El desarrollo y la cooperación internacional en el nuevo orden mundial

CAPÍTULO 3

EL DESARROLLO Y LA COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL EN EL NUEVO ORDEN MUNDIAL 1JUAN PABLO PRADO LALLANDE*

INTRODUCCIÓN El final de la contención bipolar generó importantes cambios en la concepción del desarrollo y de las estrategias para promoverlo, en donde la cooperación internacional guarda un importante lugar. En este contexto, los organismos internacionales de mayor impacto y los países más poderosos establecieron entre sus prioridades mejorar la capacidad institucional de los receptores y de la ayuda misma, en aras de promover con mayor eficacia el desarrollo. Como consecuencia de ello, la cooperación internacional al desarrollo (CID) se alineó a dicho propósito, generando importantes repercusiones. Esto fue fruto también del posicionamiento de nuevos paradigmas en materia de desarrollo tendientes a superar la dinámica imperante en el otorgamiento de la ayuda bajo los fundamentos de la teoría de la modernización. A finales del siglo pasado se configuró un nuevo bagaje en materia de ayuda al desarrollo mediante los postulados de la teoría institucionalista que puso en marcha novedosas normas, propósitos y procedimientos que guiaron a las estrategias internacionales a ese respecto.

* Juan Pablo Prado Lallande es profesor-investigador de la Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, México. Doctor en Relaciones Internacionales y magíster en Cooperación Internacional por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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El alcance de esta profunda transformación en la CID no fue menor, dado su calado en los diversos rubros de su implementación. Al respecto, sobresale el impulso de la ayuda externa a favor de la capacidad institucional de los países en desarrollo para promover el liberalismo económico y, en menor medida, a la democracia, los derechos humanos y al buen gobierno. En el año 2000 este proceso decantó en una nueva arquitectura de la ayuda, en donde los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) y la Agenda Post2015 son su expresión más clara. De ahí que Mathew Lockwood calificó a esta nueva instrumentación de la CID mediante novedosas normas, objetivos, condiciones y estrategias para conseguirlos como la “perestroika de la ayuda” (Lockwood, 1999: 13). ¿Cuáles son estas transformaciones y repercusiones respecto a los nuevos fundamentos en que el desarrollo y, por consiguiente, la cooperación internacional son promovidos desde entonces hasta hoy en día? La respuesta a dicha pregunta conforma el principal objetivo de este capítulo.

DESARROLLO, INSTITUCIONES Y COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL La principal transformación en el ámbito de la ayuda tras el final de la guerra fría consistió en que su otorgamiento por motivaciones poscoloniales e intereses ideológicos caducó. En otras palabras, tras la caída del mundo socialista, la ayuda perdió buena parte de su matiz estratégico sustentado en la lógica bipolar, por lo que “ya no resultaba necesario proveer de asistencia a autocracias corruptas, pero diplomáticamente útiles a los donantes” (Lancaster, 1993: 13). Desde el plano teórico, los postulados de la modernización, que priorizan el suministro de ayuda para incrementar crecimiento económico con miras a reducir la brecha entre desarrollo y subdesarrollo, también se debilitaron. Ello dio paso a la definición y subsiguiente praxis de los fundamentos teóricos dedicados a la capacidad institucional como principal fuente de desarrollo. Si los teóricos de la modernización consideran que el desarrollo es consecuencia del cambio económico y social, los institucionalistas señalan que tales aspiraciones dependen esencialmente de las instituciones gubernamentales1. La implicación más relevante de ello es que, según esta segunda visión, las instituciones nacionales conforman un requisito esencial para la transformación social, política, económica y gubernamental de los Estados. En esa lógica, la ayuda externa debe estar orientada de manera preferente a 1. Véase, por ejemplo, Francis Fukuyama (2004): State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

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crear, mantener o reforzar las capacidades institucionales de los gobiernos receptores (Krasner, 2010: 693). Desde entonces, los arquitectos de las nuevas directrices del desarrollo y de su inherente ayuda externa para promoverlo coincidieron en que la dinámica de otorgamiento de la CID debe atender las razones por las que los gobiernos del Sur resultan incapaces de utilizar correctamente los apoyos asignados. El eje central de dichas consideraciones argumenta que las políticas macroeconómicas liberales dictadas por el Norte son correctas. Sin embargo, debido a la incapacidad estructural de sus gobiernos para llevarlas a cabo de forma adecuada, sus resultados no son exitosos. Esto significa que, para los donantes, el principal problema de la ayuda se encuentra en las condiciones internas (y, en una palabra, instituciones) de los receptores, especialmente en sus respectivos gobiernos. Es claro que esta postura no considera en su correcta dimensión a otros factores externos del orden estructural como un sistema político y económico a favor de los más poderosos, el cual debilita a los Estados más vulnerables. Con base en este nuevo paradigma del desarrollo y, por consiguiente, de la ayuda, los donantes establecieron distintas condiciones a aquellos países, utilizando como principal referente el Consenso de Washington2. Esta transformación cualitativa del funcionamiento del sistema de la CID tomó fuerza a partir de los años noventa, dado que, desde entonces, los donantes, por consenso, establecieron nuevas condiciones para otorgar ayuda (ODI, 1992: 1). Es decir, la comunidad de donantes estableció entre las prioridades de su colaboración externa mejorar la capacidad institucional de los receptores de ayuda en torno al fomento a las reformas económicas y, posteriormente, políticas de los receptores, en el sentido de incentivar la democracia, los derechos humanos y el buen gobierno (Crawford, 1998; Robinson, 1994). En síntesis, este cambio de modalidad de colaboración fue producto de la transformación del entorno económico internacional, del cambio de las teorías sobre el desarrollo y de la manera en que los funcionarios de las instituciones financieras internacionales y países oferentes ubicaron los objetivos y estrategias de la cooperación suministrada por tales instancias (Toye, 1994: 158). 2. El decálogo del Consenso de Washington establece los requisitos necesarios para generar desarrollo, en línea con la teoría institucional, son los siguientes: 1. Disciplina presupuestaria; 2. Reorientación del gasto público; 3. Reforma fiscal para ampliar la base impositiva; 4. Liberalización financiera; 5. Tipo de cambio competitivo; 6. Apertura comercial; 7. Liberalización de la inversión extranjera directa; 8. Privatización de empresas públicas; 9. Desregulación arancelaria; y 10. Garantía de derechos de propiedad (Williamson, 1990).

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EL IMPACTO DEL FOMENTO DE LA CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN LA COOPERACIÓN AL DESARROLLO Las instituciones financieras multilaterales que tomaron la batuta de la aplicación en el Sur —en particular en los países afectados por la crisis financiera de los ochenta— de los postulados institucionalistas se dedicaron a promover (o exigir) las transformaciones estructurales necesarias para propiciar estabilidad, crecimiento económico y, a la postre, el desarrollo. En otras palabras, las reformas estructurales eran necesarias y la ayuda financiera otorgada por el Banco Mundial (BM) y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) podría contribuir a que los receptores llevaran a cabo estas reestructuraciones económicas y políticas estimuladas desde Washington. Fue entonces cuando el BM disminuyó su apoyo a proyectos locales de desarrollo y priorizó el ejercicio de la denominada “ayuda programa” (programme aid), misma que para otorgarse ameritó que el receptor atendiera determinadas condiciones establecidas por los funcionarios del BM. Así, el BM diseñó programas de ajuste estructural (Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAP), los cuales incluyen diversos requisitos que los receptores deben cumplir para recibir estos apoyos. Paralelamente, otorgó créditos para el ajuste estructural (Structural Adjustment Credits, SAC), así como préstamos de ajuste sectorial (Sectorial Adjustment Loans, SECAL). Las condiciones para otorgar créditos en el marco del SAC comprenden ámbitos de la macroeconomía de los países apoyados (principalmente, mayor rigor en el cuidado de la balanza de pagos), mientras que con los créditos SECAL las condiciones se refieren a un sector específico, tal como el de la agricultura o el financiero. Por parte del FMI, además del Extended Fund Facility (EFF), se crearon el Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) y el Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), otorgados a países de muy bajos ingresos con serios problemas en sus balanzas de pagos. En 1999, el ESAF se renovó por el Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). La condicionalidad solicitada a terceros países por parte de las citadas instituciones financieras multilaterales se estipula formalmente a través de la Carta de Intención (Letter of Intent) del FMI y de la Carta de Política de Desarrollo (Letter of Development Policy) del BM, hoy Estrategia de Asistencia a Países. Tras esta condicionalidad económica de primera generación (Stokke, 1995: 7), y dado que sus efectos no generaron suficiente crecimiento 136









































































económico y, como complemento de esta, a finales de 1991 el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD) de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) estableció que la democracia, el respeto a los derechos humanos y el Estado de derecho constituirían las condiciones esenciales para promover el desarrollo económico a través de la ayuda (en ODI, op. cit.: 1). Esta postura, identificada como una segunda generación de condicionalidad política de la ayuda (Stokke, op. cit.: 9), se basó en el principio del “buen gobierno” como el referente de las acciones de colaboración de sus miembros (OECD, 1994: 28). A esta iniciativa se sumaron también los principales bancos multilaterales. Al respecto, el BM adoptó una concepción de “buen gobierno” que se utilizó como base para seleccionar los países receptores de sus apoyos financieros, mientras que el FMI señaló que el precepto es pieza clave de los aspectos económicos de la gobernabilidad (Crawford, 2001: 6). Desde la perspectiva del buen gobierno, varios son los elementos que pueden generar condiciones de desarrollo. Estos consisten en un clima seguro para la inversión, el crecimiento económico sostenido, la inversión en las personas pobres, la estabilidad macroeconómica, el comercio y la inversión internacionales. Todo ello enmarcado en un programa de reformas estructurales (por cierto) planeadas, dirigidas y evaluadas por los más relevantes organismos financieros multilaterales (World Bank: 1998). Este planteamiento relativo al buen gobierno y de sus alternativas, para practicarlo llegó a convertirse tanto en los requisitos como en los objetivos mismos de la cooperación internacional (Santiso, 2001). Ante estos inéditos hechos, Peter Uvin (1994: 64) afirma que “un nuevo orden mundial había sido creado y la ayuda al desarrollo, mediante su condicionalidad, se convirtió en uno de los instrumentos para consolidarlo”. Estas nuevas disposiciones transformaron al sistema de CID y de su financiación al grado que, según la OCDE en 1991, “alrededor del 70% de los préstamos del FMI, al menos el 30% de los préstamos otorgados mediante el BM y cerca del 25% de la ayuda bilateral otorgada por los miembros del CAD —alrededor de 20.000 millones de dólares anuales— fue dedicada a transferencias financieras condicionadas” (Mosley, 1992: 129). Como lo señala Robert Archer (1994: 8), los objetivos políticos y económicos de la ayuda, al ser dedicados a mejorar la capacidad institucional de los Estados para incentivar el libre mercado y la democracia liberal como el único modelo a seguir, “representan una nueva ortodoxia en el plano del desarrollo”. 137









































































CONDICIONALIDAD Y SELECTIVIDAD DE LA AYUDA: LA CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN ACCIÓN En este marco de reordenamiento de fundamentos y prioridades de la cooperación internacional, el CAD asentó que “[…] a los países en desarrollo comprometidos con las reformas de mercado, la democratización y el buen gobierno se les otorgará prioridad en la concesión de asistencia al desarrollo” (OECD, op. cit.: 8). Esta postura defiende que la ayuda debe ser asignada en mayor cuantía a aquellos Estados con mejores niveles de orden institucional y gubernamental ya que ello, en principio, aumenta la posibilidad de que estos gestionen de mejor manera y con mayor transparencia los montos de ayuda y, por ende, hacer de la misma un instrumento de desarrollo más eficaz. Como una muestra de lo anterior, a partir de 1996, el BM inició la ejecución de unos 600 programas en materia de buen gobierno en 50 países para modernizar el sector público. En 1999 el BM dedicó una cuarta parte de sus recursos (entre 5.000 y 7.000 millones de dólares) a la denominada “reforma institucional” para promover la modernización del Estado (World Bank, 1999: 136). Sin embargo, debido a la ausencia de apropiación por parte de los gobiernos receptores sobre dichos programas, los referidos apoyos institucionales realizados a través del BM fueron ineficaces (World Bank, 2000). En este sentido, estudios en la materia indican que, paradójicamente, la ayuda dirigida al “desarrollo institucional” puede generar efectos negativos en cuanto a la participación social, la calidad gubernamental y la interacción entre el sector público y el privado. Lo anterior es dado a que esta asistencia desincentiva el interés de las autoridades por instrumentar políticas adecuadas y transformadoras (Moss, Patterson y Van de Walle, 2005: 16-19). Volviendo al tema de la selectividad de la ayuda, el planteamiento que le da sustento a este precepto se encuentra en el trabajo de Dollar y Burnside (2000), en donde se asevera que la eficacia de la ayuda depende de las condiciones nacionales en que esta se aloja. Es decir, según esta postura, la ayuda al desarrollo es funcional cuando se destina a países que ya cuentan con un determinado estatus de las condiciones de desarrollo previamente descritas; esto es, en los países del Sur más estables y avanzados. Para el BM, “dirigir la asistencia hacia los países con instituciones políticas acertadas aprovechará al máximo los recursos escasos de la ayuda para alentar la inversión, incitar el crecimiento y reducir la pobreza (Banco Mundial, 1999: 49). 138









































































Los estudios de Dollar y Burnside y sus subsiguientes recomendaciones en términos de selectividad de la ayuda generaron intensos debates entre los expertos en el tema de la eficacia de la ayuda. Consideraciones como qué se entiende por “un marco de buenas políticas”, o la supuesta existencia de un único modelo de desarrollo para los receptores son solamente algunas de las críticas a este paradigma. De hecho, estudios como los de Hadjimichael, Dubarry o Hansen y Tarp, en plena discordancia con Dollar y Burnside, asientan que la ayuda por sí misma genera crecimiento, incluso cuando las variables políticas son incorporadas de forma independiente (Alonso, 2003: 172). De ahí que el debate sobre la selectividad, a pesar de la postura del BM y otros donantes para sustentar sus políticas de ayuda al desarrollo con base en este planteamiento, continúe abierto. Esto lleva a Hansen y Tarp a aseverar que “el irresuelto tema acerca de la evaluación de la eficacia de la ayuda no es si la ayuda funciona, sino cómo lo hace, y si se puede hacer que los diversos instrumentos de la ayuda funcionen mejor adaptándose a las circunstancias de cada país” (ibídem)3. En un pronunciamiento conciliador entre los postulados referidos, Oliver Morrissey establece que mejores políticas gubernamentales, en conjunción con una mejor calidad de la ayuda, sí pueden incrementar el crecimiento de los países (Morrissey, 2002: 6).

HACIA LA HOMOLOGACIÓN E INSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN DE LA AGENDA GLOBAL DE DESARROLLO La ONU, aprovechando el citado contexto internacional favorable a una CID más ordenada, institucionalizada y, por ende, con directrices más claras, organizó a lo largo de los años noventa distintas cumbres internacionales. La finalidad fue lograr consensos y compromisos en diversas materias relacionadas con el desarrollo y el combate a la pobreza para contribuir a la conformación de una agenda más cohesionada en estos ámbitos. En este orden de acontecimientos, en mayo de 1996 el CAD publicó el documento Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Developing Co-operation (OECD, 1996), el cual constituiría el eje doctrinario de este Comité (y, en 3. Existen más estudios críticos a las conclusiones de Bunrside y Dollar. Entre ellos se encuentra el realizado por Delgaard y Hansen, quienes asientan que el buen gobierno, más que incrementar la eficacia de la ayuda, la reduce, ya que un gobierno eficiente substituye el proceso de desarrollo económico de los países (Delgaard y Hansen, 2001: 37-38). Jan Pronk, en una postura más sensata, afirma que “el buen gobierno no debe ser considerado como una precondición para otorgar ayuda al desarrollo, sino como un objetivo de desarrollo” (Pronk, 2001: 626).

