Strategy debates of German political parties, June 2016

Strategy debates within German political parties, 2016 LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights “same-sex marriage, “gender equality“, “patchwork family“

Liberal lifeworld Green lifeworld

“digital civil rights” “wealth tax”

B90/ Grüne

“welcoming culture “

“green growth”

„degrowth“ “pensions” “tax justice” “end of austerity”

LEFT material axis

Linke Left lifeworld

“alien workers“ „Euro exit”

“center-focused people‘s party”

Social-Democratic lifeworld

cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

SPD

FDP

“veggie day”, “safe countries of origin” “TTIP /CETA“

CDU

RIGHT Neoliberal “balanced budget“ „market-driven democracy”

lifeworld of the Christian Union

“minimum pension”

Justice of merit, market freedom

Liefworld of the AFD

“radical and fundamental”

CSU

AfD “close the borders” “ End EU-Slavery ”

“Boateng”

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state © Marc Saxer, FES

Strategy debates of German political parties, 2016 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis June 2016. https://www.fes.de/de/strategy-debates-global/strategy-debates-germany/ In the run-up to the 2017 German federal elections, intense internal debates over positioning have begun within the political parties. Party strategists have to take into account a vast array of contradictory factors: What will be the political mood in September 2017? What issues will dominate the political agenda? On which policy fields will voters attribute competency to the party and its figure-heads? What do the base, the wings, the core constituencies want? Which potential coalition seems most promising to credibly claim a shot at forming the next government? None of these questions are new to campaigners. What did change over time is the way political parties seek to tackle these challenges. In the more homogeneous German post-war society, mobilization of core constituencies was what decided elections. Accordingly, political parties aimed to mobilize their core constituencies with elaborate party and grassroots organizations. Today, deindustrialization has effectively eroded many of these socio-cultural milieus, provoking considerable voter fluctuations between the political camps. The workers and “the common man” for example, formerly core constituencies of the Social Democrat Party (SPD), are now overwhelmingly voting for conservative or right wing populist parties. Conversely, civil servants and public employees, a formerly conservative constituency, are voting for social democrats today. While voter turnout is falling year after year, the number of swing voters has gone up sharply. Political parties reacted to this trend by focusing less on core constituency mobilization, but by concentrating on winning over the swing voters at the center (“Neue Mitte”).

In the previous elections in 2012, the Christian Democrats (CDU) even successfully fielded a demobilization campaign, securing a comfortable win by asymmetrically mobilizing its core constituencies together win swing voters at the center. Instead of grassroots organizations, focus groups and opinion polls became the instruments of choice. However, the massive disruptions of the electoral landscapes in the United States (Trump and Sanders insurgencies) and Europe (rise of right-wing populist parties) have shown the limitations of such electoral engineering. What may look like a clever tactical move can easily be perceived as a lack of authenticity. In the worst case scenario, the party may lose both core constituencies, experience factional fights, or even split. Despite all the talk of „the end of ideologies“, parties cannot position themselves arbitrarily on the political map. Their own historical path, and even more importantly the socio-cultural life world of their supporters matter. These life worlds should not be understood as socio-economic classes, but as discourse communities who share central promises and historical experiences, myths, worldviews and values. These discourse communities are not static, but change over time. However, compared to the sometimes abrupt positional changes of party leaderships, discourse communities change their positions with the slow pace of generational changes. Hence, if for tactical reasons a political party positions itself outside the lifeworld of its supporters, weak voter turnout and internal quarrels are the likely consequences. The slides represent three dimensions. First, the official party line as defined by party conventions, programmatic platforms, and leadership committees. Second, the lifeworld of core constituencies, which are defined by the discourses and values predominant in social milieus. And finally the tactical debates between wings, factions and party leaders. The slides are informed by the interdependencies between these three dimensions, and aim to visualize the distortions which may arise between the highly stable lifeworlds and the highly dynamic tactical maneuvers of leaders and strategists. This tool aims at facilitating strategic debates. The exact party positions are based on my perceptions, and of course up for debate.

