DARWIN’S EVOLVING LEGACY
JORGE MARTÍNEZ CONTRERAS AURA PONCE DE LEÓN editors
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QH360.5 D37 2011 Darwin’s evolving legacy / Jorge Martínez Contreras, Aura Ponce de León, editors. — México : Siglo XXI : Universidad Veracruzana, 2011 492 p. ISBN-13: 978-607-03-0346-3 1. Evolution (Biology)–Philosophy. 2. Darwin, Charles–1809-1882– Legacy. 3. Philosophy of Nature. 4. Self-organizing systems. 5. Intelligence–Philosophy. 6. Life. I. Martínez-Contreras, Jorge, editor. II. Ponce de León, Aura, editor.
Each author is exclusively responsible for the entire content of his/her article, including its statements, texts, pictures, figures, photographs, and any other section of it. 1st edition, 2011 © siglo xxi editores, s.a. de c.v. © universidad veracruzana isbn 978-607-03-0346-3 all rights reserved printed and made in mexico printed by reproscan, s.a. de c.v antonio maura 190 col. moderna, 03510 méxico, d.f.
CONTENT
preface acknowledgements
9 11
the evolving legacy of two great thinkers: lamarck and darwin Jorge Martínez Contreras, Aura Ponce de León & Víctor Romero Sánchez 13
SECTION 1: THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION alexander von humboldt: link between lamarck and darwin Jaime Labastida
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the tree of life reconsidered Jean Gayon
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the darwinian concept of species Camilo J. Cela Conde & Cristina Rincón Ruiz
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the species concept in lamarck and darwin’s work: a retrospective glance Ernesto Rodríguez Luna & Aralisa Shedden González
74
darwin and environmental ethics Raúl Gutiérrez Lombardo
90
compensation and correlation of the organs in étienne geoffroy saint-hilaire’s TRANSMUTATIONISM Gustavo Caponi
100
towards an expanded evolutionary synthesis: taking the neo-lamarckian darwin seriously Eugenio Andrade
111
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content
methodological issues in the dual inheritance account of human evolution Paulo C. Abrantes
127
evo-devo, complexity, and multilevel causation Maximiliano Martínez Bohórquez
144
SECTION II HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION a darwinian model of scientific culture: path dependent representations embodied in practices Sergio F. Martínez
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a structuralist reconstruction of the mechanism of natural selection in set theory and graph formats Mario Casanueva L.
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aztec microcephalics: evolutionary interpretations of the anomaly in the 19th century José Luis Vera Cortés 193 some historiographic uses of darwin Violeta Aréchiga C.
207
early lamarckism and the theory of degeneration Luis Horacio Gutiérrez-González
219
comte’s lamarckian heritage Michel Bourdeau
232
first references to darwin and the hereditary ideas of medical doctors in mexico in the late nineteenth century Ana Barahona
243
content
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the long and winding road of the uses of molecules in (human) evolution Edna Suárez-Díaz
257
inheriting erasmus’ worries on hereditary ills: the paths of heredity within the darwin family Carlos López-Beltrán
272
SECTION III ANTHROPOLOGY AND EVOLUTION chimpanzee social cognition and the phylogeny of morals Alejandro Rosas
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human beings and evolutionary theory: c. darwin and a. r. wallace Rosaura Ruiz Gutiérrez, Juan M. Rodríguez Caso & Ricardo Noguera Solano
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paleoanthropology and THE DESCENT OF MAN Aura Ponce de León
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on illness and natural selection Cristina Rincón Ruiz & Alicia Bennàsar Rigo
327
darwin and what articulate language means Mercedes Tapia Berrón
334
evolution and psychological theory: classical psychoanalysis and attachment theory Fernando Ortiz Lachica
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archaeological stratigraphy, discontinuities, and evolution Fernando López Aguilar
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trade as a possible factor in human evolution Fernando Leal
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SECTION IV PRIMATOLOGY AND COGNITION conceptual thinking in animals. some reflections on language, concepts, and mind Antonio Diéguez
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how apes became human Jorge Martínez-Contreras
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jordi sabater pi (1922-2009). the life and work of a naturalist and the discovery of chimpanzee cultures IN MEMORIAM
Joaquim F. Veà
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primate societies from an evolutionary perspective Alba Leticia Pérez-Ruiz
420
evolution and human reasoning Jonatan García Campos
429
the evolution of agency Pablo Quintanilla
444
cerebral clues on the evolution of aesthetic appreciation Enric Munar & Marcos Nadal
457