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realidad, del sistema internacional de ayuda al desarrollo) en materia de objetivos de desarrollo para las siguientes décadas. Aunque el CAD señala que la experiencia de los donantes en materia de promoción al buen gobierno se encontraba en una “etapa temprana”, la publicación de referencia menciona que esta condición, misma que será apoyada con ayuda, es fundamental para establecer una relación de paternariado o asociación (partnership) entre donantes y receptores, precepto esencial para incentivar la eficacia de la asistencia al desarrollo (ibídem: 13-14). En el ánimo de “homologar” e institucionalizar de mejor forma mediante normas, instituciones y propósitos globales aspiraciones generales en materia de desarrollo (Sorensen, 2001: 53) a raíz de la mencionada e inédita convergencia de propósitos alrededor de la capacidad institucional, la ONU, el BM, el FMI y la OCDE presentaron el informe “Un mundo mejor para todos” (2000). En esta publicación se establecen siete objetivos generales de desarrollo humano, así como los respectivos compromisos e indicadores necesarios para su cumplimiento por parte de la comunidad internacional. En línea con las referidas directrices institucionales del sistema de CID, este informe reitera que el cumplimiento de los propósitos señalados debe pasar necesariamente por la instrumentación de buen gobierno, democracia y el respeto a los derechos humanos. Tales propósitos globales fueron tomados como base por la Asamblea General de la ONU, que en el año 2000 aprobó los ODM a través de la Declaración del Milenio, firmada por 189 países, incluyendo 147 jefes de Estado y de gobierno. Estas aspiraciones comprendieron ocho objetivos de desarrollo social y económico, los cuales debieron concretarse en distintas metas cuantificables durante el periodo 1990-2015, siendo la Agenda de Desarrollo Post2015 su sucesora. Si bien la democracia, los derechos humanos y el buen gobierno no se incluyen en los ODM, estos propósitos, además de las controversias generadas a su amparo, aportan importantes avances en cuanto a la institucionalización de la agenda global de CID de múltiples formas. Algunos de estos son los siguientes: establecer por primera vez propósitos prioritarios, comunes y mesurables al respecto promovidos por todos los gobiernos e instituciones multilaterales; legitimar y moldear el marco de debate sobre el desarrollo internacional; simplificar y materializar el concepto mismo de desarrollo mediante la identificación de una agenda planetaria para promoverlo, cohesionar a los actores internacionales alrededor de esta (Sakiko, 2013: 37, 51, 52). En definitiva, los ODM son “un elemento 140










































































clave de una nueva arquitectura de la ayuda que se puso en marcha a finales de la década de 1990” (ibídem: 55).

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES Las variantes del contexto histórico y de las teorías dedicadas al desarrollo tienen un claro impacto en las directrices que guían la cooperación internacional en cada momento de su historia. Como muestra de ello, Stephen D. Krasner explica que en el periodo 2002-2007 casi el 20% de la ayuda externa se realizó en concordancia con los postulados de la teoría de la capacidad institucional (ibídem: 718)4, mediante procesos de selección de la ayuda y apoyo institucional, independiente de la calidad de los resultados obtenidos, que, como se señaló, no son precisamente los más promisorios. Estas estrategias, que como muchas más se derivan de otros fundamentos teóricos, pretenden aumentar la posibilidad de que este instrumento de apoyo externo contribuya de forma más sensible al desarrollo de los países beneficiarios5, que en su conjunto alimentan al debate en torno a las condiciones en que la ayuda puede ser más eficaz. Sin embargo, “las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para que la ayuda genere una contribución positiva a procesos de desarrollo continúan siendo controversiales” (Tarp, 2006: 48), lo que indica que el principal reto teórico y práctico continúa siendo la definición de modelos analíticos y fácticos para impulsar el bienestar de las personas con mayor certidumbre.

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— (2001): Foreign Aid and Political Reform. A Compararive Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality, International Political Economy Series, Palgrave, Londres. DELGAARD, C. y HANSEN, H. (2001): “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies”, en N. Hermes y R. Lensink, Changing the Conditions for Developing Aid: A new Paradigm?, Frank Cass, Londres. DOLLAR, D. y BURNSIDE, C. (2000): “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Economic Review, 90 (4), septiembre, Estados Unidos. KRASNER, S. (2010): “Desarrollo estatal, construcción del Estado y ayuda externa”, Foro Internacional, El Colegio de México, México. LANCASTER, C. (1993): “Governance and development: The views from Washington”, Good Government?, IDS Bulletin, vol. 24, Brighton. LOCKWOOD, M. (1999): The perestroika of aid. New perspectives on conditionality, Chistian Aid, Londres. MOSLEY, P. (ed.) (1992): Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Development Countries, St. Martin’s Press, Londres. MOSS, T.; PETTERSON, G. y VAN DE WALLE, N. (2005): “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A review Essay on Aid State Building in Sub Saharan Africa”, Woking Paper, nº 74, Center for Global Development. MORRISSEY, O. (2002): “Recipient Government’s Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality”, Discussion Paper, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, nº 2002/105, Nueva York. OECD (1994): Development Co-operation: Efforts and policies of the Members of Development Assistance Committee, 1992 Report, OECD/DAC, París. — (1996): Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, OECD/DAC, París. ONU, BM, OCDE, FMI (2000): Un mundo mejor para todos. Consecución de los objetivos de desarrollo internacional, Communications Development, Washington D. C. OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (ODI) (1992): “Aid and Political Reform,” ODI Briefing Paper, enero, Londres. PRONK, J. (2001): “Aid as Catalyst”, Development and Change, Institute of Social Studies, Blackwell Publishers, 32 (4), Oxford. ROBINSON, M. (1994): “Aid, democracy and political conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa”, en G. Sorensen (comp.), Political conditionality, vol. 5, nº 1, junio, Frank Cass/EADI, Londres. SAKIKO, F. (2013): “Should Global Goal Seting Continue, and How in the Post 2015 Era?, en J. A. Alonso; G. A. Cornia y R. Vos, Alternative Development Strategies for the Post 2015 Era, Naciones Unidas, Nueva York. SANTISO, C. (2001): “Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality”, The Georgetown Public Policy Review, vol. 7, nº 1, Georgetown. SORENSEN, G. (2001): Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations, Palgrave, Londres. STOKKE, O. (comp) (1994): Aid and political conditionality, The European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Frank Cass, Londres. TARP, F. (2006): “Aid and Development”, Swedish Economic Policy Briefing, nº 13, Estocolmo. TOYE, J. (1994): “Structural Adjustment: context, assumptions, orgins and diversity”, V. R. Hoeven y V. F. Kraaij (eds.), Structural Adjustment and Beyond in Sub-Saharan Africa, Portsmouth, James CurreyHeinemann, Londres. UVIN, P. (1994): “Do as I say, Not as I Do. The limits of political conditionality,” en G. SORENSEN (comp.), Political conditionality, vol. 5, nº 1, junio, Frank Cass/EADI, Londres. WILLIAMSON, J. (1990): “What Washington Means by Policy Reform?”, en J. Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Institute for International Economics, Washington D. C. WORLD BANK (1988): Report on Adjustment Lending, World Bank, Washington D. C. — (1999): Assessing Aid: What work, What doesn´t and Why?, World Bank, Washington D. C. — (2000): Global Development Finance. Analysis and Summary tables 2000, World Bank, Washington D. C.

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Lectura 1

Desarrollo estatal, construcción del Estado y ayuda externa* Stephen D. Krasner**

INTRODUCCIÓN En las últimas décadas hemos sido testigos de algunos intentos ambiciosos de comprender las distintas trayectorias del desarrollo tanto en países exitosos en lo que se refiere a estabilidad política y posible democratización como en aquellos que han fracasado en este campo. Si bien no existe un consenso, un enfoque, el de la elección racional —que enfatiza la importancia de estímulos y, en algunos casos, de instituciones— domina cada vez más la polémica teórica en Estados Unidos. En el mundo académico, la teoría de la modernización y la capacidad institucional —las otras dos perspectivas teóricas para entender el desarrollo del Estado— han pasado a segundo plano, aun cuando la teoría de la modernización siga siendo el único marco de referencia que haya dado lugar a un debate teórico y empírico coherente. Por el contrario, en las discusiones de académicos y diseñadores de políticas en torno a la ayuda extranjera y en su propia distribución, la preponderancia relativa de estos tres enfoques es inversa: la teoría de la modernización y la capacidad institucional dominan el discurso y la práctica. Alrededor de 90% de toda la ayuda para el desarrollo que se brinda a otros países se asigna en concordancia con estas dos tendencias. Esta situación no es resultado de la ignorancia sobre la bibliografía académica; los organismos de ayuda nacionales e internacionales están repletos de especialistas. Más bien, los enfoques afines a la teoría de la modernización y a la construcción de capacidad institucional siguen alimentando las políticas porque son congruentes con los imperativos descritos por James Scott en Seeing Like a State1 Las políticas públicas requieren un entorno social, económico y político de fácil lectura. La asistencia extranjera alimentada por la teoría de la * En Foro Internacional, vol. L, nº 3-4, julio-diciembre de 2010, El Colegio de México, México, pp. 689723. Traducción de Gonzalo Celorio Morayta. ** Agradezco a Larry Diamond, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Sean Yom, James Fearon, Michael Tomz y a mis colegas del Centro para la Democracia, el Desarrollo y el Estado de Derecho sus comentarios a versiones anteriores de este artículo. El apoyo de Alex Mayyasi y María Lattanzi para la investigación fue invaluable. 1. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

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modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional sí se puede leer, particularmente, si quienes diseñan las políticas se enfocan en las aportaciones y no en los resultados; en la cantidad de ayuda otorgada y no en el impacto que ésta tiene. En contraste, es más difícil lograr que los programas diseñados para modificar los incentivos —factor fundamental de los enfoques de elección racional— se puedan descifrar. Este trabajo comienza por esbozar las principales argumentaciones en torno al desarrollo de Estado: la teoría de la modernización, la construcción de capacidad institucional y la elección racional. Posteriormente muestra cómo algunos estudios recientes sobre asistencia extranjera reflejan estas tres perspectivas, aunque rara vez se reconozcan los vínculos explícitos entre los dos cuerpos bibliográficos. Finalmente proporciona cierta evidencia relativa a la asignación actual de apoyos.

ENFOQUES RESPECTO AL DESARROLLO POLÍTICO LA TEORÍA DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN De los tres enfoques que aquí se analizan, éste es el que cuenta con mayor reconocimiento y el que ha sido analizado con mayor profundidad. La teoría de la modernización sostiene que la transformación política y la democratización son resultado del cambio social y del crecimiento económico2 La urbanización, los niveles de alfabetización más altos y la industrialización conducen a la movilización social, al cambio de actitud y a una expansión de la clase media. Una clase media más grande es más tolerante, más abierta a perspectivas políticas diversas, está más dispuesta a transigir y tiene mayores probabilidades de rechazar el extremismo. La modernización propicia que los individuos tengan mayor capacidad de autoexpresión y que participen en actividades políticas. Una mayor riqueza permitiría que incluso quienes se ubican en los primeros peldaños de la escala económica adoptaran perspectivas a más largo plazo. En un ambiente social y político más complejo, donde la población tiene un mayor nivel educativo, las divisiones transversales cobran mayor importancia. El conflicto entre clases se mitiga3. La democracia no es el resultado de una serie especial de 2. Ronald Inglehart y Christian Welzel (Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 16) encuentran el origen de este concepto en el Renacimiento. 3. Para una de las exposiciones originales de la tesis de la modernización, véase S. M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 53, núm. 1, 1959, pp. 69-105. Para exposiciones más recientes, véase la obra citada de Inglehart y Welzel, así como su “How Development Leads to Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, núm. 2, 2009.

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atributos culturales exclusivos de Occidente; es un producto de la transformación social y económica4. Aunque los teóricos clásicos de la modernización como Lipset y Lerner no hayan intentado explicar el crecimiento económico, tenían —por lo menos de manera implícita— la seguridad de que éste ocurriría. La teoría del crecimiento de las décadas de 1950 y 1960 consideraba que el aumento del ingreso era un proceso probable, por no decir inevitable. El enfoque dominante, reflejado en el modelo Harrod-Domar, ponía énfasis en la importancia del capital. Aun cuando los ahorros nacionales en países en vías de desarrollo pudieran no ser suficientes para soportar el nivel de inversión necesario para mantener altos índices de crecimiento, esta brecha podría cerrarse con apoyo del exterior. Por lo tanto, según la teoría de la modernización, había un proceso coherente que suponía la urbanización, la industrialización, la educación, la comunicación y la movilización, y que conducía a una diferenciación entre la política y otros campos de actividad, al desarrollo institucional y al triunfo de la democracia. En 2000, Adam Przeworski y sus colegas publicaron Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, una investigación empírica de la relación entre democracia y crecimiento económico5. Señalaron que los argumentos de la teoría de la modernización habían, generado más estudios que cualquier otro tema de política comparada6. Encontraron que el desarrollo económico tiene un fuerte impacto en la permanencia de los regímenes democráticos7. La esperanza de vida de los regímenes democráticos en países con ingresos per cápita inferiores a mil dólares estadounidenses es de ocho años, mientras que en países donde esta cifra oscila entre mil uno y dos mil dólares la expectativa es de dieciocho años. Una vez que las democracias alcanzan un ingreso per cápita de cuatro mil dólares, prácticamente no existe posibilidad alguna de que se conviertan en dictaduras. 4. Para ilustrar el poco consenso que existe en relación con las teorías sobre el desarrollo del Estado, Acemoglu y Robinson (“On the Economic Origins of Democracy”, Daedalus, vol.136, núm. 1, 2007, p. 160) asocian a Lipset con una argumentación a favor de la cultura. Sin embargo, la cultura que describen está ligada a valores democráticos. Por su parte, Lipset atacaba la noción de que solo algunas culturas nacionales eran propicias para la democracia. 5. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub y Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 6. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 7. Przeworski y sus coautores (ibid., pp. 19-22) utilizan una definición de democracia más específica que la de Lipset. Para los primeros, una democracia es un régimen donde el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo son electos, hay elecciones multipartidistas y el partido en el poder ha enfrentado o enfrentará la posibilidad de perder la elección y ceder el cargo. Lipset (op. cit.) definió la democracia como un sistema político con cambios regulares de gobierno, un conjun to de instituciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales que apoyan la apertura política —la prensa libre, por ejemplo— y una serie de valores que aceptan cambios pacíficos de gobierno

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Sin embargo, en contra de lo que sugiere la teoría de la modernización, no existe ninguna relación directa entre los niveles de ingreso y la permanencia de los regímenes autocráticos. Las autocracias son más estables en niveles de ingreso bajos y altos. Przeworski y sus colegas concluyen que “el poder causal del desarrollo económico en el derrocamiento de dictaduras parece mísero”8. Otro descubrimiento inconsistente con la teoría de la modernización es que la relación entre ingreso per cápita y transición hacia la democracia se puede describir, en el mejor de los casos, como endeble9. Un estudio reciente de Acemoglu y Robinson llega a una conclusión aún más negativa sobre la teoría de la modernización: los autores no encontraron relación estadística alguna entre la democratización de un país y su propio nivel de desarrollo, y hacen notar que absolutamente todas las afirmaciones empíricas de la teoría de la modernización se basan en variaciones entre distintas naciones y no en variaciones dentro de un mismo país. Su descubrimiento sugiere que la democratización no es consecuencia de niveles más altos de desarrollo, sino que existen otras condiciones que determinan tanto la democratización como el desarrollo. Los autores sugieren que la herencia colonial es un elemento fundamental que explica que los países hayan seguido distintas trayectorias. Mientras que las instituciones coloniales eran de índole represiva en las colonias donde la población europea era escasa (particularmente debido a enfermedades) y el foco estaba en los sectores de extracción de recursos, en las colonias donde la población original era pequeña y la población colonizadora alta, las instituciones coloniales eran significativamente más incluyentes. Estas distintas herencias coloniales encaminaron a los países en diferentes direcciones10. Las evaluaciones empíricas negativas de la teoría de la modernización no han dejado de ser cuestionadas. Ronald Inglehart y Christian Welzel argumentan que la modernización conduce a cambios básicos de actitud y que a largo plazo estos cambios —asociados principalmente a la auto expresión y no a la sobrevivencia; a valores no tradicionales si no de naturaleza secular racional— favorecen la democracia. Sin embargo, la riqueza por sí misma no es un indicador de modernización. A pesar de su fortuna, los emiratos del Golfo Pérsico —exportadores de petróleo— no han experimentado la modernización. Según Inglehart y Welzel, “la tendencia general es clara: a fin de cuentas, la modernización genera democracia. Esto significa que 8. Przeworski et al., op. cit., p. 98. 9. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub y Limongi (op. cit.) no encontraron relación alguna entre transiciones de autocracia a democracia. Boix y Stokes (“Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics, vol. 55, núm. 4, pp. 517-549) encontraron una débil relación positiva; es decir, la transición era más probable en niveles de ingreso más altos. 10. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared, “Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis”, documento de trabajo 13334, nber, 2007, en http://www.nber. org/papers/w13334

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el resurgimiento económico de China y Rusia tiene un aspecto positivo: hay cambios subyacentes en proceso gracias a los cuales es probable que en los próximos años surjan sistemas políticos cada vez más liberales y democráticos”11.

CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL El reinado de la teoría de la modernización como explicación preeminente del crecimiento y la democratización duró únicamente alrededor de una década. En 1968, Samuel Huntington publicó Political Order in Changing Societies. Mientras que los teóricos de la modernización consideraban que el desarrollo de las instituciones —y, en particular, de las instituciones de democracia liberal— era consecuencia natural del cambio económico y social, Huntington argumentó que el orden político y el crecimiento económico estaban supeditados a la capacidad institucional: más que un producto del cambio económico y social, las instituciones eran prerrequisito para dicha transformación. Para Huntington, sin institucionalización política, la movilización política solo podría conducir a la descomposición política. “La urbanización, el aumento en los índices de alfabetismo, la educación y la exposición a los medios de comunicación dan lugar a mayores aspiraciones y expectativas que, si no se satisfacen, impulsan a las personas y los grupos hacia la política. Cuando no hay instituciones políticas fuertes y adaptables, este aumento en la participación se traduce en inestabilidad y violencia”12. Para Huntington, el reto fundamental de la vida política es el orden y éste solamente se puede alcanzar por efecto de instituciones adaptables, complejas, autónomas y capaces de coacción13. La perspectiva analítica de Huntington no es más que uno de los muchos argumentos en una larga tradición intelectual cuyo reflejo más claro quizá sea el Leviatán de Hobbes, donde el análisis empieza por reconocer —como dice Huntington— que “la distinción política más importante entre países no tiene que ver con su forma de gobierno, sino con su grado de gobierno”14. Sin instituciones eficaces con capacidad de coacción, la vida sería desagradable, brutal y breve. En años más recientes, también Francis Fukuyama señaló la importancia de la capacidad institucional o, para ser más precisos, de su inexistencia. En StateBuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, libro publicado en 2004, Fukuyama sostiene que en muchos países en vías de desarrollo se puede observar una falta de correspondencia entre el alcance formal o legal de la autoridad del Estado y la capacidad institucional. La plantilla de la responsabilidad estatal es 11. Inglehart y Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy”. 12. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 47. 13. Ibid., pp. 81-82. 14. Ibid., p. 1.

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universal; incluye no solo lo que Fukuyama llama funciones estatales minimalistas —como la defensa, la preservación del orden público y el mantenimiento de los derechos de propiedad—, sino también funciones intermedias y activas, como brindar educación, protección medioambiental, regulación financiera, seguridad social y políticas industriales15. En el ahora mundo industrializado, el ámbito de actividad del Estado creció a lo largo de los siglos para responder a presiones internas y externas. Los países en vías de desarrollo han adoptado estas acciones porque los Estados que adquirieron su independencia inmediatamente después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial diseñaron sus estructuras organizacionales formales con base en las que ya operaban en Europa, América del Norte y, en algunos casos, la Unión Soviética16. Sin embargo, en los países en vías de desarrollo, la capacidad de muchos Estados es limitada. Fukuyama argumenta que la transferencia de patrones organizacionales formales es sencilla: los Estados saben qué ministerios deben tener. Sin embargo, es más complicado transferir el diseño del sistema político en su conjunto: las dimensiones de los distritos electorales, la naturaleza de la estructura de los partidos, las legislaturas bicamerales en oposición a las unicamerales, las normas electorales de representación proporcional contra las de mayoría relativa, los poderes ejecutivos presidenciales o parlamentarios… Estas disposiciones varían, según Fukuyama, de Estado en Estado dependiendo no solo de las condiciones estructurales, sino también de la convergencia fortuita de los intereses y capacidades presentes en momentos históricos particulares. Finalmente, Fukuyama asegura que los factores culturales, incluidos actitudes de elite y valores sociales más amplios, solamente se pueden modificar marginalmente17. Los países en vías de desarrollo llevan la carga de una falta de relación entre el alcance legal formal de la autoridad del Estado y su capacidad real. El gran reto de los estudios que ponen énfasis en la importancia de la capacidad institucional es aclarar de dónde procede dicha capacidad. La explicación más conocida es la de Charles Tilly. En Coercion, Capital, European States, AD 990-1990, Tilly argumenta que en Europa los líderes crearon instituciones nuevas para responder a desafíos externos; especialmente la guerra. La guerra hacía al Estado y el Estado hacía la guerra18. Durante varios siglos, los Estados probaron ser más aptos 15. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 8-12. 16. El argumento de Fukuyama coincide con los resultados encontrados por John Meyer y sus colegas (Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas y Francisco O. Ramírez, “World Society and the Nation-State”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103, núm. 1, 1997, pp. 144-181) sobre el grado al que prácticamente todos los Estados han adoptado un patrón universal de responsabilidades independientemente de la capacidad que tengan para cumplir con ellas. 17. Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 23-31. 18. Véase Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990-1990, Cambridge, Mass., Basil Blackwell, 1990; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996; Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,

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que otras estructuras políticas, particularmente las ciudades Estado, en la movilización de los recursos financieros y materiales necesarios para garantizar su independencia19. Otros especialistas han sostenido que la guerra no es el único camino hacia la consolidación de la capacidad del Estado: la creciente fuerza institucional también pude apoyarse en valores religiosos, legados coloniales, acuerdos de las elites y disposiciones institucionales existentes20. Por eso, la autoridad, la legitimidad y la eficacia de las instituciones centrales del Estado resultan fundamentales para los autores que ponen énfasis en la capacidad institucional. Las instituciones estatales deben ser capaces de fijar y hacer cumplir las reglas del juego. Deben poder establecer el orden público, garantizar el Estado de derecho y proporcionar bienes colectivos. Según la teoría de la modernización, si un sistema de gobierno puede encontrar la base de la escalera mecánica, será capaz de llegar hasta arriba. En los enfoques que se centran en la capacidad institucional, la escalera también puede ir hacia abajo. En la teoría de la modernización, las instituciones, particularmente las democráticas, son un producto del cambio económico y social; en los enfoques basados en la capacidad institucional, son un prerrequisito de la transformación.

ELECCIÓN RACIONAL La elección racional es la tercera perspectiva sobre la trayectoria del desarrollo político y económico. Mientras que la teoría de la modernización subraya que el cambio socioeconómico conduce a la transformación política y la teoría de la capacidad institucional se centra en el grado de gobierno que realmente pueden ejercer las instituciones estatales centrales, la elección racional considera que el crecimiento económico y la gobernanza eficaz son resultado de decisiones tomadas por actores clave. Estas decisiones siempre responden a un interés personal; son el reflejo de incentivos materiales. Aunque no todos, la mayoría de los estudios sobre elección racional señalan la importancia de las instituciones, como organismos que facilitan la conclusión de acuerdos mutuamente benéficos porque resuelven los problemas de compromiso21. A diferencia de lo que sostiene la teoría de la capacidad institucional, los institucionalistas con un enfoque de elección racional consideran que las Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 5-7, 15-16; Timothy Besley y Torsten Persson, “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics”, Ame rican Economics Review, vol. 99, núm. 4, 2009, pp. 1218-1244. 19. Véase también el libro citado de Spruyt. 20. Véase, para una crítica sobre Tilly, Tuong Vu, “Studying the State through State Formation”, World Politics, vol. 62, núm. 1, 2010, pp. 148-175. 21. Acemoglu y James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. XII, 15-23.

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instituciones son un mecanismo que puede dar estabilidad y perdurabilidad a los pactos políticos, más que estructuras para concentrar el poder y la autoridad. Ya que inicialmente no se cuenta con un sistema de vigilancia externo, los acuerdos para la creación de instituciones deben ser compromisos autovinculantes entre actores clave de un sistema de gobierno. Más que habilitarlos, las instituciones limitan a estos distintos actores. Mientras que la concentración del poder es fundamental para quienes se centran en la capacidad institucional, para los institucionalistas con un enfoque de elección racional es fatal. Como los actores tienen intereses personales, solo apoyarán políticas que aumenten el bienestar del sistema de gobierno en su conjunto cuando éstas los beneficien en lo particular. Las elites —quienes han acumulado recursos militares, económicos, ideológicos o de algún otro tipo— desempeñan un papel decisivo en cualquier sistema político. El problema fundamental para el desarrollo político y económico es que la búsqueda egoísta de las elites suele reducir el bienestar del sistema de gobierno en su conjunto. Dadas las motivaciones personalistas de las elites, el desarrollo político y económico solo es factible cuando llegar a acuerdos que beneficien a la sociedad en su conjunto —o, por lo menos, a una parte considerable de la población bajo la regla 80-20 de Pareto— sirve a los intereses de las propias elites. En una democracia, los líderes políticos pueden mantenerse en el poder únicamente defendiendo políticas que les alleguen votos. El reto para los analistas de la elección racional es explicar por qué los líderes de regímenes autocráticos adoptarían políticas que fueran socialmente favorables, especialmente si éstas pudieran, a fin de cuentas, conducir a la democratización. Si bien todos aquellos que basan su estudio en la teoría de elección racional comparten el mismo marco analítico (actores con intereses personales y, en el caso de institucionalistas con este enfoque, instituciones como mecanismos de compromiso), no hay consenso sobre las condiciones específicas que conduzcan a resultados socialmente más benéficos en sistemas de gobiernos no democráticos. Hay dos libros recientes, Violenceand Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History de Douglass North, John Wallis y Barry Weingast, y Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy de Daron Acemoglu y James Robinson, que consideran causas posibles diferentes de la transición a regímenes políticos y económicos más abiertos. El argumento sustantivo de North, Wallis y Weingast es que la libertad y el crecimiento económico sostenido solo se pueden alcanzar por medio de lo que ellos llaman “órdenes de acceso abierto”, cuya característica definitoria es que una gran proporción —si no la totalidad— de los individuos dentro de una sociedad tiene el derecho de crear e incorporarse a organizaciones. Las organizaciones son 150










































































la clave del éxito humano; permiten que los seres humanos alcancen objetivos que un esfuerzo individual desorganizado no podría lograr. En una sociedad de acceso abierto, los derechos son impersonales; las organizaciones pueden ser permanentes. Todos y cada uno de sus integrantes tienen acceso al sistema legal. La libre competencia —en la política y la economía— mina cualquier intento de capturar rentas. El control de las fuerzas de seguridad está en manos de estructuras de autoridad centralizadas. Para North, Wallis y Weingast, las sociedades de acceso abierto son un acontecimiento reciente en la historia humana que surgió apenas en el siglo XIX en algunos países de Europa Occidental y de América del Norte. Todas las sociedades anteriores estaban dedicadas exclusivamente a velar por su propio sustento y estaban compuestas por un máximo de 150 personas o eran —según el término utilizado por los autores— “órdenes de acceso limitado” o “naturales” en las que solo una pequeña elite podía crear organizaciones; los derechos eran personales; las organizaciones, aunque podían ser perdurables, rara vez se mantenían; el poder militar estaba disperso entre grupos de elite; el Estado de derecho, cuando lo había, solo existía para la elites; la actividad económica estaba restringida y los intentos por capturar rentas eran dominantes. En concordancia con la lógica del institucionalismo según la teoría de elección racional, el gran desafío para North, Wallis y Weingast es explicar por qué las elites de un orden de acceso limitado aceptarían que se desarrollara un orden de acceso abierto. ¿Por qué las elites extenderían sus privilegios a un sector más amplio de la sociedad? Para que esta transición ocurra, debe partirse de un orden maduro de acceso limitado en el que coincidan tres condiciones previas que North, Wallis y Weingast llaman condiciones de umbral: Estado de derecho para las elites, existencia de algunas organizaciones de carácter permanente y no estrictamente ligadas a un gobernante específico y un control centralizado de la milicia. Cuando se presentan estas condiciones, las elites pueden considerar que ampliar los derechos impersonales, incluyendo el Estado de derecho, servirá a sus propios intereses. La generalización de los derechos podría aumentar las compensaciones económicas de la elite; por ejemplo, al poner a disposición de un mayor número de personas las acciones de empresas privadas controladas por un grupo pequeño de individuos. Las sociedades de acceso abierto no surgieron a causa de un compromiso abstracto con la libertad, sino como consecuencia no deliberada de decisiones tomadas por las elites para favorecerse a sí mismas. North, Wallis y Weingast ponen énfasis en que no necesariamente se camina hacia adelante. Es más frecuente que órdenes maduras de acceso cerrado se colapsen y regresen a ser órdenes básicas o frágiles de acceso cerrado a que se conviertan en sociedades de acceso abierto. Los autores argumentan que: 151









































































Ninguna teleología dirige la progresión de Estados naturales de frágiles, a básicos y, finalmente, a maduros. La dinámica de los Estados naturales es la dinámica de la coalición dominante, frecuentemente a través de nuevas negociaciones y rumbos que responden a condiciones cambiantes. Si los ajustes conducen a mayor poder y a capturar rentas con base en la identidad personal, las instituciones se vuelven más simples y las organizaciones menos sofisticadas; las sociedades se acercan al extremo más frágil en la progresión de Estados naturales. Si los ajustes conducen a mayor poder con base en acuerdos perdurables, las instituciones se vuelven más complejas y las organizaciones más sofisticadas; las sociedades se acercan al extremo maduro en la progresión. No existe una lógica convincente que mueva a los Estados en una u otra dirección22.

Acemoglu y Robinson presentan un argumento distinto sobre las condiciones que conducen de un sistema de gobierno más cerrado a uno más abierto. En Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy sostienen que la apertura surge cuando las elites de una sociedad autocrática se enfrentan a una pérdida del control. Más que a acuerdos entre las elites —que es el punto focal del análisis de North, Wallis y Weingast—, Acemoglu y Robinson hacen referencia a un pacto entre elites y no elites (a quienes ellos llaman ciudadanos). Las elites solo renuncian al poder cuando las no elites representan una amenaza convincente de derrocamiento. Las elites aceptan instituciones más democráticas porque es la única manera en que pueden hacer un compromiso verosímil que les permita evitar algo que les resultaría peor: una rebelión exitosa23. En un régimen no democrático, el poder de iure —es decir el poder que procede de las instituciones— está únicamente en manos de las elites. Esta situación cambiará solo si los ciudadanos ejercen el poder de facto —la fuerza bruta— y obligan a las elites a ampliar el poder de iure. Para ejercer este último, los ciudadanos deben sortear problemas de acción colectiva, organizarse con tal eficacia que la estabilidad del régimen se vea amenazada. Las probabilidades de que esto suceda únicamente se presentan en momentos de crisis. El poder de facto es ineludiblemente temporal y, a sabiendas, la ciudadanía demandará no solo cambios en las políticas —a las que se podría dar marcha atrás si las elites vuelven a monopolizar el poder institucional—, sino una ampliación del poder de iure. La única manera en que las elites pueden comprometerse de manera convincente es aceptando estas concesiones de índole institucional24. 22. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallace y Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 78. 23. Acemoglu y Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. xii-xiii. 24. Ibid., pp. 16-28.