The strategic situation of the Left Party (Die Linke) LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights

B90/ Grüne “welcoming culture”

FDP

PDS 1990

SPD

LEFT

RIGHT Justice of merit, market freedom

material axis

Linke

CDU lifeworld of the Left

cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

“alien workers“ „Euro exit”

CSU

AfD

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

In Eastern Germany, the Left Party (Die Linke) has to compete against the right wing populist „Alternative for Germany“ (AfD). Against this background, the provocations of Sahra Wagenknecht (co-leader of the parliamentary group) and Oskar Lafontaine (former party chairman) – evoking a German exit from the Euro, use of the term „Fremdarbeiter“ (a controversial term for forced labor), insinuations that refugees may lose their „right to hospitality“ as opposed to the “Right to Asylum” – may be interpreted as attempts to position the party deeper within the cultural lifeworld of their supporters. With their movement from the left-libertarian quadrant to the nationalist pol, Die Linke is in tune with a wider European trend on the left to retreat into the shell of the nation-state to fend off the global capitalist onslaught on the welfare system. These positions, however, neither have a majority on the party leadership nor the Parliamentary group. Officially, Die Linke is promoting a culture of openness for refugees. With these quarrels between the different wings, it remains unclear if the party will come together to endorse a coalition with the Social Democrats and the Greens, or prefers to continue its course of fundamental opposition.

The strategic situation of the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights

B90/ Grüne

“radical and fundamental”

“pensions” “tax justice” “end of austerity”

SPD

LEFT social-liberal SPD 1980

Linke

FDP RIGHT material axis

Social-Democratic lifeworld

Justice of merit, market freedom

CDU

cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

Third Way/ New Labour, 2004 “TTIP /CETA”

CSU

AfD

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

The Social Democrats (SPD) have moved from the left to the right camp and back over the course of the last decade. With their „Third Way“ positions, the party seemed out of touch with the socio-cultural lifeworld of its supporters. Historical defeats in 2009 and 2013 were the consequence. In the „Grand Coalition“ government (with the center right CDU/CSU), the SPD has inched towards to the left (legislating minimum wages, rent control, promoting retirement reform, end of austerity) and the libertarian pole (gay marriage, gender quota, equal pay). At the same time, the flip-flopping on trade policy (TTIP, CETA) and the energy transition, as well as the support for austerity in the euro crisis shows that positions right of the center are still being promoted. Openness for dialogue with right-wing protesters, legislation on data retention, and a proposal to let criminal migrants serve their time in “prisons in their home-countries” point towards the authoritarian pole. All things considered, the SPD has moved closer to the lifeworld of its supporters. In the run-up to the next elections, different camps struggle over the right position on the electoral map. Many still believe that elections are won at the center (“Neue Mitte”). Putting retirement reform as well as a progressive tax reform on the agenda, on the other hand, would signal a position further on the left on the material axis, a move aimed at stealing the thunder from the culture warriors of the right-wing AfD. On the cultural axis, the SPD seeks to defend the “modern society” against the reactionary backlash from nationalist and chauvinist forces. The party chairman even floated a “radical and fundamental” repositioning, in an attempt to energize frustrated progressive supporters with the outlook of a coalition with the Left and Green parties. A recent party convention endorsed this “solidarity project” aimed at the “right wing splitters” as “Politics for the solidary center”. The usual demarcation rituals, i.e. over EU and NATO policy, show that a left alliance is far from being universally accepted in all three parties. There is still no consensus, however, if and how far the SPD should distance itself from its own actions while in government, without risking falling into a credibility trap.

The strategic situation of the Green Party (B90/Grüne) LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights

Grüne 1980

“same-sex marriage, “gender equality”, “patchworkfamily”

Green lifeworld

B90/ Grüne

“wealth tax”

“green growth”

“degrowth”

FDP SPD

LEFT

RIGHT material axis

Linke

Justice of merit, market freedom

CDU cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

“veggie day”, “safe countries of origin”

CSU

AfD

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

The long march through the institutions (the defiant call for a cultural revolution promoted by the students in 1968 after their defeat) finds its mirror image in the movement of the Green Party (B90/ Die Grünen) from the leftist-libertarian to the bourgeois camp. Its driving forces are both the business-friendly advocates of “green growth”, as well as the “guardians of virtues” who are being accused of building an “eco dictatorship” with all their “veggie days”, smoking bans and speed limits.

Green libertarians, on the other hand, are ready to (re-)fight the culture wars declared by the right-wing populist “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) and struggle to defend gay marriage, gender justice and the patchwork family ideal. The most prominent internal struggle seems to run alongside the material axis between advocates of “green growth” and “de-growth”. Accordingly, positions clash over the question of wealth taxes. The Greens are also divided over their coalition preference, with some advocating for a “red-red-green” coalition with the Left and the Social Democrats, others for a ‘black-green’ coalition with the Christian Union (CDU/CSU).

