The Significance of Property Restitution to Sustainable Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina . l\'importance de la restitution des biens pour la durabilite des retours en bosnie-herzegovine. el significado de la restitucion de propiedades para elretorno sostenible en bosnia y herzegovina

The Significance of Property Restitution to Sustainable Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina Rhodri C. Williams*1

ABSTRACT The restitution of property to refugees and displaced persons (RDPs) who fled their homes during the 1992 to 1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been highly successful on its own terms. After getting off to a slow start in the immediate post-war years, this process saw the return of more than 200,000 claimed properties to their pre-war residents by mid-2004. Although property restitution has facilitated durable solutions for RDPs who have benefited from it, these durable solutions have not exclusively taken the form of voluntary and permanent return. In many cases, RDPs have chosen instead to sell, exchange, or lease their restituted homes in order to finance voluntary internal resettlement in parts of the country other than their pre-war places of residence. In all cases, however, property restitution has been crucial to the viability and sustainability of either return or resettlement, facilitating free and informed choices by RDPs regarding their future. Property restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina has often been held up as a model for other post-conflict settings characterized by mass-displacement. However, the utility of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example must be assessed in light of favourable domestic and international factors that are unlikely to be repeated in other contexts. This paper argues that these factors should not disqualify Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example, but should instead underscore the importance that lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina be incorporated early in the planning of other peace missions and implemented consistently. One of the foremost of these lessons was the efficacy of shifting the focus from the highly politicized concept of return to a more impartial “rule of law” approach, connoting an emphasis on individuals’ rights to their former homes. The unusual level of

* Independent consultant, Finland. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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resources that allowed the international community to correct its own early mistakes would not have been enough to guarantee property restitution in the absence of this successful implementation strategy.

INTRODUCTION This paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the general relationship between property restitution and sustainable return by addressing three questions related to the dynamic of this relationship in the concrete case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These questions are: (1) what was the experience of property restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2) how did this process affect sustainable return, and (3) what are the conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding observations for other comparable post-conflict and transitional settings? Treatment of these questions is preceded by a brief overview of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the outset conditions for property restitution that resulted. On its own terms, the process of “post-conflict property restitution” in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents an unprecedented success. Less than ten years after the end of the 1992 to 1995 conflict that displaced more than two million people, or half the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of their ethnicity, more than 200,000 residential properties have been returned to those who fled them. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become both a model for implementation of the emerging right to post-conflict property restitution and a source of controversy over the impact of this right on broader issues of refugee return in the context of post-war reconstruction efforts. The controversy surrounding restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina relates to two central caveats to its success, which will be addressed individually in the subsequent sections of this paper: 1. The completion of the restitution process did not lead to actual physical return of the claimants to resume life in their pre-war homes in every case. In fact, the restitution process was explicitly based on the principle of free and informed individual choice regarding whether to return to homes of origin. 2. The extent of international political commitment, resources, and actual political power available in support of peace implementation (including property restitution) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to be available in other comparable settings. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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The existence of these caveats should serve as a caution, rather than a discouragement. As set out in this paper, the failure of property restitution to restore the pre-war demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not obscure the fact that facilitating return to homes of origin was only one of several important post-conflict goals served by this process. Likewise, the fact that the international community may not have as many tools at its disposal in other settings underscores the importance of taking the lessons of Bosnia and Herzegovina into account in other settings where initial mistakes cannot be so easily corrected. A central conclusion is that no amount of international resources will achieve restitution without being accompanied by a strategic approach that strikes a responsive chord among those affected by displacement. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in many other post-conflict settings, the concept of return had become hopelessly politicized, and restitution was ultimately achieved through a rule of law-based strategy that focused on individual rights to property, connoting individual choice on whether to return.