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Acemoglu y Robinson plantean una serie de condiciones que simplifican la transición hacia la democracia. Argumentan que las elites harán concesiones con mayor facilidad si cuentan con capital industrial o humano en lugar de tierras, que son más fácilmente gravadas. Las elites con capital humano o industrial pueden amenazar con abandonar el país; las elites terratenientes, no. Un giro hacia la democracia es más probable cuando existe un nivel medio de inequidad. Si la inequidad es muy alta, las elites serán muy reticentes al cambio; si es relativamente baja, hay menos posibilidades de un levantamiento de la ciudadanía. Una sociedad civil más robusta es favorable para el cambio democrático, pues con ella es más probable que la ciudadanía sortee problemas de acción colectiva. Si bien es cierto que una clase media más extendida (aquí Acemoglu y Robinson incorporan una tercera categoría a las de elite y ciudadanía) puede ejercer presión en contra de las elites, también puede propiciar que el cambio resulte más aceptable pues garantiza que las políticas de redistribución sean contenidas25. Igual que North, Wallis y Weingast, Acemoglu y Robinson no ven ningún movimiento teleológico hacia la democracia. Inician su libro señalando casos en los que la democracia se ha consolidado (Gran Bretaña), se ha resistido durante un largo periodo (África del Sur), no ha logrado consolidarse (Argentina a lo largo de la mayor parte de su historia) o nunca ha existido (Singapur)26. Las crisis económicas pueden conducir a la democratización, pero también precipitar golpes de Estado que pongan fin a regímenes democráticos. Un alto nivel de desarrollo no necesariamente conduce a la democracia. El ejemplo de Singapur es contundente. Según los enfoques de elección racional, el desarrollo político y económico está supeditado a acuerdos en los que las elites siempre son los únicos actores de importancia o, por lo menos, desempeñan un papel fundamental. Generalmente, estos acuerdos solo son posibles cuando se crean instituciones formales. Históricamente, el tipo de disposiciones creado entre las elites es de carácter contingente. En el caso de la elección racional no existe un solo camino que todos los sistemas de gobierno deban seguir. Los pactos de las elites dependen de su composición, sus capacidades, sus intereses y sus creencias. Estos, a su vez, dependen de la trayectoria histórica particular que haya seguido una sociedad determinada. El progreso no es inevitable. Los acuerdos institucionales que favorecen a las elites, e incluso a las no elites, pueden deshacerse debido a un cambio en los equilibrios del poder, a un giro en las creencias o a estructuras de incentivos alteradas. 25. Ibid., pp.31-40. 26. Ibid., pp. 4-14.

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En resumen, las perspectivas de la teoría de la modernización, de la capacidad institucional y de la elección racional ofrecen explicaciones muy diversas para el cambio económico y político. En el caso de la teoría de la modernización, el desarrollo es impulsado por el cambio económico y social. Aunque el camino puede ser sinuoso, la expectativa es que a largo plazo habrá progreso. Para los analistas enfocados en la capacidad institucional, el éxito depende de la concentración de recursos y autoridad en manos de instituciones políticas centrales. Para los institucionalistas de la elección racional, al dar solución a problemas de compromiso, las instituciones permiten mejorías de acuerdo a la regla de Pareto. A ninguna de estas teorías preocupan, demasiado, si es que algo, los intentos de actores externos por influir directamente en estructuras de autoridad nacionales de otros sistemas de gobierno. Sin embargo sí reconocen que el entorno externo puede alterar las trayectorias de desarrollo. Según la teoría de la modernización, el entorno externo pude brindar recursos en forma de capital, nuevas tecnologías u oportunidades para el intercambio económico. Según la teoría de la capacidad institucional, las amenazas del exterior pueden crear incentivos, en ocasiones muy persuasivos, para aumentar el poder estatal; o bien, el entorno internacional puede sugerir una serie de actividades de Estado poco indicadas para la limitada capacidad de los países en vías de desarrollo contemporáneos. En el caso de los enfoques de elección racional, el entorno exterior puede ofrecer incentivos que podrían afectar los acuerdos alcanzados por las elites dentro de un sistema de gobierno particular. Ninguna de las grandes perspectivas teóricas sobre la construcción del Estado examina de manera sistemática el impacto de esfuerzos conscientes de actores externos para alterar las trayectorias de desarrollo de otros Estados. Todas dan por hecho la premisa convencional de soberanía.

AYUDA EXTRANJERA La ayuda extranjera —una práctica internacional que no se desarrolló sino hasta después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial— busca, de manera directa, cambiar las condiciones —los índices de crecimiento económico, las instituciones políticas, las prácticas sociales, los derechos legales— que prevalecen en otro país. Cada una de las tres principales teorías del desarrollo tiene una perspectiva distinta sobre la forma en que se puede hacer un uso más eficaz de la ayuda o, incluso, sobre si se debe recurrir a ella o no. La teoría de la modernización sugiere que los donantes deben brindar recursos. Los análisis basados en la capacidad institucional suponen que los donantes deben fortalecer instituciones en los Estados meta. Las conclusiones sobre la ayuda que se pueden desprender de los estudios con un enfoque de 154









































































elección racional varían según la importancia que se adjudique a las instituciones formales y de las expectativas que se tengan respecto a la capacidad de los líderes locales para cerrar acuerdos autovinculantes sin la participación directa de actores externos. Las fórmulas que surgen de estos análisis basados en la elección racional oscilan entre la eliminación absoluta de la ayuda, porque ésta es origen de incentivos perversos, y la creación de nuevos fideicomisos posteriores al conflicto en lugares en los que, de otra manera, no se podría garantizar el bien colectivo, particularmente la seguridad.

LA TEORÍA DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN Y LA AYUDA EXTRANJERA Jeffrey Sachs es el más reconocido exponente de una serie de recomendaciones políticas en materia de ayuda que son reflejo de la teoría de la modernización. En The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, argumenta a favor de enormes incrementos en ayuda extranjera. “Cuando un país pone el pie en la escalera del desarrollo, generalmente puede seguir subiendo. Todo lo positivo tiende a avanzar junto, peldaño a peldaño […] Si un país se encuentra atrapado debajo de la escalera y el primer escalón le queda demasiado alto, el ascenso ni siquiera comienza”27. Los países no alcanzan la escalera porque están atrapados en la pobreza. Hay países tan pobres que sus ciudadanos no pueden ahorrar. Existe la posibilidad de que el gobierno sea incapaz de prestar servicios porque la población está tan empobrecida que es imposible recaudar impuestos. Los Estados se pueden encontrar atrapados en la pobreza por su desfavorecedora ubicación geográfica, sin litorales, o por ser víctimas de desastres naturales como la sequía y la enfermedad28. Enfrentar estos retos que la pobreza y otras trampas plantean —dice Sachs— requiere niveles mucho más altos de asistencia extranjera. Afirma, por ejemplo, que Kenia requeriría ayuda extranjera por 1 500 millones de dólares, quince veces más de lo que recibía alrededor de 200529. Sachs ha sido la fuerza motora detrás de la creación de los Pueblos del Milenio. Actualmente hay trece en África. Con estas comunidades se busca demostrar, inicialmente a pequeña escala, que una ayuda significativamente mayor tiene consecuencias benéficas. El plan es extender este proyecto creando nuevos Pueblos del Milenio en torno al núcleo original. En cada caso se ha aumentado la ayuda. El Proyecto del Milenio, auspiciado por el grupo de desarrollo de la ONU en el que Sachs ha representado un papel fundamental, calcula las necesidades de cada 27. Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Nueva York, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 73. 28. Ibid., pp. 56-66, 83-85. 29. Ibid., p. 236.

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habitante en 110 dólares; cuarenta de los cuales provienen de fuentes nacionales y locales30. El sitio de Internet del Proyecto del Milenio dice: Este modelo de financiamiento se cimienta en la premisa de que, con un apoyo modesto, las economías de los Pueblos del Milenio pueden transitar de una agricultura de subsistencia a una actividad comercial sostenida. Con el tiempo, los ingresos familiares aumentarán gracias a una mayor productividad, a la diversificación hacia cultivos de mayor valor y a una ampliación de los trabajos no vinculados directamente con el campo. Un mayor ingreso aumentará los ahorros por hogar, lo que acelerará la diversificación económica y las inversiones familiares en capital humano. Conforme aumente el crecimiento económico, los pueblos asumirán el costo de muchas intervenciones que actualmente son financiadas por la iniciativa de Pueblos del Milenio31.

Según la teoría de la modernización, el cambio tecnológico y el capital, no el ejercicio del gobierno, son los impulsores del desarrollo. Es probable que Estados y comunidades languidezcan bajo la escalera del desarrollo por algún tiempo, pero una vez que hayan logrado subir el primer peldaño, habrán iniciado el ascenso. La vida de africanos golpeados por la pobreza puede cambiar si se proporciona el capital necesario. Los temas de gobernanza ocupan un lugar incómodo al lado de cualquier análisis que se base en la lógica fundamental de la teoría de la modernización. Sachs ataca a quienes han atribuido el empobrecimiento de África a la corrupción y al mal gobierno. Argumenta que “tanto los detractores de la gobernanza africana como los opositores a la violencia e intromisión occidentales están equivocados. A fin de cuentas, la política simplemente no puede explicar la prolongada crisis económica del continente africano. El argumento de que la corrupción africana es la fuente primigenia del problema, no resiste un escrutinio serio ni se sostiene ante la experiencia práctica”32. Señala, además, que en África hay países “relativamente bien gobernados” que no han experimentado un crecimiento económico y países con una “corrupción extendida” que sí han crecido33. Si bien estas afirmaciones sugieren que Sachs no cree que exista relación alguna entre el ejercicio del gobierno y el crecimiento, también ha escrito sobre las consecuencias de los fracasos en la gobernanza. Reconoce que un mal gobierno puede minar el desarrollo económico, pero argumenta que un buen gobierno no garantiza el crecimiento y la prosperidad. Sin un financiamiento adecuado, ni 30. 31. 32. 33.

Consúltese http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/mv_cost.htm. Loc. cit. Sachs, op. cit., pp. 190-191. Ibid., p. 191.

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siquiera los Estados bien gobernados pueden brindar a sus poblaciones los servicios necesarios. Acepta que los países mal gobernados “no tienen un derecho garantizado”34 a la asistencia. Sin embargo, Sachs concluye que “actualmente el mayor problema no es que los países mal gobernados reciban demasiada ayuda, sino que los países bien gobernados reciben demasiado poca”35. Para mejorar el ejercicio del gobierno, Sachs argumenta a favor de un incremento en la ayuda: El problema de la corrupción ensombrece la relación entre los donantes y el gobierno de Kenia. Gran parte de la corrupción refleja secuelas de hace más de dos décadas, herencia del régimen anterior, funcionarios corruptos que aún no han sido descartados. Sin embargo, parte de la corrupción es nueva y absolutamente evitable, pero solo si los donantes ayudan a Kenia a mejorar el funcionamiento de la administración pública; no moralizando y haciendo acusaciones sino con la instalación de sistemas de computación, de la publicación de informes, de la capacitación para el empleo y los ascensos profesionales, de mejores salarios a los administradores de alto nivel para que no necesiten vivir de sobornos y pagos laterales, de un apoyo continuado a los importantes esfuerzos gubernamentales en curso para mejorar el sistema judicial, de la facultación de comunidades del ámbito local para la vigilancia de la prestación de los servicios públicos y a través de cierta humildad por parte de los donantes, en cuyos gobiernos también hay corrupción […]36.

Sachs termina por refrendar, sin reconocerlo explícitamente, el pacto acordado en la Conferencia sobre Financiamiento para el Desarrollo, celebrada en Monterrey, México, en 2002, donde los países industrializados prometieron aumentar el nivel de ayuda si los países en vías de desarrollo mejoraban su gobernanza37. La dificultad que representa para Sachs —o para cualquiera cuyo enfoque sobre la ayuda extranjera se base en último grado en los optimistas supuestos de la teoría de la modernización— honrar a cabalidad esta fórmula se refleja no solo en las inconsistencias presentes en The End of Poverty, sino también en la relación —o la falta de relación— entre la medición de la corrupción y el proyecto de Pueblos del Milenio, la manifestación política de las ideas de Sachs. Si el ejercicio del gobierno fuera un factor que se tomara en serio, los pueblos deberían estar ubicados en Estados africanos mejor gobernados. No es el caso. Por el contrario, los criterios establecidos para seleccionar a los trece pueblos es que todas las zonas 34. 35. 36. 37.

Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., p. 269. Ibid., p. 237. Loc. cit.

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agroecológicas importantes del continente estuvieran representadas. Los Pueblos del Milenio se encuentran en Etiopia, Ghana, Kenia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Ruanda, Senegal, Tanzania y Uganda. El índice de percepción de la corrupción proporcionado por Transparencia Internacional incluye 45 países africanos cuyo ranking oscila entre 36, en el caso de Botswana, y 180, en el caso de Somalia. El promedio para los países africanos es de 121. La calificación de los diez países en los que hay Pueblos del Milenio oscila entre 67 (Ghana) y 147 (Kenia). El promedio es de 10238. Un programa que realmente tomara en cuenta el Consenso de Monterrey se habría centrado en los países pobres de África que tuvieran los indicadores de corrupción más bajos. Sin embargo, un enfoque de esta naturaleza habría significado reconocer la importancia de la gobernanza de tal manera que resultaría inconsistente con la teoría de la modernización y debilitaría el argumento a favor de importantes aumentos en ayuda extranjera, incluso en países donde el ejercicio de gobierno es problemático.

CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL, AYUDA EXTRANJERA Y CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL ESTADO Mientras que los temas de gobernanza se inmiscuyen de manera incómoda en los análisis enmarcados por la teoría de la modernización, son el centro de las discusiones que se basan en la capacidad institucional. Un caso concreto, aunque no único, es el de los entornos posconflicto. Las políticas del gobierno estadounidense en Afganistán e Iraq, por ejemplo, han puesto énfasis en la necesidad de que las instituciones nacionales desarrollen mayor capacidad. Una muestra es el Plan de Campaña Integrada Cívico Militar de Apoyo a Afganistán del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos (United States Government Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan), fechado el 10 de agosto de 2009, que establece, en el primer párrafo, su componente primordial: “una alianza sólida con el Gobierno de la República Islámica de Afganistán (GRIA) que construya la capacidad necesaria para que Afganistán tenga acceso a un futuro estable. El objetivo final es que el GRIA contraiga la responsabilidad absoluta sobre su propia seguridad y administración mientras la comunidad internacional continúa ofreciendo asistencia económica, capacitación y otros apoyos ajenos al ámbito del combate para el desarrollo sostenido del país”. Las capacidades afganas, estipula el plan, tendrán que incrementarse no solo en el campo de la seguridad, sino también en lo relativo al Estado de derecho, las comunicaciones, los procesos electorales, el empleo, la administración 38. A partir de información encontrada en http://www.transparency.org/policy_re-search/surveys_indices/cpi/2008

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fronteriza y el control de drogas. Según el plan, el primer “principio central” es el “liderazgo afgano, la capacidad afgana, la sustentabilidad afgana. Nuestros esfuerzos en Afganistán, deben ser diseñados, en todo momento, para ayudar al gobierno afgano a asumir un papel de liderazgo más eficaz”39. En Fixing Failed States de Claire Lockhart y Ashraf Ghani —antiguo funcionario del Banco Mundial, ex Ministro de Finanzas de Afganistán y candidato que no ganó la presidencia de su país en 2009— se presenta una serie de argumentos muy similares sobre la importancia de la capacidad institucional40. Los esfuerzos de ayuda, aseguran Ghani y Lockhart, deben concentrarse en diez funciones: Estado de derecho, monopolio del uso legítimo de la fuerza, control administrativo con normas claras y predecibles, finanzas públicas, servicios de salud y educación, infraestructura, derechos ciudadanos, creación de mercados y política industrial, administración de bienes públicos y endeudamiento público41. El objetivo es el Estado típico ideal de Weber. Al hacer sugerencias sobre cómo los donantes extranjeros podrían posibilitar que el Estado desempeñara estas funciones de mejor manera, Lockhart y Ghani refrendan las recetas de la comunidad internacional para el desarrollo, plasmadas —por ejemplo— en la Declaración de París42. Estos autores subrayan la necesidad de que exista mayor coordinación entre los actores involucrados, incluidas las ONG, las agencias oficiales de ayuda, tanto nacionales como internacionales y los diseñadores de políticas en los países receptores. Si la asistencia ha de eliminar la falta de soberanía, todas las partes arriba mencionadas deben acordar una serie de reglas comunes para la construcción de la capacidad del Estado43. La construcción de instituciones no es únicamente un problema técnico; no se limita a orquestar la provisión de recursos, equipo y capacitación. La bibliografía clásica sobre la capacidad institucional —Huntington y Tilly, por ejemplo— explica el incremento en la capacidad de Estado en razón del deseo de los líderes de permanecer en el poder. En algunas situaciones —para ser más claros, cuando las elites se enfrentan a amenazas externas—, la sobrevivencia de las elites depende de que el Estado tenga mayor capacidad, particularmente capacidad de gravar y combatir. Las elites no pueden sostener su propia posición si sus sistemas de gobierno son incapaces de generar los recursos necesarios para repeler invasores externos. A fin de incrementar los recursos económicos, los líderes políticos crean instituciones 39. Embajada de Estados Unidos, Kabul, Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos, Afganistán, 2009, pp. 1-2. 40. Véanse los capítulos 2 y 5 de Ashraf Ghani y Claire Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2008. 41. Ibid., cap. 7. 42. OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, en http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 43. Ghani y Lockhart, op. cit., cap. 8.

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con mayor capacidad para recaudar impuestos, hacer cumplir contratos y promover el crecimiento del crédito privado44. Sin embargo, en el mundo contemporáneo, no resulta evidente qué mecanismos alinearían los intereses de las elites políticas con los de la sociedad en su conjunto. La construcción del Estado no es un problema de ingeniería; es un reto político, no solo un desafío técnico. El apoyo de las elites políticas es condición necesaria, por no decir suficiente, para el ejercicio eficaz del gobierno. El argumento de Tilly sobre la amenaza externa ya no es aplicable; virtualmente, la muerte del Estado a causa de una invasión dejó de ser una posibilidad desde 194545. Hay indicios de que las elites políticas en entornos posconflicto con un alto nivel de dependencia en la ayuda extranjera son sensibles a la presión externa de los donantes46. Sin embargo, la argumentación sobre la capacidad institucional se centra demasiado en el andamiaje necesario para un Estado eficaz y no lo suficiente en los motivos originales por los que las elites políticas podrían haber optado por la construcción de dichas estructuras.

ELECCIÓN RACIONAL Y AYUDA EXTRANJERA La teoría de elección racional no ofrece una receta única para que la ayuda extranjera sea de mayor utilidad para el crecimiento económico y para un mejor ejercicio del gobierno. Los autores que han escrito desde una perspectiva de la elección racional han hecho todo tipo de planteamientos: desde cesar completamente la ayuda hasta la ocupación militar. Sus fórmulas varían según la importancia que asignen a las instituciones formales y a su opinión sobre la capacidad de los actores locales para establecer dichas instituciones por sí mismos. En Wars, Guns and Votes, Paul Collier argumenta que hay situaciones en las que los participantes nacionales no pueden alcanzar un acuerdo autovinculante que ofrezca un nivel aceptable de seguridad para la sociedad en su conjunto. En estas condiciones, el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo político solo son posibles si intervienen actores externos. En contraste, Dambisa Moyo afirma en Dead Aid que la ayuda ha sido perjudicial para África —parcialmente, porque debilita la gobernanza— y debe eliminarse gradualmente. Como Moyo, William Easterly asume, en The White Man’s Burden, que los problemas de gobierno no impiden el desarrollo. Las políticas de ayuda 44. Besley y Persson, art. cit., pp. 1235-1239. 45. Según Fazal (State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007), solo dos países han muerto desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. 46. Desha M. Girod, “Foreign Aid and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, tesis doctoral, Stanford, Stanford University, 2008.

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deben basarse —sostiene— en la búsqueda y no en la planeación, en la construcción a partir de programas exitosos desarrollados por innovadores de los propios países receptores y no en la imposición de planes originados en el exterior que todo lo abarcan. Según la elección racional, a los actores los impulsan incentivos materiales; sin embargo, se ha cuestionado la capacidad que tienen los donantes extranjeros de manipular estos incentivos. Los donantes podrían cambiar los escenarios de oportunidad externa que se presentan a los líderes políticos condicionando distintos beneficios económicos —como la ayuda o el comercio— a reformas políticas nacionales, o, por el contrario, modificar el contexto de oportunidades internas desplegando la ayuda de tal manera que la lucha de poder entre los distintos grupos dentro de un determinado sistema de gobierno se vea alterada, por ejemplo, a través del apoyo a las ONG, de la promoción de reformas al uso de la tierra para generar un tipo de individuo interesado en proteger sus derechos de propiedad, de mayor educación para las niñas o del fortalecimiento de la eficacia legislativa. Sin embargo, algunos analistas han expresado su escepticismo sobre la utilidad de incentivos externos. Argumentan que los donantes no están dispuestos a implementar una condicionalidad predeterminada porque les conviene mantener el flujo de ayuda incluso si los destinatarios dejan de cumplir sus compromisos de reforma47. Algunos otros afirman que los actores externos no tienen suficiente información para manipular exitosamente ambientes políticos nacionales. Hay quienes han sostenido que la ayuda crea incentivos perversos y que los receptores estarían mejor sin ella. La lógica de la elección racional ha conducido a que Moyo pida poner fin a la ayuda; Collier, a la soberanía; e Easterly, a la planeación.

FIN A LA AYUDA En Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way, Dambisa Moyo sostiene que la ayuda debería reducirse significativamente. Escribe: “la idea de que la ayuda puede aliviar la pobreza sistémica y, que de hecho, así ha sucedido, es un mito. Millones de personas en África son más pobres hoy en día a causa de la ayuda; el sufrimiento y la miseria no han terminado; han aumentado. La ayuda ha sido, y sigue siendo, un rotundo desastre humanitario, económico y político para la mayor parte del mundo en vías de desarrollo”48. “La ayuda no es benigna; es maligna”49. 47. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Nueva York, Penguin Press, 2006, p. 149; Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, Nueva York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009, p. 56. 48. Moyo, op. cit., p. xix. 49. Ibid., p. 47.

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La elección racional es el sustento intelectual de las conclusiones de Moyo. En lugar de fortalecer el buen gobierno, la ayuda lo debilita. La asistencia sesga los incentivos porque los gobernantes responden a donantes externos en vez de a sus propias poblaciones. La ayuda, al sustituir los ingresos tributarios, rompe el vínculo entre los líderes políticos y sus electores50. La ayuda frena la reforma porque los donantes externos no actúan con firmeza respecto a la condicionalidad. Primero se establecen condiciones que después serán violadas, pero la ayuda continúa. Como la ayuda carece de mecanismos de rendición de cuentas, la confianza social se debilita. Para los ambiciosos, controlar el gobierno y la posibilidad de disponer —y robar— los apoyos extranjeros que ese control trae consigo resultan más atractivos que cualquier actividad socialmente productiva. Los gobiernos corruptos minan el Estado de derecho, desalientan el crecimiento de la clase media y debilitan las libertades sociales, factores que son necesarios para la inversión —interna y externa— que a fin de cuentas deberá impulsar el crecimiento. La ayuda puede fomentar una guerra civil porque el control del Estado se convierte en la fuente más importante de riqueza. Incluso sin estos funestos acontecimientos, la ayuda puede desalentar las reformas al despojar a los líderes políticos del sentido de urgencia que de otra manera podrían tener51. La ayuda no solo debilita el buen gobierno, también lastima el crecimiento económico. Los índices de ahorro son menores de lo que serían. Las entradas de capital pueden contribuir a la inflación; pueden conducir al síndrome holandés: una moneda sobrevaluada desalienta el crecimiento de sectores orientados a la exportación y distorsiona los precios entre bienes comerciables y no comerciables. Un alto nivel de ayuda puede desalentar la inversión extranjera, pues es reflejo de que el país no está funcionando adecuadamente52. Moyo afirma que los Estados africanos se pueden liberar de la ayuda extranjera en un periodo de cinco a diez años53. En promedio, 75% del dinero que ingresa a los países del continente proviene de este tipo de ayuda. Los líderes africanos deberían tener como meta que la entrada de capital estuviera distribuida de la siguiente manera: 5% proveniente del apoyo internacional, 30% del comercio, 30% de inversión extranjera directa, 10% de mercados de capital y 25% de remesas y ahorro interno54. Deberían obtener calificaciones de crédito internacionales para sus países; un primer paso para acceder a los mercados de capital internacionales que les son inaccesibles en gran medida por el incumplimiento de sus 50. Para una argumentación similar, véase Bruce Bueno de Mesquita y Hilton L. Root, “The Political Roots of Poverty: The Economic Logic of Autocracy”, The National Interest, 68, 2002, pp. 27-38. 51. Moyo, op. cit., p. 56. 52. Ibid., cap. 4. 53. Ibid., p. 74. 54. Ibid., p. 141.

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gobiernos en la liquidación de deuda. Moyo hace notar que solo dos Estados africanos —Ghana y Gabón— han podido emitir bonos en los últimos años55. Aparte de permitir el acceso a mercados de crédito internacionales, la mayor contribución de los países desarrollados sería eliminar barreras comerciales, que han sido particularmente graves en el campo de la agricultura. Moyo no concede mayor importancia a dos esfuerzos de gran envergadura para fomentar las exportaciones africanas: La Ley de Crecimiento y Oportunidades para África de los Estados Unidos (AGOA, por sus siglas en inglés) y la iniciativa europea Todo Menos Armas. Señala que no ha habido un incremento significativo en las exportaciones y que la mayoría de los beneficios de la AGOA están dirigidos a solo cuatro países: Nigeria, Gabón, África del Sur y Lesotho56. Los líderes africanos deberían sacar mayor provecho a las oportunidades comerciales que ofrece China. Se podría lograr una mayor diversificación por efecto de un comercio intracontinental. El microfinanciamiento podría hacer una mayor contribución. Si los cargos por transacción se redujeran, las remesas podrían ser una fuente de capital aún más importante57. Para Moyo, una repentina reducción de la ayuda desataría el crecimiento económico. Rechaza los argumentos que condicionan el crecimiento económico a la democracia; afirma en cambio —en concordancia con la teoría de la modernización— que la democracia es consecuencia del crecimiento. Según su opinión, la forma ideal de gobierno sería una dictadura benevolente. Sostiene que en China, Chile, Perú, Corea, Malasia, Singapur y Taiwán las políticas de crecimiento fueron promovidas por gobiernos autocráticos58. La democracia, si acaso llegó, vino después. La premisa tácita en el análisis de Moyo es que las cosas no se desmoronan59. Si hay problemas de gobernanza en Estados africanos, son el resultado de que se dependa de fondos provenientes de donantes externos. Sin esos recursos, el ejercicio del gobierno sería mejor. Lo que ha impedido el crecimiento económico ha sido una serie de políticas inadecuadas, efecto de esta dependencia. Sin este apoyo, las instituciones de gobierno no serían un impedimento para el crecimiento.

55. Ibid., pp. 86-87. 56. Ibid., pp. 117-119. Paul Collier (The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 169), en cambio, sostiene que el programa estadounidense funcionó, mientras que el europeo resultó inútil debido a normas de origen más restrictivas. [The Bottom Billion se publicó en español con el título El club de la miseria. N. del T.] 57. Moyo, op. cit., pp. 123-125, 133-136. 58. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 59. Véase la obra de Robert H. Bates (When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late Century Africa, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) para un análisis de cómo sí se desmoronaron las cosas en África a consecuencia del declive de las condiciones económicas mundiales.

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FIN A LA SOBERANÍA La publicación del libro The Bottom Billion de Paul Collier en 2007 atrajo una gran atención. Collier apuntó que mientras los países con los 4 000 millones de personas de en medio —como él los llamó— habían crecido rápidamente en las décadas de 1980 y 1990, las naciones con la población de los mil millones más pobres se habían tambaleado: su situación era peor en 2000 de lo que había sido en 197060. Collier identificó cuatro condiciones para que la pobreza se perpetuara: los conflictos armados, los recursos naturales, la falta de litorales cuando no se tiene buenos vecinos y el mal gobierno. A diferencia de Moyo, sostuvo que la ayuda sí tenía un impacto positivo; mejoraba el crecimiento económico en alrededor de un punto porcentual al año61. A diferencia de Sachs, rechazó la idea de que mayor ayuda podría sacar de la miseria a los mil millones en el nivel inferior. Collier concluyó The Bottom Billion argumentando que para atacar cada una de las cuatro causas —o trampas— arriba mencionadas, había un tratamiento distinto que resultaba más adecuado. La mejor manera de enfrentar la trampa del conflicto era el compromiso a largo plazo de tropas extranjeras y el desarrollo de infraestructura cuidadosamente supervisado por donantes del exterior. La trampa de los recursos, con ayuda de normas que fomentaran la transparencia presupuestaria. Una ayuda adicional y proveedores de servicios internacionales podrían servir para apoyar a los países sin acceso al mar62. En su libro más reciente, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Collier analiza más detalladamente algunos de los temas que introdujo en The Bottom Billion, particularmente el de la trampa del conflicto. Hay situaciones —señala— en las que los actores locales no pueden crear un equilibrio estable y socialmente beneficioso. Los Estados con los mil millones que están en el rango inferior probablemente no tengan la capacidad para proporcionar rendición de cuentas o seguridad. Su reducido tamaño no da cabida a economías de escala, lo que agrava la demanda de recursos. Están desunidos por divisiones étnicas que dificultan la provisión de bienes públicos. Los líderes políticos alientan la ineficacia del Estado, abriéndose así oportunidades para capturar rentas63. La violencia civil es un problema inmanente. “Si una rebelión es factible —escribe Collier—, seguro ocurrirá: el nicho del rebelde será ocupado por algún empresario social”64. La democracia no puede solucionar los problemas de gobernanza de los mil millones en el rango inferior. Con base en su propio análisis empírico, Collier 60. 61. 62. 63.

Collier, The Bottom Billion, pp. 8-9. Ibid., pp. 110-112. Ibid., cap. 11. Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Nueva York, Harper Collins, 2009, pp. 182 y cap. 9. 64. Ibid., p. 134.