darwinian selection in a modular mind Paola Hernández Chávez
469
representation and information Karla Chediak
480
Trade as a Possible Factor in Human Evolution* fernando leal**
Quite a few evolutionists have lately been pretty busy trying to shine the light of evolution on those features which we have traditionally been prone to consider the mark of the human—toolmaking, language, thought, religion, morality, symbolism. Conspicuously absent from this shortlist of usual suspects is trade—what Adam Smith, almost a hundred years before The Descent of Man, had called “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.” On that occasion, the father of economics put forward the hypothesis that trade is a uniquely human trait and asked the question whether trade so conceived was a consequence of ”the faculties of reason and speech” or whether it was rather “an original principle” (Smith, 1776, i, ch. 2). If we put an evolutionary spin on these ideas, then we could suggest that trade, language and thought are evolved traits of our species, whose relative chronology and causal relationships are thus far unknown. Again, maybe not all or even none of the three has been produced by evolution. As far as language and thought are concerned, the debate has certainly raged and will probable rage for a while yet. I submit that it is time to allow trade to enter that debate. Economists write copiously about trade, but do not seem to be interested in how trade came to occur among humans, never mind among nonhuman organisms. Biologists talk all the time about nonhuman animals, of course, yet practically never use the word “trade” * I wish to thank Jorge Martínez for his kind invitation to participate in the LamarckDarwin International Symposium where I presented a first draft of this paper. Presenting my ideas in this sharp, witty and friendly environment was a unique experience. My profound gratitude goes also to Jean Gayon, Joaquim Veà, Alejandro Rosas, Gustavo Caponi, Paulo Abrantes-Coelho and Michel Bourdeau for their comments, instruction and suggestions, which I have used to improve upon the first draft. I only hope that this new version will better convey the core and direction of my argument. **Departamento de Estudios Socio-Urbanos, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, Universidad de Guadalajara. Correo:
[email protected]. Página de internet: https://sites.google.com/site/filosofiasinaspavientos/.
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to describe their coping with each other or with the environment. It seems that, as far as the mainstream in both biology and economics is concerned, trade is just not a biological issue. However, this consensus of the mainstream has started to break under the pressure of a few researchers who fall into two groups: those who believe trade is an exclusive human phenomenon and those who do not.1 In this paper I shall concentrate on the former after briefly reviewing the latter, for whom some form of trade can indeed be seen as taking place among different species of animals and plants.2
is there trade among nonhuman organisms? First of all, it may be a good idea to start with a working definition for trade. My suggestion is that there are three conditions for trade; each single one is necessary and the three together are sufficient (see Noë, 2006: 226-227, for a slightly different yet equivalent list): • The ownership condition. There have to be two parties, not necessarily related to or even acquainted with each other, such that each party “owns” certain “resources” that the other does not. The words in quotation marks will be explained presently. • The mutual benefit condition. At least part of the “resource” which each party “owns” has to be coveted by the other party and vice versa, so that an exchange of “resources” would in principle benefit both parties. A “resource” can be anything which is desirable to 1 Among the former see Tullock, 1979, ch. 3; Hauser, 2000; Ofek, 2001; Chen, Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2006; Brosnan and Beran, 2009. As far as I can see, only one of the authors mentioned does not just state that trade is unique to humans but actually argues the claim. Ofek’s reasoning (2001, ch. 2) basically refers to just one aspect of exchange, viz. the particular set of organisms to which the exchanging partners belong. He distinguishes three kinds of exchange—symbiosis, kin exchange (“nepotism”) and trade (“mercantile exchange”)—and argues, first, that symbiosis is always interspecific whereas the other two never are, and secondly, that trade normally if not exclusively takes place among genetically unrelated strangers (cf. Seabright 2004). I dont think this argument really works. 2 For the sake of completeness I should mention one biologist who claims economics is highly relevant to the whole of the living world and yet manages to exclude trade—the bread and butter of economists—from his description of what economics is about (Vermeij, 2004). I must confess to being speechless in the face of this anomaly.