The strategic situation of the Christian Union LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights

B90/ Grüne “welcoming culture”

FDP SPD

LEFT

RIGHT

material axis

“center-focused people‘s party” „balanced budget“ „market-driven democracy”

Linke

Justice of merit, market freedom

CDU cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

Leipzig Party Convention 2003

Kohl‘s CDU

“minimum pension”

lifeworld of the christian union

CSU “close the borders”

AfD

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

The Christin Union (CDU/CSU) traditionally combines the globalist-liberal and the national-social currents of conservatism. Internal struggles over the so-called „social democratization“ of the Christian Democrats tend to play out rather on the cultural than the material axis. On the material axis, today‘s CDU‘s position is much closer to the „Christian-social“ position of the Kohl government (1982-1998) and the CSU (“Care Allowance”) than to the historical outlier of the neoliberal Leipzig Party Convention (2003).

This is why the conflict cleavages within the Union crystallize rather along the cultural axis. Angela Merkel’s ‘modernization’ courses climaxed in the “Welcoming Culture” (Willkommenskultur). How far this is removed from the lifeworld of many supporters can be observed through the angry reactions of the nationalconservative wing. Accordingly, the “refugees deal” with Turkey as well as the asylum compromise were not only meant to steal the thunder of the rightwing populist AfD, but also to heal the rift running through the Union. What remains open is the question on how to respond to the challenge posed by the right-wing AfD culture warriors in its “own quadrant”. Some, mostly in the CDU, argue the best way of weakening the AfD is to emphasize the material axis with an agenda centered on merit, justice, and market freedom (e.g. the “Black Zero/ Schwarze Null”[balanced budget], tax breaks, as well as Minimum Pensions). Others, many of them in the Bavarian CSU, seek to monopolize the right-authoritarian sector by emphasizing the cultural axis with a domestic security and “traditional values” agenda (e.g. the Father-Mother-Child family as opposed to patchwork families, “Border control” as opposed to unlimited refugee intake). Whether these strategies will succeed in undercutting the right-wing surge remains to be seen. On the one hand, by accommodating some of the material and cultural demands of “angry citizens”, the AfD could gain social respectability. On the other hand, the Christian Union parties have decades worth of experience in suffocating right-wing challengers with a close collaboration between its market-liberal and its socio-culturally conservative wings.

However, if the Union moves too far towards the authoritarian pole, a coalition with the libertarian FDP or Green Party seems more difficult.

The strategic situation of the “Alternative for Germany” LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights

B90/ Grüne

FDP SPD

LEFT

RIGHT Justice of merit, market freedom

material axis

Linke

CDU

AfD 2013

cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

CSU “End EU-Slavery ” “failure of integration”

AfD “Boateng”

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

The How important the position of a party with regard to the socio-cultural lifeworld of its supporters is, can also be observed in the case of the „Alternative for Germany“ (AfD). Starting out as a political project for market freedom, its first chairman, Lucke, quickly lost control of the culturally authoritarian base. His successor Frauke Petry, embattled by the culture warriors of the New Right, may share his fate. One the one hand, with its new programmatic platform, the party seeks to establish itself as a permanent force in the German political party system. On the other hand, the Alternative needs a steady flow of carefully placed provocations in order to establish itself as an “anti-establishment or even “anti-system party. With its attacks against the “rotten red-green 1968 Germany”, the AfD managed to tap into middle class rage by giving “angry citizens” (“Wutbürger”) an imaginary space to project their fears and anger. In this spiral of escalation, the party moves ever closer to the authoritarian pole. How difficult it is to control this structural dynamic can be observed in the latest quarrels over where to draw the “red line” between its own nativist positions and racism, anti-Semitism, and rightwing extremism.

The strategic situation of the Liberal Party (FDP) LIBERTARIAN individual, emancipation, self-determination, participation, minority rights socialliberal FDP 1980

B90/ Grüne

“digital civil rights”

Liberal lifeworld

FDP SPD

LEFT

material axis

Linke

RIGHT Justice of merit, market freedom

CDU cultural axis

distributive justice, solidarity, redistributive state, social justice

Westerwelle FDP 2002

CSU

AfD

AUTHORITARIAN collective, hierarchy , nationalism , xenophobia , traditionalism, security state

© Saxer, FES

At its neoliberal peak, the Free Democrats (FDP) almost completely abandoned its civil rights wing. With a stronger emphasis on digital civil rights, the last party convention aimed at reestablishing this lost heritage at the center of the liberal agenda. Internal debates focused on the question on how to fend off the challenge by the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). Some state units advocated a national-liberal posture to fend off the threat at the market freedom pole. The party leadership seems to have opted for a clear contrast by emphasizing more libertarian positions. This would make the FDP a valuable coalition partner for the Christian Union (CDU/SU), which may for tactical reasons have to abandon some of its more libertarian positions. On the other hand, moving away from the market freedom pole may open the way for a coalition with the Social Democrats and the Greens.