BACKGROUND: THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND ITS AFTERMATH The 1992 to 1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place in the larger context of the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Bosnia and Herzegovina is bounded on its northern and western borders by Croatia, which seceded from the SFRY in 1991 after elections saw a resurgence of Croat nationalist politics and increasing unrest among Croatia’s large Serb minority. The eastern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina is shared with Serbia, which initiated hostilities in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, ostensibly to prevent the break-up of the SFRY and protect Serb minorities but with the apparent intent of creating a greater Serbia incorporating, through force, traditionally Serb areas in both countries (see Silber and Little, 1996). Although the plurality of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of Muslim “Bosniaks”, large Serb and Croat minorities were distributed throughout its territory. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in early 1992, with a campaign by secessionist Serb paramilitaries, supported by armed forces controlled by Serbia, which overran more than half of the country. Occupied areas were “ethnically cleansed” of Croat and Bosniak populations and declared to be a “Serb Republic” (Republika Srpska). The resulting influx of refugees from the Republika Srpska contributed to the eruption of conflict in 1993 between the previously allied Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Both sides in this conflict also engaged in ethnic cleansing, both of each other and of Serbs remaining on the territory they controlled. The Bosnian Croats enjoyed the backing © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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of Croatia, which at least tacitly envisioned the ultimate secession of areas under their control. The end of the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict came about primarily through a territorial solution that gave implicit recognition to the ethno-nationalist parties that prosecuted the war and their territorial gains. First, in 1994, the Bosniaks and Croats agreed under international pressure to form a joint “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” that came to consist of ten “Cantons”, a territorial division that effectively allowed each side to remain in charge of the areas they controlled. By 1995, the resurgent forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had pushed the Republika Srpska back to about 49 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, allowing the international community to broker a peace under which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely retained its gains and the Republika Srpska avoided further losses (see Holbrooke, 1998). In the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) signed in Paris in December 1995, the Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became the two “Entities” constituting the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP, Annex 4).2 Annex 4 to the GFAP set out a new Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution that secured the formal status of the Entities, granting them broad residual powers vis-à-vis the new and distinctly weak state apparatus. The Constitution also reinforced the post-war link between ethnicity and territory through pervasive reliance on ethnic vetoes and quotas related to political representation. On the other hand, the GFAP maintained the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and included numerous provisions which – if implemented – had the potential to subvert war-related ethnic separation through the restoration of the rights of thousands of refugees and displaced persons (RDPs).3 In particular, Annex 7 of the GFAP contained provisions guaranteeing all RDPs the “right freely to return to their homes of origin” and to “have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them” (GFAP, Annex 7, Chapter One, art. I (1)). Annex 7 also included numerous positive obligations, ranging from the general responsibility to “accept the return of … persons who have left [the parties’] territory” to specific undertakings to create “conditions suitable for return” such as repeal of discriminatory laws and prevention of incitement of ethnic hostility (GFAP, Annex 7, Chapter One, art. I (1) – (3)). Annex 7 also provided for a quasi-international “Commission for the Real Property Claims of RDPs” (CRPC) mandated to “receive and decide any claims for real property in [BiH], where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where the claimant does not now © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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enjoy possession of that property” (GFAP, Annex 7, Chapter Two). Finally, Annexes 4 and 6 of the GFAP set out strong prospective human rights obligations, accorded the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) supremacy over domestic law, and set up institutions, including a judicial body, the Human Rights Chamber, to apply these protections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taken together, these provisions had the potential to undo the results of ethnic cleansing through the collective effect of hundreds of thousands of decisions to return. However, the obstacles were formidable. The conflict had displaced approximately one million people outside the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a further one million internally, un-mixing the entire population. Ninety per cent of the Serbs who had lived on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were displaced, along with about 95 per cent of the Bosniaks and Croats originally from the territory of the Republika Srpska, leaving only about 40 per cent of the population in their pre-war places of residence (Rosand, 1998: 1100). About half of the housing stock in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been abandoned by its pre-conflict residents, with as much as one-third damaged or destroyed and the habitable balance occupied by persons who had moved in during the conflict (Hastings, 2001: 221). Moreover, the ethno-political regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina initially shared a common incentive to resist any development that appeared likely to dilute their captive mono-ethnic political constituencies of displaced persons. The Bosniaks alone, as a numerical majority in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a plurality in all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had the potential to instrumentalize return as a “political strategy for reversing the war gains of the other two parties and regaining territorial control, but through peaceful means” (Woodward, 2000). However, Bosniak support for return remained largely rhetorical, and all three groups discouraged both the departure of displaced persons of their own ethnicity and the return of persons of the other ethnicities.

THE EXPERIENCE OF PROPERTY RESTITUTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The successful post-conflict property restitution regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina began as an engine for facilitating return of refugees. The push, first for passage of laws allowing for property restitution, and then for their implementation came in the wake of two years of failure to promote widespread return through other more ad hoc means, such as mutual commitments by the entity authorities to accept set quotas of returnees. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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By 1997, there had been significant “majority return”, that is, return of RDPs to areas where people of their own ethnicity constituted the post-war majority. However, there had been insignificant “minority return” of RDPs to homes in areas where the post-war majority – including the local authorities – were of a different ethnicity. By this time, however, many of the nearly 700,000 Bosnian refugees in western European states were under increasing pressure to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the majority of these refugees fled areas where they would now be minorities, they faced repatriation into a state of internal displacement (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 73). Initial concerns regarding basic security and freedom of movement eased with the adoption of a more assertive approach by the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the imposition of common license plates that did not disclose the ethnicity of the driver (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 76-77). As a result, continued adverse occupation of the homes of RDPs came to be seen as the primary obstacle to return in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the war, the authorities in each part of Bosnia and Herzegovina promulgated laws and administrative practices allowing the property of those who had fled – overwhelmingly ethnic minorities – to be declared “abandoned” and reallocated. Although allocation of abandoned property was meant to benefit persons displaced from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it often became part of an ethnic patronage system in which highly placed persons in the local political structure received attractive properties regardless of need. Despite the obligation under Annex 7 of the GFAP to repeal discriminatory legislation, regulations on abandoned property remained in force in the postDayton period. These regulations did not include effective means for RDPs to reclaim their occupied homes and the continued presence of the persons to whom the properties had been allocated was a de facto barrier to repossession. Worse yet, ethnic cleansing accompanied by re-allocation of property continued throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina in the immediate post-war period, directly undermining the authority of the international community. As a result, both entities were pressured in 1998 into the passage of laws – eventually known as the “property laws” – that prospectively put all regulations on abandoned property out of force (Hastings, 2001: 228-230). The same laws also set out a restitution process that would allow RDPs to claim their pre-war property and have it restored to them in accordance with Annex 7 of the GFAP.4 The claims processes initially foreseen in the property laws were so vague and conditional that they were nearly unworkable. However, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a body created under Annex 10 of the GFAP to oversee civilian implementation of the peace agreement, tested its extraordinary powers © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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to impose legislation through successive amendments to the property laws in 1999, each less negotiated than the previous.5 A final sweeping set of amendments in October 1999 harmonized the claims procedures in both entities, creating a uniform administrative process heavily weighted in favour of claimants, who effectively needed only assert their pre-war rights to the property. All subsequent users were deemed “temporary occupants” and faced forcible eviction if they did not vacate voluntarily, leavened only by the provision of temporary “alternative accommodation” in the event that they had yet to repossess their own property or otherwise could not house themselves. Notably, implementation of these laws, from the initial collection of claims to their decision and enforcement through police-supported evictions was the responsibility of locally appointed officials sitting in the municipalities where the claimed property was located. The fact that this arrangement was allowed to stand, despite the fact that these officials were accountable to ethno-nationalist parties and had often been the same authorities allocating abandoned properties during the war, reflects a sober early assessment of the Annex 7 CRPC’s capacity to fulfil its envisioned mandate. Although the CRPC had performed an important function simply by receiving property claims at a time when no other remedies existed, the challenge of making centralized determinations regarding 200,000 claims for properties in about 130 post-war municipalities necessitated reliance on ex parte proceedings that were dubious from a procedural fairness perspective and did not always produce accurate results. For example, isolated cases arose in which competing claimants for the same property both received positive decisions (Human Rights Chamber, 2003). Moreover, while the authorities were bound by the GFAP to give effect to CRPC decisions, CRPC did not have an explicit enforcement mandate (GFAP, Annex 7, Chapter Two, art. XII (2)). As a result, the October 1999 imposed amendments effectively required the administrative authorities to give the same effect to submitted CRPC decisions that they would to one of their own positive decisions. Although this constituted a tacit admission that CRPC decisions were not “self-executing”, it ensured that holders of CRPC decisions would benefit along with all other claimants once the domestic claimsprocessing system began to function. Viewed as an “attempt to bypass the domestic institutions through an internationalised body”, CRPC was therefore unsuccessful (Cox and Garlick, 2003: 74). Fortunately, the domestic institutions would eventually carry the day. The focus of the international community following the October 1999 amendments shifted quickly to implementation, with the dismissal, by OHR, of 22 public officials for obstructing property restitution, and the formation of an © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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interagency working group to oversee field monitoring of the process. This working group, the “Property Law Implementation Plan”, or PLIP, consisted of OHR as well as UNHCR, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH). The PLIP structure proved useful in uniting all involved international agencies, with their disparate mandate interests in human rights, institutional reform and return issues, around a common policy approach, thereby allowing interventions at both the field and headquarters level to carry the full weight of the collective international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Implementation breakthroughs came quickly in 2000, in particular: -