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someone—food, sex, grooming, protection, attachment, territory, instruction. To “own” a resource (a body part, a skill, a possession) means to be able to put up a good fight over it. Ownership amounts thus to what biologists call “resource holding potential.” • The pricing condition. For both parties, the costs of the transaction can be overcome without disrupting the benefits of the exchange. Among these costs we should include handling the loss, diminution or alteration of the “owned resource,” coping with the fear of being cheated (which might include sometimes being killed or eaten), and therefore most importantly working out an exchange rate (a “price”) which will fluctuate according to supply and demand. It is only natural that negotiations be on occasion subtle and protracted (as indeed there often are among humans as well). Apart from mating between sexually differentiated members of the same species, biologists for the past 150 years or so have documented exchanges both within a single species (food sharing, cooperation, division of labor) and across species (symbiosis, commensalism, mutualism). The main analytic tools used to explain all those exchanges are classical fitness (direct reproduction of one’s genes), inclusive fitness (more or less onerous exchanges in favor of genetic relatives and in correlation with the degree of genetic relatedness, Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocal altruism (more or less onerous exchanges with unrelated acquaintances on the basis of repeated interactions, Trivers, 1971; see also Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).3 However, a quiet revolution has been taking place for the last two decades or so which proposes to add to those recognized mechanisms the analytic apparatus devised by economists to describe and explain trade phenomena (see e.g. Noë, van Shaik and van Hooff, 1991, Noë and Hammerstein, 1994, de Waal, 1997, Bhsary and Grutter, 2001, Hoeksema and Schwartz, 2003, Kummel and Salant ,2006, Simms et al., 2006, Barrett, 3 Classical fitness can account for the operation of natural selection at the level of individuals. For a while, biologists resorted to group selection to counteract the shortcomings of classical fitness, but it was swiftly rejected on good grounds (Williams 1966), and largely replaced by the constructs of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism (Sober and Wilson, 1998). During the last decades, however, group selection has been staging a comeback. If the reader is a group selectionist, then I can rephrase my thesis by saying that trading should be seen either as one of the paths of group selection or else as an analytic complement to it.
