defend itself against crime’ stated the MCP minister a few weeks before the election, adding that the government would ‘defuse the bomb at the foundations of the Greek society, the bomb of immigration’ and ‘put an end to all these activities and phenomena [of crime] mainly in the centre of Athens’ (MCP, 2012d). The electoral pressures from the far right were greater on ND that competed with them for votes from the conservative, nationalist ideological space. In an attempt to regain it, it presented common candidate lists with LAOS in the regional elections of 2010 and following its disintegration, some of its former MPs were included in the ND candidate lists for the 2012 elections (Ellinas, 2012). However, the positions adopted by ND on citizenship and the Citizenship Law are possibly the best indication of the impact of far right pressures on this party. LAOS made the repeal of the law a condition for their support in the interim government, and its abolition became one of the items of the electoral programme of ND (2012a, d) on immigration. Like PASOK, ND in this period adopt the far right agenda on urban crime, but also its rhetoric. The leader of ND stated in a pre-election speech that the party will ‘remove the ghettoes of illegal immigrants, will remove the gangs of illegals […] we will reoccupy our cities and neighbourhoods’’ (ND, 2012a). The reference to ghettoes was a signature expression of LAOS, in a similar manner that references of a former minister of Public Order to ‘the asymmetric threat [author’s emphasis] of illegal immigration’ (ND, 2012d, e) use the same expression as Chrysi Avgi to frame immigration (Hellenic Parliament, 2012a, pp. 68, 81, 148; 2012b, p. 195). The direction of immigration policy under the coalition government formed after the June elections of 2012 suggests that the turn towards more restrictive policies is far from over. One of the first initiatives of the coalition government was Operation Xenios Zeus (ironically named after the ancient god of hospitality) aimed at the arrest, detention and deportation of unlawful migrants (MCP, 2012e). Although it had the approval of all coalition partners, other policy developments reveal rifts hinting at both ideological divisions between left and right parties and the extreme right’s pressures on ND. ND expressed its intentions to repeal the citizenship law, supported by Chrysi Avgi and Independent Greeks, and despite opposition from its coalition partners (Hellenic Parliament, 2012a; PASOK, 2012a, b). The decision of the Supreme Court to declare the law unconstitutional precipitated this process (Triandafyllidou and Kouki, 2013) A further rift in the coalition government emerged by the reluctance of ND to support the introduction of an anti-racism law proposed by PASOK and Dimar, a move that was interpreted as bowing to the pressure of Chrysi Avgi. © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
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Conclusion: The Crisis of the Greek Parties and Immigration
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The immigration policy positioning of the two mainstream parties reflects in many ways the radical change in Greek politics. From a two-party system producing strong majority governments, the economic and political crisis in Greece resulted in the weakening of the power of the two mainstream parties. At the same time, the crisis benefited in electoral terms the smaller parties of both left and right. While the successes of the leftist fringe, especially SYRIZA, should be attributed to grievances of the electorate regarding economic issues, the success of far right parties can be attributed to their anti-immigration agendas. Their positions on immigration can be seen, using Mudde’s (2010) term, as a ‘pathological normalcy’ whereby they offer extreme versions of the policy preferences of the mainstream parties helped by Greece’s humanitarian crisis, the absence of efficiently implemented policies, and a predominant rhetoric of threat. The policy preferences of PASOK and ND diverged on issues of citizenship and converged on migration control. Equally, as the editors suggest, the policy positions of the two parties are difficult to integrate in either the Left–Right, or the GAL/TAN dimensions. Both advocate strong controls and both accepted, until the economic crisis, the necessity of migration as a labour source despite their differing placements on the left/right and the GAL/TAN dimension, where ND is seen as a more authoritarian party than PASOK (see Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). For both parties, these positions reflect ideological strains similar to those faced by other centre right and centre left parties (see Bale, 2008a; Bale et al, 2010; Odmalm and Bale, 2014), especially between economic liberalism and nationalist tendencies for ND, and between control and commitments to human rights for PASOK. The largely consensual nature of Greek immigration politics produced, in agreement with the editors’ first hypothesis, patterns of competition between PASOK and ND over their ability to deal with immigration, especially before the 2012 elections. Party preferences – with the exception of regarding migration as a source labour and therefore economic benefit for the country – have remained stable despite pressure from far right. However, the character of the policies adopted has become more restrictive and securitarian in nature in the process of attempting to recapture the ownership of the migration issue from the far right. While the two mainstream parties could still be engaging in competition and blame-shifting, their policy positioning during the interim government and pre-election periods suggests that they were both, and in relatively equal measure, try to reclaim the ownership of the migration issue from the far right. The Greek case study suggests that both parties have responded by ‘adopting’ (Bale et al, 2010) the far right agenda and refutes rather the second and third hypotheses by the editors, since there is little evidence that mainstream parties avoided or diverted attention from immigration issues, either because of internal ideological strains or because of the loss of trust implied by their loss of votes. At the time of writing, disagreements between ND on the one hand and 14
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PASOK and Dimar on the other over the citizenship and anti-racism laws suggest the emergence of a new patterns of polarisation along ideological lines. These patterns are likely to continue while Greece is in crisis, and could have serious implications in terms of immigration policies and public attitudes. Greek migration policy has always privileged control over reception (in the case of asylum seekers and irregular migrants) and integration, which resulted, in combination with the pressures from EU migration policies, in a humanitarian crisis that was exploited by the far right. The current turn to even more restrictive, control-oriented policies has run parallel with the rise of racist violence against immigrants. To use expressions favoured by politicians, the issue of immigration is in danger of becoming a fenceless vine run by Chrysi Avgi – a snake’s egg that has already hatched.
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About the Author
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Lena Karamanidou is a Lecturer at the Department of Sociology at City University London. Her research interest include the political discourse of asylum and migration, the migration discourse of far right parties in Greece, asylum and migration policies, and the intersections between migration, exclusion and the state.
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Notes
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1 I use the term far right to refer to both LAOS, a radical right part, and Chrysi Avgi, a neo-fascist party. 2 LAOS fits in the criteria of a nativist ideology, authoritarianism and populism used by Mudde (2007).
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