the spread of “double occupancy commissions”, in which international monitors and local authorities jointly identified temporary occupants who were not entitled to alternative accommodation and whose eviction could therefore be legally expedited (Hastings, 2001: 238-239);

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the use of UNMiBH’s supervisory power over domestic police forces to ensure that forcible evictions were carried out and that violent protesters seeking to block evictions were arrested (Hastings, 2001: 239-243);

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the deployment of “public information campaigns” to inform all parties to the process of their legal rights and expectations and destabilize the perception of temporary occupants that they would be permitted to remain in abandoned homes indefinitely; and

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the publication of monthly self-reported “PLIP statistics”, including data on implementation at both the aggregate and municipal levels, which both fostered a competitive dynamic, accelerating implementation, and gave the psychological sense of a tangible end to the process.6

Perhaps inevitably, in light of the legislation-based approach chosen to address return issues, PLIP’s strategy for completing property restitution came to focus on “rule of law”, with a heavy emphasis on capacity building for domestic administrative authorities: The PLIP varies from [earlier ad hoc return strategies] by promoting the neutral application of the law across the board, rather than the notion of ‘minority return’ to rural areas. By insisting that no deviation is permitted from the strict requirements of the law, it ensures that equal standards, procedures and international pressure are applied throughout the country (PLIP, 2000, § III).

The rule of law strategy was explicitly meant to de-block return by de-politicizing it. The notion of return, as such, remained impossibly contested, with some © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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Bosniaks at one extreme asserting that displaced people should be forced to return collectively, if necessary (ONASA, 1999a), and some Serbs at the other extreme insisting that Annex 7 could be implemented through a compensation scheme in lieu of return (ONASA, 1999b). PLIP bypassed this debate by focusing on the right of each individual property claimant to an impartial adjudication and routine enforcement of their claim. However, the necessary corollary to this focus was that the beneficiaries, having repossessed their property, should exercise “a free choice whether or not to return” (PLIP, 2000, § III). This element of choice arguably contributed to the success of the restitution process just as much or more than public acceptance of the rule of law: Several years after Dayton, it had become clear to all of the major political players that restoring property rights was the essential precondition not only to return, but also to the successful resettlement of those who chose not to return. Those who were able to sell their pre-war homes recovered the means to build or buy in a new location. Even authorities opposed to return came under pressure to help their own citizens reclaim properties in other parts of the country (Cox and Garlick, 2003: 77).

Thus, while the PLIP process did not, on its own, guarantee return, it became an increasingly efficient mechanism for restoring property to those who claimed it, an indispensable precondition for return. As the process approached completion, the rule of law emphasis was strengthened, even in areas where it had been perceived as coming into conflict with earlier international policies seeking to promote return. For instance, although PLIP had long insisted that the property laws should be interpreted to require chronological processing of claims based on the date of filing, the agencies within PLIP had insisted, as a matter of policy, that certain categories of claimants be “prioritized” for repossession ahead of other claimants. The practice was justified on the grounds that the beneficiaries were either inherently likely to encourage further return by their own early presence in return areas (e.g. ethnic minority municipal counsellors and police) or depended on return as their sole attainable durable solution (e.g. residents of collective centres). The efficacy of prioritization in promoting return was never clear. However, there was growing awareness that such policies gave rise to ambiguity about the order in which processing of claims should proceed, and that this ambiguity was doing at least as much harm as good: Until now, implementation of the property laws has been largely subject to the discretion of local authorities. Decision-making has been conducted with little regard to principles of administrative fairness. Political interference, corruption and, often, pure arbitrariness have dictated which claims are processed and when…. In response, the IC has all too often focused on ad hoc interventions in individual cases. While this undoubtedly benefited individual claimants, it hurt the process by undermining the principle of chronology (PLIP, 2002c, § 3.2). © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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This realization resulted in the inclusion of an explicit requirement of chronological processing, as part of the abovementioned December 2001 amendments imposed by OHR. Two prioritization categories, minority policemen and collective centre residents, were given formal legal status as exceptions to this rule in the form of time-limited OHR decisions, and PLIP went on to embrace chronological processing, along with strict adherence to legal deadlines for enforcement of its decisions, as a matter of policy as well as law (OHR, 2002a, 2002b). At the same time, the PLIP agencies set aside their previous reluctance to specify a date for the end of the process, demanding its completion by the end of 2003 (PLIP, 2002b). This deadline was largely met with processing in a few municipalities and verification extending into 2004.