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2009, Pollett and Nettle, 2009; for an independent perspective see Moyle, 2000). It is well known that each step away from classical fitness has encountered some measure of justified resistance on the part of biologists; we can therefore only expect a sound skepticism vis-à-vis the hypothesis that there may well be “biological markets” in which the three conditions of trade, as described above, are actually fulfilled. The champions of “biological markets” have said loud and clear that, for instance, “kin selection may conceal market effects,” thus making their identification more difficult and yet contending that reciprocal altruism models can only be applied to a restricted area, viz. where cheating plays a potential role and partner verification is an important issue (Noë, van Shaik and van Hooff: 1991, 104-105; Noë and Hammerstein, 1994: 3). The arguments pro and con have just begun, and this is not the place, and I am not the person, to pretend to give an opinion on whether this fourth mechanism will prove its mettle in the attempts to explain the evolution of organisms. The approach is certainly not without its problems.4 Nonetheless, let us accept for the sake of argument that “market effects” are real, that economic analysis of trade can be applied to the exchanges that take place within and across species and that “biological market” models deserve a place beside classical fitness, inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism models and will permanently extend the theoretical and empirical reach of the theory of evolution. The fact of the matter is that humans have developed trade in a direction which appears to be species-specific. Could it be that full-blown hu4 An example may serve to illustrate one sort of problem I have spotted. Among scorpionflies (Bittacus apicalis) there seems to be a two-good market in which insect prey is offered by males in exchange for sperm reception by females. It is said, on the one hand, that the amount of sperm transferred correlates with insect size, and on the other hand, that females reject smaller prey when the number of male suppliers increase. The latter phenomenon is then considered to clinch the case for a “biological market” (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994: 6). Yet, from a strictly economic point of view, the first fact seems to be more important, for it would indicate that an exchange rate (a price) is in place. The increase in the supply of male offerings should then have an effect on price short of rejection—it should make preys cheaper or copulation more expensive in that market. The very brief description given (reporting research published in 1976, long before any talk of “biological markets”) omits one side of the equation: in a proper market we would have a certain number of “sellers” (in this case, females offering sex) facing a certain number of “buyers” (males offering food), yet we do not hear anything about what happens when more females are available.
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man trade as we know it evolved? Could it even be the case that “biological markets” are evolutionary precursors of modern human trade? Before we can even dream of answering the second question, we have to ask the first. As far as I know, the most extended effort to do so comes from Haim Ofek, an economist from Binghamton University who has worked extensively on mainstream issues such as labor, markets, human capital and urban economics, before his solitary book on trade and human evolution attracted the attention of Nature and Science reviewers (Wills, 2002; Grafen, 2002).
the evolution of trade among humans: a model Although Ofek’s model is more complex than I can do justice to here, the following skeleton of it is hopefully not too distorting (see Ofek, 2001 for details). To use an analogy from police investigation, the model shows that our ancestors had the motive, the means and the opportunity to commit trade. First, they had the motive. Ofek starts from the hypothesized reduction in size and energy consumption of the human gut in favor of the increase of the human brain (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995). Encephalization and all its mental accompaniments (the “higher cortical functions”) were made possible by the shrinking of the gut (Ofek, 2001, ch. 5). This led in turn to the need for a complicated diet, diverse and choosy. The transition from easy-going ape to anatomically modern, gastronomically fussy humans yields a hard economic constraint with which hominids and early humans just had to live, and which they initially satisfied by a judicious combination of gathering plant carbohydrates and hunting animal protein, yet was a powerful incentive for trade. Our similarity with other primates immediately evokes the picture of individual hunters and gatherers obtaining their food and consuming it on the spot. Yet the archaeological record, at least as interpreted by Glynn Isaac (see Ofek, 2001: 131-137), shows something else: our ancestors gathered their fruits, nuts and leaves, and brought them “home” for redistribution; and the hunters did the same with their prey. Now “home” does not mean here a single kinship group—the sheer number of bones and artifacts found lying together implies a much larger group. This means that