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concluye que la democracia aumenta la violencia en países con ingresos per cápita por debajo de los 2.700 dólares estadounidenses65. La imperfección de la información a la que tiene acceso el “club de la miseria” debilita la posibilidad de que una rendición de cuentas democrática mejore el ejercicio del gobierno. Los ciudadanos no cuentan con la información suficiente para saber si un mal desempeño es resultado de decisiones gubernamentales o de sucesos externos fuera del control de sus propios líderes. En parte, los gobernantes participan en actividades para capturar rentas porque saben que sus electores no tendrán información para responsabilizarlos de las malas consecuencias resultantes66. Como los beneficios de estar en el poder son sumamente altos comparados con los de cualquier otra opción, quienes mantienen un cargo público buscarán arreglar los procesos electorales. La escasez de recursos dificulta frustrar este tipo de acciones67. Si bien Collier comparte el escepticismo de Moyo sobre las bondades de la democracia, también es cierto que se muestra pesimista ante el prospecto de las autocracias, por lo menos en África. Señala que a nivel mundial existe mayor variación en el desempeño económico de los gobiernos autocráticos que en el de los democráticos. Sin embargo, no hay ninguna autocracia africana altamente eficaz. Quizá el dictador benevolente de Moyo sería el gobernante ideal, pero, en el continente que nos ocupa, ningún Estado ha dado origen a una persona con esas características. Collier sugiere que la autocracia puede ofrecer resultados socialmente beneficiosos únicamente cuando existe un partido fuerte, un partido cuyos seleccionadores puedan remover a las cabezas sin afectar las instituciones del Estado. Las divisiones étnicas en los Estados africanos del “club de la miseria”, aunadas a estructuras partidistas poco sólidas, minan los incentivos para que un reducido grupo de seleccionadores llame a cuentas a su líder por la pobreza de las políticas. Si un dirigente cae, todos sus seguidores caen con él68. Los problemas de gobernanza, seguridad y prestación de servicios son más agudos en entornos de conflicto y posconflicto. Según Collier, aun cuando hay menores posibilidades de que los regímenes autocráticos regresen a la violencia a que lo hagan los democráticos, no hay grandes probabilidades de paz en ninguno de 65. Ibid., pp. 19-21. Roland Paris (At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2004) —argumentando fundamentalmente desde una perspectiva de construcción de instituciones y no de un institucionalismo basado en la elección racional— llega a una conclusión similar a partir de una serie de estudios de caso sobre esfuerzos de mantenimiento de la paz en situaciones de posconflicto desde 1990. Paris argumenta que la institucionalización debe preceder a la liberación política o económica. 66. Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes, pp. 25-27. 67. Ibid., pp. 44-50. 68. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

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los dos casos. El crecimiento económico puede reducir el riesgo de violencia, pero solo si se trata de un crecimiento sostenido a lo largo de una década69. Collier concluye que en muchos Estados africanos —y en especial en aquellos que ya han sido sacudidos por la guerra civil— es imposible alcanzar un equilibrio autovinculante entre los distintos actores nacionales que se acerque a la frontera de Pareto. La ayuda puede desempeñar un papel fundamental en ambientes de posconflicto. Los fondos extranjeros pueden sustentar un entorno monetario sólido y crear infraestructura. Pero más importante es que los actores externos pueden brindar seguridad. Según los resultados de las investigaciones de Collier, una inversión de 100 millones de dólares en operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz puede reducir el riesgo de guerra civil en 21%70. Incluso cuando hay condiciones más propicias —países que no se están recuperando de una guerra civil—, Collier se mantiene pesimista en relación con las perspectivas de una rendición de cuentas en el ámbito nacional71. Propone un pacto en el que los donantes brinden mayor ayuda a cambio de que los líderes políticos se comprometan a elecciones libres y justas. Los donantes anunciarían que, en caso de que el gobierno subvirtiera posteriormente dicha elección, no se opondrían a un golpe de Estado militar, siempre y cuando los líderes golpistas estuvieran, a su vez, dispuestos a prometer un regreso al régimen democrático. Así sería menos probable que los líderes políticos —conscientes de que podrían ser derrocados por la milicia— sabotearan un proceso electoral. Otra posibilidad es que si un gobierno libremente electo fuera depuesto por un golpe de Estado, los garantes internacionales anunciaran que ellos mismos destituirían al nuevo régimen. El anuncio serviría como mecanismo de compromiso y, en la mayoría de los países con los mil millones de personas más pobres, el costo de una intervención militar sería reducido. Ante la verosimilitud de esta amenaza, los militares se abstendrían de derrocar a un gobierno libremente electo72. Collier no es un autor que se resista a llevar sus argumentos hasta su lógica conclusión. Collier también profundiza en la necesidad de contar con proveedores de servicios independientes, una sugerencia que hizo originalmente en The Bottom Billion. El Estado establecería las políticas pertinentes, pero la prestación del servicio estaría a cargo de una serie de entidades distintas, entre ellas, organizaciones no gubernamentales, grupos religiosos o empresas privadas. Con el fin de garantizar que los fondos se utilizaran apropiadamente, sería preciso crear una dependencia que fungiera de intermediario entre los ministerios encargados de establecer las políticas y los 69. 70. 71. 72.

Ibid., p. 80. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., cap. 9. Ibid., pp. 202-212.

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proveedores de servicios propiamente dichos. Los donantes, el país anfitrión y la sociedad civil estarían a cargo de monitorear los trabajos de esta oficina73. La Comisión de Consolidación de la Paz de las Naciones Unidas y el gobierno nacional podrían compartir la soberanía en situaciones de posconflicto. Algunos actores proporcionarían fuerzas de seguridad; otros, asistencia extranjera, y unos más, servicios. El gobierno tendría la responsabilidad de la orientación general en materia de políticas74. Collier concluye que “lejos de avanzar de manera sostenida desde la violencia política hacia una democracia legítima y responsable, el “club de la miseria” se ha dirigido a un callejón sin salida: unas elecciones competitivas sin limitación alguna frustrarían la cooperación interna y una soberanía presidencial frustraría la cooperación externa”75. Collier opina que los actores locales no serán capaces de lograr un equilibrio autovinculante, cada vez mayor, según el principio de Pareto. Un equilibrio de esta naturaleza solo se puede alcanzar si los actores externos se involucran directamente. Para que los países con los mil millones en el rango inferior progresen, se debe violar el entendimiento convencional de los principios de soberanía Westfaliana-Vatteliana. Por lo tanto, mientras que Moyo considera liberador el fin de la participación extranjera, Collier piensa que es potencialmente desastroso. Para Collier no existe una expectativa natural de orden. La existencia de organizaciones de gobierno formales es fundamental y no hay garantía alguna de que surjan por sí mismas. La vida puede ser desagradable, brutal y breve para los mil millones más pobres. Los líderes políticos en este rango inferior, como en cualquier otro Estado, responden a incentivos. Sin la intervención de actores externos, con frecuencia estos incentivos podrían ser abyectos.

FIN A LA PLANEACIÓN La obra de William Easterly, como la de Moyo y la de Collier, se basa en el análisis de elección racional. Para Easterly, uno de los mayores retos a los que se enfrentan los donantes es la asimetría en la información. Los actores locales saben mucho; los donantes externos apenas un poco. Easterly sostiene que por este motivo los donantes solo pueden obtener resultados positivos si limitan sus aspiraciones. Está en contra de las grandes estrategias o, para fines prácticos, de cualquier tipo de estrategia. En The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So little Good, Easterly argumenta que las agencias de ayuda deben dedicarse a buscar y no a planear; deben aferrarse a 73. Ibid., p. 217. 74. Ibid., p. 225. 75. Ibid., p. 231.

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programas específicos que alivien la pobreza, de preferencia programas diseñados desde adentro y no por donantes externos. En The White Man’s Burden, el autor tiene mayores reservas en sus recomendaciones sobre políticas que en su libro anterior, The Elusive Quest for Growth, donde analiza la triste historia de la ayuda en relación con su impacto —apenas perceptible— y con las teorías que se habían utilizado para defenderla. Concluye que ninguna de ellas estaba sustentada en evidencia empírica. Los donantes seguían casados con el modelo de la brecha financiera —modelos de crecimiento que dependían totalmente del capital e ignoraban tanto la mano de obra como la tecnología— incluso mucho después de que se hubiera desacreditado su fundamentación teórica. No prestaban atención a los resultados de la evidencia empírica que indicaban que no había relación alguna entre la ayuda y el crecimiento76. Easterly descarta otros enfoques sobre la ayuda que se basan en supuestos sobre la importancia del capital humano, el rápido crecimiento poblacional y el exceso de deuda. En The Elusive Quest señala que los incentivos son fundamentales, que el mal gobierno y las políticas gubernamentales equivocadas podrían ser apabullantes, que la corrupción —particularmente la descentralizada— podría acabar con el crecimiento y que las poblaciones polarizadas impulsaban a los líderes políticos a proporcionar bienes privados más que colectivos77. Finalmente indica que, para que haya desarrollo, se debe conjuntar una serie de factores —entre ellos, un gobierno aceptable, el uso apropiado de la tecnología, la educación y políticas adecuadas—, y argumenta que, inevitablemente, existe un elemento de suerte aunado a la consecución idónea de todos estos componentes78. La lectura que se puede hacer de The White Man’s Burden es que Easterly reconoce que los agentes externos no pueden hacer mucho por alinear los incentivos, crear instituciones pertinentes y fomentar las políticas correctas. Señala que son contados los ejemplos del éxito de esfuerzos de actores externos por transformar una sociedad determinada. Es posible —apunta— que la ocupación estadounidense después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial sea uno de los pocos casos en la historia donde alguien ajeno logra la transformación verticalista de una sociedad. De ser así, este hecho no se presta a ser reproducido, pues solo con la aniquilación absoluta se tuvo la oportunidad de rehacer Japón. Sin embargo, la mayoría de las pruebas apuntan hacia factores endógenos: en el escenario más favorecedor, los estadounidenses estaban reconstruyendo una economía ya en sí avanzada79. 76. William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists Adventures and Misadventures In the Tropics, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001, cap. 2. 77. Ibid., caps. 11-12. 78. Ibid., caps. 10-14. 79. Ibid., p. 345.

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Los grandes éxitos de un crecimiento económico sostenido posteriores a la guerra —los de China, Corea del Sur, Hong Kong, Singapur y Botswana incluidos— han sido éxitos obtenidos por cada uno de estos países80. “Incluso cuando Occidente no logra ‘desarrollar a El Resto, El Resto se desarrolla por sí mismo’. El éxito de desarrollo de El Resto se debe, mayoritariamente, a esfuerzos independientes y exploratorios; a tomar prestadas ideas, instituciones y tecnología occidentales cuando así le conviene a El Resto”81. Desde el punto de vista de Easterly, la ayuda está desafortunadamente dominada por planeadores y no por buscadores. Los planeadores establecen metas específicas —como los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio— y diseñan elaboradas estrategias para alcanzarlas. Los planeadores fracasan porque las circunstancias locales siempre son complejas. Por lo general, los actores externos no comprenden a cabalidad el entorno en el que operan. Los programas tienen consecuencias no previstas. Los buscadores, en cambio, establecen metas generales —como reducir la pobreza— y después identifican programas específicos que sean eficaces. El modelo organizacional adecuado, señala Easterly, debería ser el de “salir del paso” de Lindblom82. Easterly no niega que un mal gobierno pueda destruir las posibilidades de crecimiento y desarrollo. “Sabemos que la flagrante violación del libre mercado y el autoengrandecimiento brutal de los autócratas suele impedir el éxito”83. Sin embargo, es muy escéptico ante el llamado a que actores externos intervengan. En un artículo publicado en la revista Boston Review en el que retoma las propuestas de Collier sobre la provisión externa de seguridad, Easterly afirma que: “las intervenciones agresivas de esa naturaleza tendrán, casi sin lugar a duda, consecuencias negativas tencionadas. ¿Generará más violencia local la violencia occidental? ¿Habrá un contragolpe dirigido a la intervención extranjera? […] El lema ‘primero, no lastimes’ pone el peso de la prueba en los académicos que intervienen”84. Moyo, Collier, Easterly —todos autores que se basan en la lógica causal de la elección racional— llegan a conclusiones muy diferentes sobre la ayuda y la construcción de Estado. Moyo pide la supresión de la ayuda; Collier, el fin de la soberanía Wesfaliana-Vatteliana; Easterly, esfuerzos poco sistemáticos para mejorar la vida individual de las personas. La diferencia entre los estudiosos que trabajan desde una perspectiva de elección racional estriba en la importancia que atribuyan a la falta de un buen ejercicio de gobierno, en particular en lo que se refiere a la provisión de seguridad. Raymond Fisman y Edward Miguel lo explican con 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Easterly, The White Man’s Burden, cap. 10. Ibid., p. 363. Ibid., pp. 11-17. Ibid., p. 363. Easterly, Boston Review, 2009, en http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/easterly.php

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claridad: “Entre los economistas existe un desacuerdo fundamental en el tema de ayuda externa. [Esencialmente,] se reduce a si los países ricos ya han proporcionado demasiado dinero […] o ni siquiera el suficiente. Resulta que la respuesta depende enormemente del punto de vista que se tenga sobre el papel de la corrupción y la violencia en el empobrecimiento de las naciones”85. Moyo asume que si se pone fin a la ayuda extranjera, la corrupción disminuirá significativamente. Collier argumenta que algunos países se ven atrapados en una situación de conflicto que impide acuerdos autovinculantes beneficiosos según el principio de Pareto entre las elites locales y que, en ese caso, la intervención extranjera es el único camino a seguir para lograr el crecimiento. Easterly, refutando a Collier, opina que una intervención torpe por parte de Occidente —y nada lo es más que la provisión de seguridad— puede, fácilmente, empeorar la situación: es mejor permitir que los países salgan del paso y que las agencias de ayuda apoyen los pasos exitosos.

CONCLUSIONES: TEORÍA Y PRÁCTICA En el ámbito académico estadounidense, la elección racional ha llegado a dominar la discusión intelectual sobre el desarrollo del Estado. Sin embargo, en el ámbito de la ayuda extranjera, más relacionado con las políticas, es un elemento menor, si no es que completamente inexistente. En la práctica, la asignación de fondos de asistencia exterior se basa principalmente en la teoría de la modernización y en inquietudes relativas a la capacidad institucional. Alrededor de 90% del flujo de la ayuda es consistente con la teoría de la modernización y con enfoques que ponen el acento en la capacidad institucional. El Sistema de Notificación por parte de los Países Acreedores (CRS, por sus siglas en inglés) de la OCDE recoge información sobre los flujos de ayuda oficial al desarrollo (OAD) por actividad para los veintidós miembros del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo y para varios otros donantes multilaterales como la Asociación Internacional de Desarrollo (AID) y la Comunidad Europea. El CRS tiene 194 códigos de sector destino que incluyen prácticamente cualquier tipo de actividad de ayuda imaginable; por ejemplo: salud, educación, seguridad, consolidación de la paz, abastecimiento de agua, alivio de deuda, ayuda humanitaria, apoyo presupuestal, medio ambiente, agricultura, pesca, infraestructura y apoyo a las ONG. Estos códigos son una manera de ver cómo los flujos de la asistencia extranjera caen sobre los tres distintos enfoques que se describen en este artículo. En el periodo 2002-2007, un poco más de 70% de los apoyos se realizaron en concordancia con la 85. Raymond Fisman y Edward Miguel, Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 10.