THE EFFECT OF PROPERTY RESTITUTION ON SUSTAINABLE RETURN IN BIH Any description of the relationship between property restitution and sustainable return in Bosnia and Herzegovina depends in part on how “sustainable return” is defined. In the Bosnia and Herzegovina context, return has typically been viewed as to the RDPs’ “homes of origin” as set out in Annex 7 of the GFAP. 7 From this perspective, the relationship is easy to summarize. Property restitution has been a precondition to return in thousands of cases where RDPs’ pre-war homes were habitable but adversely occupied. However, property repossession, by itself, does not inherently create the conditions for sustainable return, and thousands have opted, upon repossession, not to return to their pre-war homes. Analysis of the relationship between restitution and return in Bosnia and Herzegovina is complicated by issues with data. As discussed above, the PLIP organizations have published relatively reliable monthly statistics on restitution. Because these statistics track discrete administrative acts which have been defined in a commonly accepted manner, they can be said to be accurately representative of progress in restitution, if not beyond error (PLIP, 2002a). While separate statistics on actual return are kept by UNHCR in Bosnia,8 the latter must be read in light of inherent difficulties in defining return in individual cases. Under different circumstances, RDPs have re-registered their residence in pre-war municipalities without actually returning to live there, or returned without reregistering. In other cases, parts of families may return to test the waters while their relatives remain behind indefinitely in their municipality of displacement. A final caveat is that the restitution and return statistics have not been formally linked, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the results, in terms of return, of individual instances of restitution. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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Nevertheless, available statistics on restitution and return may be illustrative of general trends. According to UNHCR statistics, for instance, nearly one million people were registered as having returned to live in their pre-war homes as of June 2004, the time when the restitution process could be said to be largely completed. However, less than half of these (444,000) were “minority returns”. As these numbers include some who did not have to claim their property, 9 it is safe to assume that the number of returns, and particularly minority returns, would have been considerably higher – in light of the total figure of about 2.2 million people displaced in the 1992 to 1995 conflict – if each of the more than 200,000 families (comprising approximately 800,000 people) that have had their property returned to them to date had actually returned to live in these properties. Anecdotal evidence indicates that return to homes of origin is a phenomenon that is subject to extremely high regional and even local variation. Significant return movements to areas heavily ethnically cleansed during the war such as Prijedor, Drvar, Zvornik, and Bratunac, combined with disappointing levels of return to ostensibly welcoming places such as Sarajevo have left observers puzzled as to whether the glass should be seen as “half-empty or halffull” (Judah, 2004). Given that there is little disagreement that property restitution is an all-important first step to return, the key question appears to be whether the international community could have done more to foster return than it has. Commenting on the Balkans region in its 2004 World Report, Human Rights Watch asserted that the “true measure of effectiveness of return policies pursued by national authorities and the international community…is the extent to which minorities have been able to return” and that robust international policies had come too late, allowing nationalist officials to outwait minority return: By the time the authorities, under pressure from the international community or with its direct involvement, finally began to improve the security and housing situation for returnees, the willingness to return had faltered. Having spent months and years living elsewhere, the refugees and displaced persons had already become acclimated to their new environment. At the same time, return to the place of pre-war residence promised discrimination in employment, education, and law enforcement. Given a choice between local integration and return under such conditions, many opted for the former (Ivanisevic, 2004).

On the other hand, the OHR has, by its own count, exercised its extraordinary powers well over 100 times in aid of refugee return, including unprecedented sweeping legislative amendments and mass-firing of public officials in aid of property restitution in 1999.10 The OHR has come under intense criticism for overriding democratic processes so freely, even in this core mandate area, and it is not clear that such powers will, in any case, be so readily available to future © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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international administrators in comparable peace implementation settings (Chandler, 2004). A question also remains as to whether the international community should have gone further in pursuing return issues beyond property restitution. The outlines of the international “exit strategy” from return issues is now clear – the remaining PLIP agencies (OHR, UNHCR, and OSCE) will act as guarantors of the integrity of the property restitution process through rigorous certification of each municipality’s “substantial completion” of the process (PLIP, 2003a, 2004), but have formally handed over responsibility for all other return issues to the domestic authorities: The OHR’s Reconstruction and Return Task Force will close on the last day of 2003, when the relevant BiH institutions will formally assume responsibility for the return process. Property Law implementation is nearing completion, almost one million people have returned to their homes, and the BiH institutions have expressed a clear desire to take the lead in maintaining and then completing the return process. As part of the ongoing process of handing back responsibility for key state functions to BiH institutions, the International Community will primarily assist and monitor the newly empowered domestic authorities with Annexe-Seven [sic] implementation as of next year (OHR, 2003a).