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this redistribution is not on a par with ordinary nepotistic exchange of the sort we find when birds bring food back to the nest. This is the first sign that trade—exchange “in the company of strangers” (Seabright, 2004)— might have already started by 1.8 million years b.p. (Of course, even if trade started as early as that, the transition from its humble beginnings of isolated exchanges to full-blown trade and recognizable markets may have taken a long time, and we might never come to know the details.) Secondly, they had the means. Specialization and division of labor in the separation of hunting and gathering does not imply market exchange, yet the findings of elaborate toolmaking indicate that there was. Even Darwin, in his apparently single reference to the phenomenon of trade in his Descent of Man, responded to a contemporary archaeologist, who insisted on the ”extraordinary ability and long practice” exhibited by the extant fragments of knives, lances and arrowheads, by saying that ”each man did not manufacture his own tools or rude pottery, but certain individuals appear to have devoted themselves to such work, no doubt receiving in exchange the produce of the chase” (1871, i, ch. iv). Darwin’s bold hypothesis— his solitary if brilliant incursion into economics—is buttressed by the “large accumulations of unprocessed stones hauled from distant sources of flakeable rocks” at Olduvai (Ofek, 2001: 134-135). Finally, they had the opportunity. The aforesaid two pieces of archaeological evidence of market exchange are aptly combined by Ofek with some macroevolutionary thinking: whereas Australopithecines and even homo habilis “showed a proclivity for speciation evident in the considerable variability in size and shape,” just as is usual in all primates, from homo erectus on our ancestors tended to “a single unified human species” (Ofek, 2001: 118), in spite of its spreading all over the world. Trade might have replaced adaptive specialization, characteristic of the one human species, for the ancestral and primate option of adaptive radiation (ibid.). If this three-pronged argument is right, then we have a prima facie case for hypothesizing that trade and markets are much more ancient than anybody thought before—in fact, as old as homo habilis himself. More to the point, trade would then be crucial for the understanding of human evolution, at least as much as language, theory of mind, judgment and decision-making, symbolism, religion, mathematics, music, and the other characteristic features of our
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species evolutionists rightly fret about; trade, humble trade, would then deserve pride of place as one more piece in the puzzle of human evolution along these older and better established feats of the human brain. There is certainly still a big question derived from all this: How did trade start in the first place? And Ofek is all but naïve about this question. The last part of his book (2001, ch. 9-13) is devoted to sketching a model of the likely process. He begins by facing one difficult fact. There is a natural resistance to part with a valuable object—one of the obstacles to be overcome in order for trading to occur. (It is called “loss aversion” in the economic literature, and it seems to be common to humans and chimpanzees; see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Chen, Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2006.) Like the chess novice who is afraid of losing a piece even if he sees the sacrifice will favor him later on, those ancestral would-be traders must have been inhibited to “play the gambit” (Ofek, 2001: 142). This is the only occasion in which Ofek introduces hard economic reasoning (complete with demand curves) in order to reconstruct rationally what kind of commodity would have been most appropriate to overcome this resistance to trade. Some goods cannot be consumed by two or more people at the same time (say, a grain of popcorn), while other goods can (say, a movie). The former are called “rival” goods by economists (for the consumers are indeed rivals vis-à-vis consumption of them). Again, it is very easy to charge the individual user for the consumption of some goods (you pay for your popcorn as well as for watching the movie) and very hard if not impossible to charge consumers for the use of other goods (air today, water before piping). The former are called “excludable” goods by economists (for you can exclude nonpayers from consumption of the commodity). Without entering into too many details, the combination of excludability and nonrivalry elicits the strongest incentives for would-be traders (Ofek, 2001, ch. 9). Armed with this insight, Ofek looks for a commodity that might have kickstarted trade, and he finds fire (prior of course to ignition technology, ibid., ch. 10). In Ofek’s model the invention of prenumismatic money, and the enhancing of trade it brought forth, had to be next (ibid., ch. 11). Finally, there is the question of agriculture and pastoralism. Contrary to popular accounts and idyllic misconceptions, the replacement of deliberate, organized food production for the old strategies of gathering and hunting (around 12K years ago)
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does not lead to autarky. Given the dietary constraints of anatomically modern humans, agriculture and pastoralism do not look like promising strategies of survival unless there were already huge trade networks in place (ibid., ch. 12 and 13).