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teoría de la modernización. Entre los grandes rubros de esta categoría están el apoyo presupuestal directo y el alivio de deuda. Alrededor de 19% siguió patrones afines a la capacidad institucional. La mayoría de estos fondos fueron asignados a gestión administrativa y capacitación de varios sectores. Aproximadamente 9% de los fondos se desembolsaron de acuerdo con el principio de elección racional. La aceptación implícita de la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional que se observa tanto en declaraciones públicas como en la propia asignación de recursos no es resultado del conocimiento empírico. Los resultados de la investigación sobre la eficacia de la ayuda son, en el mejor de los casos, ambivalentes86. Si la ayuda fuera un negocio que tuviera como objetivo promover el crecimiento económico, habría caído en bancarrota hace muchos años, incluso si se considera que una gran parte de la ayuda ha sido utilizada con fines estratégicos y políticos que pueden no guardar relación alguna con el apoyo al desarrollo87. A pesar de los cuestionables resultados obtenidos por el flujo de ayuda distribuida de acuerdo con la teoría de la modernización y, desde la década de 1990, con los principios de la capacidad institucional, se ha prestado poca atención a los enfoques sustentados en la elección racional. El escaso atractivo de estos últimos en el ámbito de las políticas no se debe a la falta de conocimientos académicos. Las agencias para el desarrollo, tanto nacionales como multilaterales, según decíamos, están repletas de especialistas. El grado en que las teorías de la modernización y de la capacidad institucional siguen orientando la asignación de recursos más bien refleja lo que James Scott llama “desde el punto de vista de un Estado”88. Los Estados —señala Scott— deben ser capaces de hacer “legibles” los entornos social, económico y político, es decir, manejables desde el punto de vista administrativo. Antes del siglo XX, la actividad del Estado se limitaba fundamentalmente a los impuestos, al servicio militar y al mantenimiento del orden político interno. Cuando el Estado quiso gravar la tierra, promovió que un sistema de plena propiedad delimitada por mapas catastrales sustituyera las prácticas tradicionales donde los derechos de suelo se podían dividir según las distintas actividades (pastoreo, agricultura, tala) y las lindes podían traslaparse entre distintos dueños y la propiedad de la tierra podía ser colectiva, familiar e incluso individual. Cuando el 86. Craig Burnside y David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth”, American Economic Review, vol. 90, nº 4, 2000, pp. 847-868; Raghuram G. Rajan y Arvind Subramanian, “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?”, Review of Economics and Stati tics, vol. 90, núm. 4, 2008, pp. 643-665. 87. Para un análisis del valor, en términos de ayuda extranjera, de un escaño en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, véase Ilyana Kuziemko y Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign AID and Bribery at the United Nations”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 114, nº 5, 2006, pp. 905-930. 88. Scott, op. cit.

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Estado buscó reclutar o gravar a los individuos, insistió en que se asignaran apellidos, un distintivo superfluo cuando la actividad política estaba en manos del noble local. La ampliación del campo de acción del Estado en los siglos XIX y XX no habría sido posible si no se hubiera hecho legible un número significativamente mayor de esferas de la vida social y económica89. Es difícil lograr que la ayuda extranjera sea legible, particularmente cuando se trata de analizar las aportaciones en términos de resultados. Rara vez los donantes tienen un control fidedigno de las acciones dentro de los países receptores. Su conocimiento del entorno local es —como señala Easterly— inevitablemente limitado. En la mayoría de los casos, la enorme cantidad de factores que pueden afectar el desenlace dificulta juzgar la utilidad de cualquier programa determinado90. Sí se puede lograr que las aportaciones de ayuda extranjera concordantes con la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional sean legibles o manejables. En el caso de la teoría de la modernización, la atención se centra en destinar recursos a los Estados meta. La aspiración más frecuente de la comunidad internacional ha sido que se destine 0,7% del PIB a asistencia para el desarrollo. Medir ese objetivo no representa ningún problema. Es posible lograr que la construcción de capacidad institucional se pueda leer midiendo el número de personas capacitadas o la cantidad de asistencia técnica proporcionada. Por ejemplo, un elemento crítico de la política estadounidense en Iraq y Afganistán ha sido la capacitación de un número previamente determinado de policías y militares. Medir qué hacen esas personas después de haber sido capacitadas resulta más complejo y puede generar cuestionamientos sobre la conveniencia de haberlos capacitado en primera instancia. Las aportaciones a la construcción de capacidades institucionales son legibles; los resultados quizá no lo sean. No es del todo posible, en cambio, lograr que los programas de asistencia basados en la elección racional sean legibles por el simple hecho de reportar las aportaciones, particularmente cuando se trata de programas diseñados para modificar los escenarios internos de elección más que los externos. Es difícil defender la inversión en organizaciones de la sociedad civil, en capacitación de legisladores o para apoyar un sistema judicial más independiente como un fin en sí mismo. Más bien, es de esperarse que gracias a este tipo de programas la adopción de políticas que procuren mayor bienestar a la sociedad en su conjunto sea más atractiva para 89. Ibid., caps. 1-2. 90. Existen algunas excepciones, como el Plan de Emergencia del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América para el Alivio del Sida (PEPFAR, por sus siglas en inglés), que entrega antivirales directamente a las personas. Sin embargo, incluso en este caso, el impacto en el sistema de prestación de servicios de salud en su conjunto de los países receptores es incierto, ya que el PEPFAR podría conducir a una asignación de recursos que no fuera la óptima para alcanzar objetivos de salud más amplios.

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los líderes políticos. Sin embargo, no existe donante internacional alguno que pueda tener una certeza sobre el impacto real de estos programas. Es difícil saber cómo una legislatura que contara con mayores apoyos cambiaría los cálculos personales de los líderes políticos. La elección racional indica que la ayuda extranjera es como el capital de riesgo donde solo un porcentaje pequeño de las inversiones tienen resultados positivos. La diferencia radica en que los Estados requieren mayor previsibilidad y consistencia que los inversionistas de capital de riesgo. Actualmente, las discusiones en el entorno académico están dominadas por las perspectivas de elección racional que subrayan la importancia de incentivos, conductas estratégicas y, por lo general, también de las instituciones. Por el contrario, en el ámbito de los sistemas de gobierno, la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de instituciones alimentan tanto la retórica como el comportamiento en sí de las agencias para el desarrollo. Sin importar cuán lógicamente convincente sea el razonamiento de la elección racional, para quienes diseñan las políticas será difícil aceptar sus implicaciones en el campo de la ayuda extranjera. Aun cuando Easterly probablemente esté en lo correcto cuando señala la necesidad de contar con buscadores más que con planeadores, el tipo de programas de asistencia que él suscribe es ilegible. Las conclusiones a las que llegan Collier y Moyo, independientemente de su mérito, se encontrarían con la oposición de importantes electores en los principales países donantes. Por lo menos en la Europa social demócrata, gran parte del electorado quiere brindar ayuda. Por otro lado, los Estados no están deseosos de comprometer tropas, aunque —como señala Collier— en muchas situaciones el número requerido para imponer la paz sea bastante modesto. Tal vez la ayuda fundamentada en las teorías de la modernización y de la capacidad institucional no funcione —o por lo menos ha resultado difícil demostrar que sí lo hace—, pero seguirá dominando las prácticas de las agencias de ayuda tanto a nivel nacional como multilateral.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA ACEMOGLU, Daron y ROBINSON, James A. (2006): Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. — (2007): “On the Economic Origins of Democracy”, Daedalus, vol. 136, nº 1, pp. 160-162. ACEMOGLU, Daron; JOHNSON, Simon; ROBINSON, James A. y YARED, Pierre (2007): “Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis”, documento de trabajo 13334, NBER, 2007, en http://www.nber.org/papers/w13334 BANCO MUNDIAL, COMISIÓN DE CRECIMIENTO Y DESARROLLO (2008): The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, World Bank, Washington, D. C. Disponible en http://cgd.s3.amazonaws.com/GrowthReportComplete.pdf BATES, Robert H. (2008): When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late Century Africa, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. BESLEY, Timothy y PERSSON, Torsten (2009): “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics”, American Economics Review, vol. 99, nº 4, pp. 1218-1244.

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BOIX, Carles y STOKES, Susan (s. f.): “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics, vol. 55, nº 4, pp. 517-549. BUENO DE MESQUITA, Bruce y ROOT, Hilton L. (2002): “The Political Roots of Poverty: The Economic Logic of Autocracy”, The National Interest, 68, pp. 27-38. BURNSIDE, Craig y DOLLAR, David (2000): “Aid, Policies, and Growth”, American Economic Review, vol. 90, nº 4, pp. 847-68. COLLIER, Paul (2007): The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Oxford University Press, Nueva York. — (2009): Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Harper Collins, Nueva York. EASTERLY, William (2001): The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge, MIT Press. — (2006): The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Penguin Press, Nueva York. — (2009): Boston Review. Disponible en http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/easterly.php FAZAL, Tanisha (2007): State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, Princeton University Press, Princeton. FISMAN, Raymond y MIGUEL, Edward (2008): Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton. FUKUYAMA, Francis (2004): State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. GHANI, Ashraf y LOCKHART, Claire (2008): Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Oxford University Press, Nueva York. GIROD, Desha M. (2008): “Foreign Aid and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, tesis doctoral, Stanford University, Stanford. HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. (1968): Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven. INGLEHART, Ronald y WELZEL, Christian (2005): Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. — (2009): “How Development Leads to Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, nº 2. KUZIEMKO, Ilyana y WERKER, Eric (2006): “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 114, nº 5, pp. 905-930. LERNER, Daniel (1958): The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Free Press, Nueva York. LIPSET, S. M. (1959): “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 53, nº 1, pp. 69-105. MEYER, John W.; BOLI, John; THOMAS, George M. y RAMÍREZ, Francisco O. (1997): “World Society and the Nation-State”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103, nº 1, pp. 144-181. MOYO, Dambisa (2009): Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, Nueva York. NORTH, Douglass C.; WALLACE, John Joseph y WEINGAST, Barry R. (2009): Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. OECD (2005): The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Disponible en http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf — (s. f.): Creditor Reporting System. Disponible en http://stats.oecd.org/ Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW PARIS, Roland (2004): At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. PRZEWORSKI, Adam; ALVAREZ, Michael E.; CHEIBUB, José Antonio y LIMONGI, Fernando (2000): Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. ROSTOW, Walt W. (1960): The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non--Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York. RAJAN, Raghuram G. y SUBRAMANIAN, Arvind (2008): “Aid and Growth: What Does the CrossCountry Evidence Really Show?”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 90, nº 4, pp. 643-665. SACHS, Jeffrey D. (2005): The End of Poverty Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin Books, Nueva York. SCOTT, James C. (1996): Seeing Like a State, Yale University Press, New Haven. SPRUYT, Hendrik (1996): The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, Princeton University Press, Princeton. TILLY, Charles (1990): Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990-1990, Cambridge, Mass., Basil Blackwell. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN (2009): “Documento de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos en Kabul/US-FOR Afghanistan”. Disponible en http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryand mcchrystal.pdf VU, Tuong (2010): “Studying the State through State Formation”, World Politics, vol. 62, nº 1, pp. 148-175.

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Lectura 2

Should global goal setting continue, and how, in the post-2015 era?* Sakiko Fukuda-Parr**

INTRODUCTION The 21st century began with an unprecedented commitment to a new consensus on ending poverty as the central purpose of international development. World leaders from 189 countries, including 147 Heads of State and Government, gathered at the United Nations General Assembly to define the central challenges for the new century. They adopted the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000 (A/RES/55/2)) which stated their determination to work towards development and poverty eradication, peace and security, environmental conservation, democracy and human rights. They pledged to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty” (paragraph 11). They further emphasized that the global reach of these commitments went beyond their own national borders to people worldwide, notwithstanding the primary responsibility that Governments have for their own citizens. The Declaration was a visionary document that reiterated the shared values of solidarity, equality, dignity and respect for nature as the basis for their consensus and was exceptional for its clear vision and articulation. It was also particularly powerful because it went beyond vision and values and included a concrete action plan by setting ambitious and measurable goals with a clearly defined deadline. One year later, the Secretary-General published his implementation plan, the Road Map document (A/56/326), which contained, in an annex, a list of goals derived from the Declaration. These were structured and elaborated as 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators and packaged with a new catchy name, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)1. The purpose of this * This paper appeared in José Antonio Alonso, Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Rob Vos (2013): Alternative Development Strategies for the Post-2015 Era, The United Nations Series, New York, pp. 35-68. The author is grateful for comments from the workshop on Alternative Strategies for the Post-2015 Era held at the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in Florence, Italy on 7-8 December 2011, particularly those of Ana Luiza Cortez and Frances Stewart. The paper draws on collaborative work with Frances Stewart on the report of the UN Committee for Development Policy on its fourteenth plenary session to the Economic and Social Council and with Joshua Greenstein on MDG progress measurement. The usual caveats apply. ** She is Professor of International Affairs at the New School University, New York. She is also member of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy (CPD). 1. In 2005 the list was expanded to include 21 targets and 60 indicators.

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list was to “harmonize reporting on the Millennium Declaration” (p. 55, paragraph 1). The expiration of the MDGs in 2015 raises several questions: should they expire, be renewed with an extended deadline, or be replaced with a new set of global goals? The objective of this paper is to argue for the last option. The expiry is an opportunity to correct some of the deficiencies of the MDG approach, and to set new goals that more adequately reflect the equitable growth and human rightsbased development strategy set out in the Millennium Declaration. The paper begins with a critical review of the MDG experience, highlights its importance in development debates and outcomes, and its flaws in composition and implementation. The subsequent section details the MDG experience by explaining their goals as a normative instrument rooted in human rights and their origins in the controversies of the 1980s and 90s. The paper then proposes an approach to setting post2015 goals based on the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration. The final section concludes.

THE MDG EXPERIENCE: 2001-2011 THE IMPORTANCE OF MDGS Poverty as a global priority According to Weiss, Jolly and Emmerij (2009), the MDGs were among the most important UN ideas that changed the world. Like most UN resolutions, the MDGs could have been forgotten within a few weeks or months of their introduction, but they continue to dominate international debates on development. As one of the architects of the MDGs remarks, “The conceivers of the MDGs never expected the support to spread so wide and so deep” (Vandemoortele, 2009). The MDGs have become the standard reference point around which international debates on development revolve. They are used as a proxy to judge progress in tackling global poverty. The UN, the World Bank and numerous other international bodies monitor MDG implementation and issue annual reports with detailed data. The staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) systematically include data on MDG targets in their country reports, along with key macroeconomic performance indicators. UN meetings to review progress in achieving MDGs have become both frequent and high-profile political events that are significant for a country’s prestige and international standing. Political leaders make speeches defending policy 176

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initiatives with the warning: “Without such and such action the MDGs will not be achieved”. Economists write research papers on macroeconomic policy choices and evaluate them against contributions to achieving MDGs. Local NGOs advocate national budget reforms “to achieve the MDGs”, however critical they may be of these goals, because the MDGs are the accepted standard to evaluate policy. Media reports on poverty refer to failure to achieve MDGs as a demonstration of pervasive abject poverty. In other words, MDGs have become a convenient shorthand of development and poverty alleviation… The MDGs have raised awareness of ending global poverty as an urgent challenge and a priority for global action. They have helped to maintain development as a priority, not only at the UN, but also in other fora such as meetings of the G-8 and G-20. But their importance in shaping international development debates goes further. Since their introduction in 2001, the MDGs have become increasingly accepted and consolidated as the legitimized framework for debates on international development. Even those who initially opposed them or hesitated to embrace them now use them2. In so doing, MDGs have shaped the international development debates in several ways. First, the MDGs institutionalized the consensus on ending poverty—their broad purpose as a whole or a package—as an international norm (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011)3. Second, the MDGs have come to reshape the concept of “development” to mean ending poverty. Poverty has not been the central issue in development, but has been more about transforming economic structures and creating capacity for sustainable growth. Yet, as I will explore later in this paper, this reconceptualization of development has also had perverse effects on development policy debates by over-simplifying the challenges involved.

2. For example, initially many NGOs were hesitant to espouse the MDGs because they did not agree with the list of goals, targets and indicators or objected to the lack of adequate consultation in the way they were drawn up, or because they replaced agendas that they were pursuing. But over time, they have become more broadly accepted and some of the initial critics have begun to use them as the consensus framework for development efforts. For example, the human rights community initially ignored or criticized them (Alston, 2005) but changed course and adopted a more constructive approach to use the MDGs to pursue a human rights and development agenda (OHCHR 2008). 3. The MDG narrative meets the criteria of a norm that has become well established according to the trajectory of international norm dynamics elaborated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Norms emerge, then cascade, and then reach the final stage of becoming “institutionalized”. At this stage, norms take on “a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.” (p. 9). The mechanisms that keep the norm alive at this stage are “habit” and “institutionalization”. The main actors are the professions and bureaucracy who uphold and adhere to the norm in order to conform to a recognized standard. In contrast, it is the idealistically committed “norm entrepreneurs” who drive the emergence of a norm, and states and organizations that promote its “cascade”. See Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2010).