While PLIP is at pains to acknowledge that the completion of property restitution does not release Bosnia and Herzegovina from its broader obligations under Annex 7 of the GFAP (PLIP, 2003b), it is clear that, for better or for worse, the international community will no longer systematically intervene to guarantee their observance. In the past, international peace implementation policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina has tended toward a bias in favour of actual return of refugees over resettlement, in order to counteract the efforts of nationalist domestic authorities to maintain the ethnic status quo in territories they control. However, both international and domestic observers remain sceptical as to whether the international community has succeeded in assuring the conditions, once property repossession is achieved, for fully free choices to be made regarding return to the home of origin: Although debates within the international community regarding the merits of promoting minority returns versus majority relocation have been essentially resolved by emphasizing the centrality of choice, work also remains to be done to promote Bosnian social, economic, and political parameters that would facilitate realization of this right in practice (Cousens and Cater , 2001: 83).

If the inquiry is reframed as the relationship between property restitution and sustainable repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, as opposed to © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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sustainable return to the specific home of origin, property restitution takes on a different significance. In this case, the use of recovered property either as a home or an asset contributes to a durable solution – whether return to the home of origin or internal resettlement – for refugees (as, indeed, for IDPs). For many families, pre-war homes remained the only asset that was practically recoverable after the conflict. The significance of this was not lost on the international community, which described property restitution as “essential to the creation of durable solutions for refugees and displaced persons,” whether through “actual return to the property or sale of the property in order to finance one’s own local integration elsewhere, through purchase or rental of a home that does not belong to someone else” (PLIP, 2002c: 1-2). However, it is important to bear in mind that property restitution is not a panacea in terms of creating durable solutions. A significant number of people without any cognizable pre-war property claims have been forced to vacate property occupied during the conflict and have little prospect of being able to house themselves (OHR, 2003b). This category could include up to 9,000 families that missed controversial deadlines to claim socially owned apartments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dnevni Avaz, 2004). In addition, although there has been considerable donor-funded reconstruction of war-damaged and destroyed housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has been strongly targeted to beneficiaries willing to commit to return, as ethnic minorities, to live in their pre-war homes (Cox and Garlick, 2003: 77-79). As a result, large categories of RDPs, and particularly those with destroyed homes in areas now controlled by their own ethnic group, have been excluded from reconstruction programmes (Global IDP Project, 2004: 5). Finally, even in the best case scenario, recovery of a habitable (and marketable) home provides economic support to returnees and repatriates without necessarily addressing broader issues raised by the recent emphasis on repatriation of refugees as a durable solution, such as issues of voluntariness and attachments formed to countries of asylum (Chimni, 1999). A final consideration in examining the relationship between property restitution and sustainable return is the fact that both matters arguably represent emerging human rights requirements on post-conflict states. The “right to return” itself is now increasingly understood to obligate states to permit individuals and groups displaced in conflicts to return not only to their country, but their actual home of origin. Property repossession is seen as a crucial element in achieving the preconditions for the exercise of this right, an understanding confirmed in the terms of numerous recent peace settlements as well as by the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, appointed to examine “housing and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and displaced persons.” In an initial working paper, Mr. Pinheiro described property restitution © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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as a “necessary component of the implementation of the right to return to one’s home” (UN, 2002, para. 29). A parallel rationale for post-conflict property restitution derives from the necessity of providing adequate remedies to the victims of human rights violations. In a series of recent studies, the UN Commission on Human Rights has recommended restitution as one of a number of remedies applicable in cases of severe and widespread violations of human rights, including arbitrary interference with the home and property (UN, 2000). The UN Rapporteur on property restitution has accordingly noted that “restitution as a remedy for actual or de facto forced evictions resulting from forced displacement is itself a free-standing, autonomous right” (UN, 2002, para. 32). This dual human rights rationale for property restitution is reflected as well in the GFAP in BiH, where property restitution has been both the central element in securing the right of return under Annex 7 and a required remedy for ongoing wartime human rights violations found by the human rights bodies set up under Annex 6 (see Engelbrecht, 2003). Thus, to the extent that compliance with human rights norms – and the broader goals of accountability and redress that they ultimately serve – can be seen as a component of sustainable return, property restitution plays a significant role.

THE VALUE OF PROPERTY RESTITUTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A MODEL The peace implementation environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be described as atypical in a number of respects. Taken together, these factors raise serious issues regarding the value of practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in the area of property restitution, as a model for other post-conflict settings. -

The resources available for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unusually generous, with the total international intervention valued at up to $19 billion (The Economist, 2003). This has led observers to conclude that return programming of the intensity seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina “has been possible only because of the scale of international commitment to the Bosnian peace process, involving seven years of foreign military engagement, civilian police monitors and a US$5.1 billion reconstruction programme” (Cox and Garlick, 2003: 66).

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The extraordinary powers of the High Representative to effectively rule by decree have been a crucial component of return programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the exercise of these powers has led © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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to a sharp debate regarding their effect on long-term democratization and domestic accountability (Chandler, 2004; Knaus and Martin, 2003). In any case, it is neither clear that international administrators in other contexts will have recourse to such sweeping powers, nor that the domestic authorities in other contexts will accept the exercise of such power as deferentially as they have to date in Bosnia and Herzegovina. -

The proximity of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Europe is also a distinguishing factor. On one hand, this factor may in part explain the resource intensive international reconstruction effort, given the demonstrated threat that instability in the region will produce refugee flows to western Europe. On the other hand the real possibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to European and Atlantic institutions such as Council of Europe, Partnership for Peace, and the European Union have provided a positive incentive to undertake difficult reforms.

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Although restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina was complicated by the persistence of socialist tenure forms and weak registration and adjudication regimes, the pre-war distribution of property was relatively equitable and largely uncontested. As a result, the parameters for Bosnia’s restitution programme were clearer than those in places such as Afghanistan or East Timor, where successive waves of dispossession have resulted in multiple competing claims and complicated consensus around a fair starting date for restitution (Hurwitz et al., 2005: 9).