trade and other factors of human evolution This beautiful model, of which I have only given the barest skeleton here, is naturally speculative. Yet, like all good models, it yields precious clues for archaeologists and paleontologists if they are prepared to take trade seriously. Besides, the model has nothing to say about “biological markets” as possible precursors of human ones (in fact, Ofek seems to be unaware of this literature). It may be that human trade is something completely different, even a cultural artifact that either coevolved with our genes or is altogether nonbiological.5 We do not know. But my impression is that very few evolutionists are aware of the questions. Yet those questions are enormously important for the understanding of our species. For instance, it has been argued that trade and trade networks might have been responsible for the fact that our numerical feats have developed well beyond anything predictable from animal abilities (Hauser, 2000; see also Harper, 2008).6 If this hypothesis should be confirmed, then it is obvious that trade has been enormously consequential for human evolution. In a similar vein, it has been argued that language and trade did actually co-evolve, thus giving a possible answer to Adam Smith’s question (Horan, Bulte and Shogren, 2008). In this scenario, trade exerted a pressure on our faculties of consumer persuasion which accelerated language sophistication, and possibly “theory of mind” abilities. The reader may remember Humphrey’s original hypothesis (1976) that 5 Pryor (2003) compares the “economic systems” of nonhuman primates and contemporary hunter-gatherer societies, but he fails to find traces of prices and markets anywhere (p. 113). The conclusion he argues for is that ”the economic activities of humans, unlike monkeys and apes, are structured through economic institutions, which are mutable.” However, this conclusion depends on the assumption that contemporary hunter-gatherers are similar to ancestral ones, which is extremely doubtful. 6 Although not written from the point of view of evolution, there is evidence that children acquire a sophisticated handling of calculations in the context of trade (see Carraher, Carraher and Schliemann, 1991; Nunes, Schliemann and Carraher, 1993).
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we became skillful mind readers because of the intensity of family and community (proto-political) life. Perhaps we did, but trade will only have enhanced this process. Of course, Horan, Bulte and Shogren’s exercise in formal modeling is just a sophisticated kind of abductive reasoning (Peirce, 1896). As such, it does not constitute proof but allows for the precise formulation of hypotheses that paleontological ingenuity might one day put to the test. The only obvious objection to the hypothesis of “advertising rhetoric” as a linguistic propeller is the “silent trade” phenomenon, well known from anthropology (see Grierson, 1903); but I myself do not see it as unanswerable. A final example, rather closer to the economic perspective, is Ofek’s suggestion that Neanderthals may have become extinct because of comparative disadvantages vis-à-vis our ancestors (2001: 181 and 173-174 for more details). It seems indeed quite likely that trade among Neanderthals did not evolve beyond a very modest and primitive stage (Gee, 1996: 36), so it is possible to model the struggle which finally did them in, a task also recently accomplished (Horan, Bulte and Shogren, 2005). One important aspect of this hypothesis is the stark contrast between the migrating lust of anatomically modern humans to populate the whole planet and the relative geographic immobility of Neanderthals. Ofek argues that migration was, if not originally triggered by trade, at least enormously potentiated by it (2001, ch. 11). This hypothesis had by the way already been adumbrated by British ecologist Steven Cousins and his co-workers in the late 1980s in the context of trying to define an ecosystem unit (Jacobs, 1992: 124, 228; see also Cousins, 1994). If we take our cue from this hypothesis, then we can face the biggest of all facts in human history—the creation of a “commercial society” (Adam Smith) that produced empires, conquests, and finally an increase in wealth, efficiency, longevity, comfort, quality of life, and sheer population numbers far beyond the wildest dreams (Maddison, 2001, 2003; see also Seabright, 2004). If that is not considered a huge success by any measure in evolutionary terms, I do not know what could be. To take a different (but, if there is anything in Horan, Bulte and Shogren, 2008, not unrelated) topic, it is clear that when humans started to speak (and I am not venturing any hypothesis as to how this happened), they could not have dreamed that a time might come in which a language would harbor over a million words with its speakers