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Finally, the lack of a clear “winner” in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina creates a different dynamic than that which exists in the wake of ethnic conflicts where the issue was effectively resolved by force and the losing side largely displaced (Croatia and Kosovo, for example). Because all three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been forced to interact on the basis of de facto as well as de jure political equality, there have been shared incentives to facilitate programmes such as property restitution.

Nevertheless, the central lesson that might be drawn from the Bosnia and Herzegovina experience is that property rights, particularly as related to return, should be addressed early, systematically, and from a rule of law perspective. Fitzpatrick has suggested that systematic attention to transitional property administration should be a component of future UN temporary administrations, in accordance with current re-thinking of UN peace-building missions. He notes both the opportunity that coherent land policy presents to assist “both in recovering from conflict, and ensuring that further conflict does not follow”, and the risk © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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that “unless the immediate issues…are handled well, resolution of more longterm issues relating to property restitution and land administration in general will be greatly complicated” (Fitzpatrick, 2002: 3-4). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, early international engagement with return and restitution issues enjoyed considerable political support and resources but suffered from the lack of a strategic vision. Ultimately, the decision to concentrate on rule of law – impartial realization of individual rights framed in legislation – allowed unconstructive domestic debates about the nature of “return” as such to be bypassed, freeing up the process. Although this approach was largely imposed by the international community, it struck a sufficiently powerful chord with the thousands of dispossessed property claimants to be able to overcome significant domestic political opposition. Moreover, despite early delays, arrival at a rule of law strategy came early enough to pre-empt complications in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the type referred to by Fitzpatrick. For instance, restitution of a critical segment of the urban housing market, so-called “socially owned apartments,” was greatly facilitated by the fact that passage and implementation of the restitution laws came prior to entry into force of domestic laws permitting the privatization of this category of apartments. In other words, the situation was arrested before wartime temporary occupants could acquire arguably bona fide ownership rights to such apartments. However, it follows that in situations where international administrators will not have the power to intervene at will in the legislative process, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attention to property issues should begin in the earliest planning stages of interim peace-building administrations. In terms of property restitution, the applicable norms and their concrete implications should be set out as clearly as possible a priori in order to avoid the political difficulties and legal uncertainty that could arise from later attempts to address predictable problems. The continuing crisis surrounding property rights in northern Iraq provides an example of the risks of failing to plan for such matters in the design of transitional administrations. As reported by the New York Times, the lack of a clear policy has led to a potentially dangerous vacuum of authority in areas experiencing Kurdish return: Some people said American officials waited too long – more than a year – to set up a mechanism to resettle displaced Iraqis. By then, they said, the Kurds grew tired of waiting and took matters into their own hands. Peter W. Galbraith, a former United States ambassador, who has advised the Kurdish leadership, said he recommended a claim system for Kurds and Arabs to Pentagon officials in late 2002. Nothing was put in place on the ground until last month, he said, long after the Kurds began to move south of the Green Line. “The C.P.A. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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adopted a sensible idea, but it required rapid implementation,” Mr. Galbraith said. “They dropped the ball, and facts were created on the ground. Of course people are going to start moving. If the political parties are encouraging this, that, too, is understandable” (Filkins, 2004).

A related point is the need to ensure coherent international input into property and return issues, with engagement premised on a long-term strategy and sound institutional arrangements. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the PLIP structure facilitated unified international policy and consistent focus on property issues over the course of four years of monitoring and intervention, playing a substantial role in the completion of the restitution process. Lynn Hastings, who participated in the founding of PLIP, asserts that these factors were crucial: I suggest several reasons for the success of the implementation of the property legislation [in Bosnia and Herzegovina …primarily the international community’s more unified and interventionist approach – and the lessons the international community should learn from that success – namely, that property return…in a post-conflict area cannot be resolved in one or two years. States and organizations that wish to become involved in post-conflict reparations must be prepared to commit considerable time and resources until the complex task is finished or until it is apparent that their efforts will not prevail (Hastings, 2001: 223).

Few future international missions are likely to enjoy either the open-ended resources or broad political powers available to the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the restitution process there. However, the lesson of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be that restitution is impossible in the absence of such resources. As witnessed by the ineffectiveness of the CRPC, attempts to leverage international power to bypass domestic authorities in pursuit of return and restitution did not fare well. Arguably, the most effective exercises of international power – those in support of the PLIP monitoring structure – mobilized domestic support for restitution through a course correction from early, ad hoc return efforts to a rule of law-based strategy. In future peace missions, appropriate, rights-based restitution strategies should be adopted early and given consistent support with such resources and powers are available to the international community.

CONCLUSION Property restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been highly successful on its own terms, and has facilitated durable solutions for RDPs who have benefited from it. In many cases, such durable solutions took the form of voluntary © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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return to restituted homes; however, in other cases such homes were sold, exchanged, or leased in order to facilitate voluntary internal resettlement. Thus, although restitution did not lead to return in every case, it did represent an important first step in allowing RDPs a free and informed choice regarding return or resettlement. In this sense, the most principled debates in the wake of restitution have revolved around the issue of whether the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina did enough, beyond facilitating restitution, to make both return and resettlement truly viable options. The importance of taking into account lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina is underscored by the fact that neither the domestic political factors nor the level of international resources that facilitated restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina will necessarily be present in future post-conflict settings. As a result, if restitution is to succeed in other settings, it will need to be incorporated early, strategically, and integrally into future peace-building missions.