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creating hundreds of them each year or that a language could produce syntactical conundrums like those found in any scientific journal or in highly elaborate poetry and narrative. Yet linguists know that any language can in principle develop the phonological, morphological and syntactic techniques to create huge vocabularies and intricate phrase, sentence and discourse structures. The fact of the matter is that language—as a collective creation of human groups—has apparently become more and more complex (Sampson, Gil and Trudgill, 2009). My point is that the same can be said about human trade (although there are as yet no commonly accepted measures of complexity that would permit comparisons between language and trade). Yet, if the point is well taken, why is it that, in discussions about how humans became what we are, trade in all its glory is so little discussed in comparison with language, toolmaking, symbolism, theory of mind or intelligence? Here I can only speculate, but not idly, I hope, about two possible reasons. One is the mathematical form that economic reasoning takes. Although some biologists are perfectly used to this kind of thinking—and in fact have borrowed and further developed some of the tools economists invented—most are not (McElreath and Boyd, 2003, Gintis, ms). The second reason is that biologists and other evolutionary thinkers are academics, and academics as a group are hostile towards economic reasoning as such and besides tend to undervalue the profitable activities of commercial people, which is the immediate (although by no means the sole) object of economics. Ever since economics was finally established as a respected field of scholarship, it has waged an over two-century-old war of ideas against the seemingly unaccountable resistance of ordinary people to get from the procedural knowledge of actions pertaining to the well-being of self, kin and close associates—in which we all excel—to the declarative knowledge of the principles of economic theory—where fallacies abound (for more references see Leal, 2008: 167; cf. Coleman, 2002). This is not the place to expound this two-pronged hypothesis or to risk an account of it, so I will just conclude by saying that, if my argument in favor of trade as quite possibly a major factor in human evolution is on the right track, then the very framing of the questions and their associated hypotheses will necessarily require the use of economic theory and economic history as a relatively new component of
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the magnificent interdisciplinary effort which is slowly taking shape in evolutionary research. references Aiello, Leslie C. and Peter Wheeler, 1995, “The Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis: The Brain and the Digestive System in Human and Primate Evolution,” Current Anthropology 36, 2: 199-221. Axelrod, Robert and William D. Hamilton, 1981, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 211: 1390-1396. Barrett, Louise, 2009, “A Guide to Practical Babooning: Historical, Social, and Cognitive Contingency,” Evolutionary Anthropology 18, 3: 91-102. Bhsary, Redouan and Alexandra S. Grutter, 2002, “Experimental Evidence that Partner Choice is a Driving Force in the Payoff Distribution Among Cooperators or Mutualists: The Cleaner Fish Case,” Ecology Letters 5, 1: 130-136. Brosnan, S. F. and M. J. Beran, 2009, “Trading Behavior between Conspecifics in Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes,” Journal of Comparative Psychology 123, 2: 181-194. Carraher, Terezinha, David Carraher, and Analúcia Schliemann, 1991, En la vida diez, en la escuela cero, Mexico, Siglo XXI. Chen, M. K., V. Lakshminarayanan, and L. R. Santos, 2006, “How Basic are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy 114, 3: 517-537. Coleman, William Oliver, 2002, Economics and its Enemies: Two Centuries Of Anti-economics, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan. Cousins, Stephen H., 1994, “Hierarchy in Ecology,” in R. Haines-Young, D. R. Green, and S. H. Cousins, eds., Landscape Ecology and Geographic Information Systems, Boca Raton, crc Press, pp. 75-86, De Waal, Frans B. M., 1997, “The Chimpanzees’ Service Economy: Food for Grooming,” Evolution and Human Behavior 18, 6: 375-386. Gee, Henry, 1996, “How Humans Behaved before they Behaved Like Humans,” London Review of Books 18, 21: 36-38. Gintis, Herbert S., Mathematical Literacy for Humanists, in preparation for Princeton University Press, available at . Grafen, Alan, 2002, “Should it be Homo economicus?,” Science 296, 5571: 1243. Grierson, P. J. Hamilton, 1903, The Silent Trade: A Contribution to the Early History of Human Intercourse, Edinburgh, William Green and Sons. Hamilton, William D., 1964, “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 1: 1-52.
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