NOTES 1. This paper was prepared for and presented at a conference entitled “The sustainability of ‘voluntary assisted return’: the experience of the Balkans”, held by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty of the University of Sussex, in Tirana, Albania on 14 September 2004. The author is an independent consultant and member of the New York State Bar who has worked in the field of international human rights and refugee law. He has spent five years working in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Legal Department of the Office of the High Representative and the Human Rights Department of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2. The GFAP, also known as the “Dayton Accords” or “Dayton Peace Agreement”, was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It consists of an international treaty binding on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbouring states, and 11 annexes that set out the constitutional structure of the post-war state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as specific obligations binding on all Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, in areas such as human rights, elections, and refugee return. 3. The terminology “refugees and displaced persons” (RDPs) appears to have been intended to encompass forms of displacement beyond traditional refugees displaced outside Bosnia and Herzegovina and internally displaced persons. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many people were displaced from their homes but remained in their municipalities of origin throughout and after the conflict. In any case, this terminology is adopted in this paper as the parlance used in the GFAP. 4. The consolidated texts of the Bosnia and Herzegovina laws providing for postconflict property restitution, as amended to date, are available at http://www. legislationline.org by following the link for “property rights and restitution”. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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5. Despite having a fairly modest coordination mandate under the explicit terms of Annex 10, the High Representative was attributed powers to provisionally legislate and dismiss public officials as necessary to implement the GFAP by its governing intergovernmental body, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), in 1997. 6. Monthly updated statistics on the restitution of property throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina from late-2000 until the present are available at www.ohr.int/ plip. 7. This provision of the GFAP has been an important source of support for broader assertions that the right of return should be understood as permitting resumption of life in one’s place of origin or habitual residence, rather than simply repatriation to the frontiers of one’s country of origin, making it relevant to internally displaced persons as well as returning refugees. 8. Updated return statistics are available http://www.unhcr.ba/return/index.htm. 9. For instance, when homes were damaged or destroyed, and were therefore not adversely occupied, it was typically possible to simply repossess such properties without the formality of a claim. 10. OHR decisions related to return issues are available at http://www.ohr.int/ decisions/archive.asp. Of direct relevance are “Decisions in the field of property laws, return of displaced persons and refugees and reconciliation (94 decisions) as well as “Removals and suspensions from office” (numerous decisions based on obstruction of return).

REFERENCES Chandler, D. 2004 “Imposing the ‘rule of law’: the lessons of BiH for peacebuilding in Iraq”, International Peacekeeping , 11(2). Chimni, B.S. 1999 “From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: towards a critical history of durable solutions to refugee problems”, UNHCR Working Paper no. 2. Cousens, E.M., and C. Cater 2001 “Toward peace in Bosnia: implementing the Dayton Accords”, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Cox, M., and M. Garlick 2003 “Musical chairs: property repossession and return strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in S. Leckie (Ed.), Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights for Refugees and Displaced Persons , Transnational Publishers, New York. Dnevni Avaz 2004 “Prodavat æe se stanovi za koje nije podnesen zahtjev za povrat”, Dnevni Avaz. Economist, The 2003 “Almost like one country”, The Economist. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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Engelbrecht, W. 2003 “Property rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the contribution of the human Rights ombudsperson and the human rights chamber towards their protection”, in S. Leckie (Ed.), Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights for Refugees and Displaced Persons , Transnational Publishers, New York. Filkins, D. 2004 “Kurds advancing to reclaim land in northern Iraq”, New York Times. Fitzpatrick, D. 2002 “Land policy in post-conflict circumstances: some lessons from East Timor”, UNHCR Working Paper no. 58. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina (GFAP) 1995 75 I.L.M. 138, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380. Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council 2004 “Bosnia and Herzegovina: 330,000 people still displaced eight years after the peace agreement”, Global IDP Project. Hastings, L. 2001 “Implementation of the property legislation in Bosnia Herzegovina”, Stanford Journal of International Law, 37: 221. Holbrooke, R. 1998 To End a War, Random House, New York. Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 Radija Volic against the Federation of BiH, Case No. CH/01/7664, Decision on Admissibility. Hurwitz, A., et al. 2005 “Housing, land, property and conflict management: identifying policy options for rule of law programming”, International Peace Academy Policy Report. Ivanisevic, B. 2004 “Legacy of war: minority return in the Balkans”, Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, http://hrw.org/wr2k4/. Judah, T. 2004 “Half-empty or half-full towns?”, Transitions OnLine . Knaus, G., and F. Martin, F. 2003 “Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: the travails of the European Raj”, Journal of Democracy, 14(3). Office of the High Representative (OHR) 2002a Decision on the use of collective/transit centre space in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote the phased and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp? content_id=27620. 2002b Decision prioritising, as an exception to the chronological order rule, the repossession of property by returning police officers, http://www.ohr.int/ decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id=7607. 2003a “BiH institutions assume responsibility for return process”, Press Release, http://www.ohr.int/ohr -dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_ id=31466. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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“OHR, OSCE and UNHCR remind local authorities of the need to plan for social welfare housing”, Press Release, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/ presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29540.

ONASA 1999a “Serb refugee association demands compensations for those not willing for the return”, ONASA, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1999b “Kosovo model for refugee return should be implemented in BiH; Silajdzic”, ONASA, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 2000 Inter-agency framework document, http://www.ohr .int/plip/key-doc/ default.asp?content_id=5510. 2004 “Banja Luka and Donji Vakuf last municipalities in Bosnia to complete property repossesion”, Press Release, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/ pressr/default.asp?content_id=33024. 2002a Statistics Guidelines, http://www.ohr.int/plip/key-doc/default.asp?content _ id=30053. 2002b “A new strategic direction in PLIP: IC principals demand an end to selective implementation of the property laws”, Press Release, http://www.ohr. int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=27893. 2002c “A new strategic direction: proposed ways ahead for property law implementation in a time of decreasing IC resources, http://www.ohr.int/plip/ key-doc/default.asp?content_id=27904. 2003a Municipal Guidelines for Substantial Completion of Property Law Implementation, http://www.ohr.int/plip/key-doc/default.asp?content_id= 29969. 2003b “Property law implementation is just one element of Annex VII”, Press Release, http://www.ohr.int/ohr -dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_ id=29347. Rosand, E. 1998 “The right to return under international law following mass dislocation: the Bosnia precedent”, Michigan Journal of International Law , 19: 1091. Silber, L., and A. Little 1996 Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin, New York. United Nations (UN) 2000 “The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms: final report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 2000/62. 2002 “The return of refugees’ or displaced persons’ property”, Working paper submitted by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro pursuant to Sub-commission decision 2001/122, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/17. Woodward, S. 2000 “Labours of Sisyphus? A framework for considering the return of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the coming period”, Framework paper prepared for the Strategies for the Future of BosniaHerzegovina and Croatia: A Working Conference to Review Returns Five Years after Dayton, 10-11 November. © 2006 The Author Journal Compilation © 2006 IOM

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L’IMPORTANCE DE LA RESTITUTION DES BIENS POUR LA DURABILITÉ DES RETOURS EN BOSNIE-HERZÉGOVINE La restitution des biens aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées (RPD) ayant fui leurs foyers durant le conflit qui a sévi en Bosnie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1995 a été un vrai succès. Après un démarrage lent au lendemain immédiat de la guerre, ce processus avait permis la restitution, à la mi-2004, de plus de 200.000 propriétés à leurs occupants d’avant la guerre. Si la restitution des propriétés a apporté une solution durable aux RPD qui en ont bénéficié, cette solution durable n’a pas exclusivement pris la forme d’un retour volontaire et définitif. Dans de nombreux cas, les RPD ont plutôt choisi de rendre, d’échanger ou de mettre en location leurs logements restitués afin de financer une réinstallation volontaire dans d’autres régions du pays. Dans tous les cas, cependant, la restitution des propriétés a été cruciale pour la viabilité et la durabilité soit du retour soit de la réinstallation, facilitant des choix libres et en connaissance de cause de la part des RPD quant à leur avenir. La restitution des propriétés en Bosnie-Herzégovine a souvent été donnée en exemple pour d’autres contextes d’après-guerre caractérisés par des déplacements massifs. Cependant, l’utilité de la BosnieHerzégovine comme exemple doit être évaluée à la lumière des facteurs internes et internationaux favorables qui ont peu de chance de se produire dans d’autres contextes. L’auteur considère que ces facteurs ne doivent cependant pas disqualifier la Bosnie-Herzégovine en tant que modèle à suivre, mais qu’il faut plutôt souligner l’importance des enseignements tirés dans cette partie du monde pour les incorporer à un stade avancé dans la planification des autres missions de paix et faire en sorte qu’ils soient appliqués de manière cohérente. L’une des principales leçons à tirer en l’occurrence a été l’efficacité avec laquelle le concept hautement politisé du retour a opéré un glissement vers une approche plus impartiale favorisant la “primauté du droit”, en ce sens qu’un accent particulier a été mis sur le droit des personnes à reprendre possession de leurs anciens logements. Le niveau de ressources inhabituel ayant permis à la communauté internationale de corriger ses propres fautes initiales n’aurait pas suffi pour garantir la restitution des biens en l’absence de cette stratégie positive de mise en œuvre.

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EL SIGNIFICADO DE LA RESTITUCIÓN DE PROPIEDADES PARA EL RETORNO SOSTENIBLE EN BOSNIA Y HERZEGOVINA La restitución de propiedades de refugiados y desplazados que tuvieron que abandonar sus hogares durante el conflicto de Bosnia y Herzegovina entre 1992 y 1995, ha tenido mucho éxito de acuerdo con lo estipulado en su propio mandato. Tras un inicio sumamente lento en los primeros años de posguerra, a mediados de 2004 el proceso dio lugar a la restitución, de más de 200.000 bienes reclamados por sus residentes de antes de la guerra. Si bien la restitución de bienes ha facilitado soluciones duraderas para los refugiados y desplazados que se han beneficiado de la misma, estas soluciones duraderas no se han traducido exclusivamente en un retorno voluntario y permanente. En muchos casos, los refugiados y desplazados han decidido vender, intercambiar o alquilar las propiedades restituidas a fin de financiar su reasentamiento interno voluntario en otras partes del país, distintas de aquéllas donde residían antes de la guerra. En cualquier caso, la restitución de propiedades ha sido fundamental a la viabilidad y sostenimiento del retorno o reasentamiento, facilitando así las opciones libres e informadas de los refugiados y desplazados con relación a su futuro. La restitución de bienes en Bosnia y Herzegovina se considera como un modelo para otros entornos posconflicto caracterizados por desplazamientos masivos. Ahora bien, la utilidad de Bosnia y Herzegovina como ejemplo debe evaluarse a la luz de factores nacionales e internacionales favorables que probablemente no se den en otros contextos. Este estudio arguye que estos factores no descalifican a Bosnia y Herzegovina como ejemplo pero deben poner de relieve la importancia de las enseñanzas extraídas de la experiencia de Bosnia y Herzegovina en la planificación temprana de otras misiones de paz y llevarse a cabo de manera consecuente. Otra de las principales lecciones fue la eficacia de transferir el centro de atención del concepto altamente politizado del retorno a una perspectiva más imparcial de imperio de ley, que hizo hincapié en los derechos individuales de cara a sus ex hogares. El nivel inusual de recursos que permitió que la comunidad internacional corrigiese sus propios errores anteriores, y no habrían sido suficientes para garantizar la restitución de propiedades si no hubiera habido una estrategia acertada de puesta en práctica.

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