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Third, the MDGs have helped defining poverty as a multidimensional deprivation in the lives of people, including such dimensions as education, health, environment, food, employment, housing, and gender equality—or “human poverty”4. Since the 1990s, the question of how poverty should be defined and measured has been a subject of much controversy. Though it is now widely recognized that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and a human centred concern, the most frequently used definition has been consumption based, and its measurement defined as the money-centric headcount below a threshold level of income5.

MDGS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY National Governments and donor agencies have consistently adopted MDGs as an important part of their policy frameworks. What this has meant, in practice, has ranged from rhetorical adoption, such as referring to them in general policy statements, to instrumental adoption, such as using the targets to drive resource allocation and policy shifts. For example, as part of the MDG implementation effort, the UN Millennium project made a major effort to assist Governments with the necessary cost and programme investments to achieve the 2015 targets. In most cases, these estimates were controversial and were not incorporated into national planning, budgeting and resource mobilization processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, national development plans and budgets. In fact, in a 2008 study (Fukuda-Parr 2008) I reviewed 22 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)6 under implementation and found that they consistently referred to the MDGs as a major national development objective, but not all included timelines or action plans for achieving the targets. Moreover, those that did were selective about which of the 8 goals and 18 targets were incorporated in the papers. While many included income poverty, primary education, child mortality and water goals, other goals (e.g., decent work, food and nutrition, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and global partnerships) were consistently neglected. Additionally, many PRSPs adopted a strategy of economic growth and social sector investments without considering distributional challenges. Implicitly, PRSPs have assumed that aggregate 4. “Human poverty” was introduced by the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report and refers to multiple capability deprivations (UNDP, 1997). 5. See Stewart and others (2007) for a detailed review of alternative definitions and measures of poverty. 6. PRSPs are prepared by Governments of low-income countries and serve as a framework for reaching agreement with the donors on development priorities and financing requirements. The study included all “second generation” (second PRSP prepared by the country) PRSPs existing at the time of the study.

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national economic growth and social sector expansion would lead to the achievement of the goals through a process of “trickle down” without acknowledging the considerable evidence that macroeconomic policies may have distributional impacts that can undermine poverty reduction. Only one of the PRSPs reviewed mentioned inequality and gave attention to the most vulnerable. The same study reviewed policy frameworks of 21 bilateral donors and found all consistently mentioned MDGs as overall objectives. Environmental sustainability, education, health and global diseases as well as income poverty were the goals mostly cited. Priority was also given to governance, including human rights and democracy, as well as peace and security that are chapters of the Millennium Declaration but were not included in the MDGs. However, none of the donors have adopted MDGs as a framework for allocation of resources and for programming purposes. Nonetheless, there has been a perceptible increase in funding for social sectors and within these sectors, for primary basic services (see tables 1 and 2). ODA for other MDG priorities, notably food production and agriculture, which are important for reducing hunger and malnutrition and for reducing rural poverty, also increased but less markedly. Increased ODA allocation to primary basic services took place at the expense of other sectors. The proportion of aid allocated by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to basic social services increased from 10.1% in 1999 to 21.0% in 2009 while the proportion of ODA for building trade capacity declined from 38.5% in 2001 to 28.9% in 2009. TABLE 1

ODA COMMITMENTS BY OECD/DAC BILATERAL DONORS, 1990-2010 ($2010 MILLIONS)

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Social Infrastructure and Services

19,844

20,231

20,919

34,174

44,333

Production Sectors

10,322

6,755

4,405

5,997

8,977

-

2,142

2,219

3,042

5,372

General Budget Support

1,155

1,291

561

1,826

2,365

Education Total

8,631

7,307

5,522

6,656

9,470

-

775

1,166

1,910

2,510

2,441

2,845

2,385

4,076

5,116

Basic Health

-

1,266

1,329

2,532

2,945

Food Crop Production

-

83

66

102

239

Agriculture

Basic Education Health Total

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (2011A), HTTP://MDGS.UN.ORG/UNSD/MDG/RESOURCES/STATIC/DATA/2011%20STAT%20ANNEX.PDF. ACCESSED APRIL 14, 2012.

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TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF TOTAL BILATERAL, SECTOR-ALLOCABLE ODA OF OECD/DAC BILATERAL DONORS TO BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND AID FOR TRADE, 1999-2009 (PER CENT)

Basic social services (MDG indicator 8.2) Aid for trade (MDG indicator 8.9)

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

10.1

14.0

15.7

15.9

19.9

21.0

-

38.5

29.0

30.7

27.7

28.9

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (2011A) HTTP://MDGS.UN.ORG/UNSD/MDG/RESOURCES/STATIC/DATA/2011%20STAT%20ANNEX.PDF. ACCESSED APRIL 14, 2012.

While the years following the introduction of the MDGs were notable for the ambitious and high profile political commitments made by the G-8 countries, such as the pledge to double development aid to Africa (or 0.51% of their GNIs) made at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, they have largely not been implemented (United Nations, 2011: 12, figure 3), except for a few cases7. Moreover, no significant international poverty initiatives were launched, and the rich countries have not shifted their positions on critical international economic policies including trade, finance, investment and technology transfer. As the title of the UN MDG Gap Task Force 2011 report, “The Global Partnership for Development: Time to Deliver”, makes clear, donor countries have fallen far short of implementing their Goal 8 targets for aid, trade, debt and technology (United Nations, 2011a). So far, the only tangible progress in these areas has been the reduction of the debt burden of the poorest countries. Multilateral trade negotiations—the Doha Round, labelled the “development round”—have become deadlocked, largely over differences between developing and developed country positions on agricultural subsidies in the developed countries. Aid commitments have increased in volume, but these trends started before 2000 and have slowed since 2006. Moreover ODA flows still remained at 0.31% of donor GNI in 2010, far short of the UN target of 0.7% of GNI. There has been substantial reallocation to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)— from $21 billion in 2000 to $29 billion by 2009 (2009 prices and exchange rates). But this is still only 0.10% cent of donors’ GNI compared with the UN target for ODA to LDCs of 0.15-0.2% of GNI (United Nations, 2011a: 10, table 1). Beyond Governments, the MDGs have spawned numerous responses on the part of local governments, civil society and businesses across the world. For example, in 7. The US doubled aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2009, one year ahead of the pledge; Canada doubled funding from 2001 levels; Norway surpassed the pledge to maintain ODA at 1% of GNI, and Switzerland increased its ODA to 0.41% of GNI.

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Ecuador, local governments used MDGs as a framework for establishing priority action plans. In Brazil, the MDGs have mobilized the national petroleum company to initiate social projects. The numbers participating in the “Stand Up Against Poverty” campaign have mushroomed into millions. There are numerous other examples, though it is difficult to assess the impact of these diverse and disparate initiatives. TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE MDGS

IMPROVEMENT SINCE 1990

DISTANCE PROGRESSED TO GLOBAL GOAL (100% = GOAL ATTAINED) ON TRACK

FASTER THAN FASTER PROGRESS HISTORICAL 1990-2000/2000-8 PATTERNS

I. Global Progress Poverty

Y

80

Y

Y

-

Undernourishment

Y

77

N

N

-

Primary Education

Y

90

N

Y

N

Gender Equality*

Y

96

Y

N

N

Child Mortality

Y

69

N

Y

Y

Maternal Mortality

Y

57

N

Y

Y

Drinking Water

Y

88

Y

N

-

II. National Progress

% OF COUNTRIES MAKING % OF COUNTRIES PROGRESS ON TRACK Poverty

% OF COUNTRIES FASTER PROGRESS THAN PRE-MDGS

% OF COUNTRIES OUTPERFORMING HISTORICAL PATTERNS

FASTER THAN HISTORICAL PATTERNS

63

47

51

-

-

Undernourishment

55

25

-

-

-

Primary Education

75

55

35

68

-

Gender Equality*

61

89/82**

46

56

-

Child Mortality

95

36

32

51

-

Maternal Mortality

83

30

-

33

-

Drinking Water

73

66

34

-

-

NOTES: * REPRESENTS THE PROPORTION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR WHICH THE APPROPRIATE DATA IS AVAILABLE. ** GENDER EQUALITY FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, RESPECTIVELY. SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 12).

Surprisingly, the consensus on poverty as a policy priority has not led to fundamental debates or new thinking about policy alternatives for faster poverty reduction. Over the last half-century, many ideas have marked the evolution of development thought and driven historical shifts in theory and strategies. Some examples that come 181

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to mind include Basic Needs in the 1970s, structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, and Human Development in the 1990s, all of which brought elements of theoretical ideas with practical policy strategies. Such shifts in policy strategies did not occur since the consensus on poverty as a priority emerged. While poverty reduction was identified as the “overarching” objective, development strategies continued to follow the approach of the 1990s that emphasized macroeconomic stabilization as the priority objective through the application of “Washington Consensus” policies to promote aggregate economic growth through private investments. Greater focus has been placed on social sector investments to meet basic needs and on social protection, including conditional cash transfers. For sure, important studies have been published and there have been many departures from the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. Social investments and protection, including initiatives such as conditional cash transfers, have emerged as important priorities. But the core macroeconomic strategies have remained unchallenged. The MDGs did not propel new thinking about challenging the macroeconomic policy approaches of the Washington Consensus framework and their implications for poverty reduction have not emerged into mainstream international policy debates. In other words, the core Washington Consensus policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization have continued to dominate development strategies, only supplemented by emphasis on social investments. New development strategies and approaches have emerged not from mainstream thinking and advice from the international community, but from innovation within developing countries that have not been in IMF policy-based lending programmes. These approaches have included not only alternative growth strategies, but also poverty reduction strategies, particularly in Brazil and several other Latin American countries which have achieved not only stable economic growth and weathered the global financial crisis, but have also reduced inequality. These policy approaches are similar to those that have been raised by interventionists, in terms of promoting expansionary macroeconomic policies, expanding employment, and raising incomes of the poorest through targeted programs such as conditional cash transfers.

OUTCOMES It is difficult to assess whether the MDGs have had an impact on the pace of poverty reduction and development outcomes, since it is impossible to attribute any recent trends to the MDGs as opposed to the myriad of other factors that 182

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have driven national poverty outcomes. But the problem remains that while poverty reduction has continued globally, progress has been too slow and unevenly distributed (table 3). Overall, the pace of progress has not accelerated, with Sub-Saharan Africa showing faster progress than other regions (table 4). Progress has been uneven also among different social groups, thus reflecting persistent horizontal inequalities (table 5). TABLE 4

GLOBAL POVERTY ESTIMATES, 1990-2015 PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION

NUMBER OF POOR (MILLIONS)

1990

2005

2015

1990

2005

2015*

East Asia and Pacific

54.7

16.8

5.9

873.3

316.2

119.0

China

60.2

15.9

4.8

683.2

207.7

66.1

2.0

3.7

1.2

9.1

17.3

5.8

11.3

8.2

4.7

49.6

45.1

29.1

4.3

3.6

1.3

9.7

11.0

4.8

South Asia

51.7

40.3

22.4

579.2

595.6

379.3

India

51.3

41.6

22.4

435.5

455.8

276.8

Sub-Saharan Africa

57.6

50.9

35.8

295.7

388.4

344.7

Total

41.7

25.2

14.4

1,816.6

1,373.5

882.7

-

-

-

1,133.4

1,165.8

816.6

East Asia and Pacific

79.8

38.7

19.7

1,273.70

728.7

399.4

China

84.6

36.3

15.4

960.8

473.7

213.4

6.9

8.9

4.5

31.9

41.9

21.4

Latin America and the Caribbean

19.7

16.6

10.7

86.3

91.3

66.3

Middle East and North Africa

19.7

16.9

7.2

44.4

51.5

26.2

South Asia

82.7

73.9

57.1

926

1,091.5

967.2

India

82.6

75.6

56.9

701.6

827.7

702.0

Sub-Saharan Africa

76.2

73.0

57.7

391.2

556.7

555.6

63.2

47.0

33.1

2,753.5

2,561.5

2,036.1

-

-

-

1,792.7

2,087.8

1,822.7

$1.25 Poverty line

Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa

Total, excluding China $2 Poverty line

Europe and Central Asia

Total Total, excluding China

NOTES: * PROJECTIONS. SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 13-14).

The UN and other international agencies assess progress made against the 2015 targets, focussing on the level of achievement. According to the 2011 UN MDG Progress Report (United Nations, 2011c), globally, the 2015 targets for income poverty (goal 1) and water (goal 7) are on track to be met, while there is steady progress 183

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in the reduction of child mortality (goal 4), malaria and other global diseases (goal 6). Primary school enrollment has been advancing, but the pace has begun to slow down and the goal of universal enrollment may not be achieved. More alarmingly, there has been either stagnation or regress for some goals and targets. For instance, the proportion of people who are hungry (goal 1) has plateaued at 16% since 2000/2002; the number of undernourished people grew from 817 million in 1990/92 to 830 million in 2005/2007; employment and decent work (goal 1) have shown a setback in many countries; progress has been slow in gender equality and empowerment, other than in primary education (goal 3), and in reducing maternal mortality (goal 5). TABLE 5

SELECTED MDG INDICATORS: NATIONAL AVERAGE AND SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS

NATIONAL AVERAGE

WOMEN

RURAL POPULATION

POOREST 20%

MDG 1 - Underweight prevalence in children under five, 2003-2009 (%) Developing countries excl. China

23

24

28

40

Sub-Saharan Africa

22

21

25

29

South Asia

42

42

45

56

LDCs

28

27

30

34

China

6

7

8

-

India

43

43

46

57

Developing countries excl. China

81

64

61

51

Sub-Saharan Africa

72

58

55

45

South Asia

74

59

58

44

LDCs

76

65

62

56

China

94

-

-

-

India

70

56

54

40

Developing countries excl. China

63

-

50

28

Sub-Saharan Africa

46

-

36

24

South Asia

42

-

33

17

LDCs

38

-

29

24

China

98

-

97

..

India

47

-

38

19

MDG 4 - Measles coverage, 2008 (%)

MDG 5 - Births attended by skilled health personnel, 2003-2009 (%)

SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 17).

The impact of the MDGs on changing policy behaviour and outcomes would be reflected not on the levels of achievement but rather on whether the pace of 184

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progress had improved. Countries have different starting points, and, for many countries, achieving the MDGs may not be feasible even if they were to adopt improved efforts resulting in better performance (Clemens and others, 2007). In another paper (Fukuda-Parr and others, forthcoming), my co-authors and I have argued that the criterion for success should be improvement in performance to be measured by the pace of progress. We proposed a methodology for this criterion and made estimates for 24 MDG indicators. Our findings were disappointing at the country level, but more encouraging for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia as regions. We found improved performance by a majority of countries for just five of the 24 indicators studied. On the other hand, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries showed improved progress for 16 indicators (table 3). At the global level, the pace of progress improved for under-5 mortality rate, measles immunization and gender parity in primary schooling, but not for attended births or safe drinking water. For income poverty, the pace improved in all developing regions. South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa— the two regions with the highest concentrations of poverty—showed consistent improvement and performed better than the other regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been made at a faster rate for all but one indicator for which data are available since the MDGs were introduced. In South Asia, improvements have accelerated for all indicators, except child mortality and child malnutrition. While it is not possible to attribute the improved progress to the MDG initiative, the record of improvement is encouraging. In brief, the impact of MDGs on outcomes and policy is ambiguous, uneven and limited at best, while the initiative has been a significant factor in shaping international debates. The MDGs did not introduce a new concept or policy strategy, but created a narrative that has raised global awareness of poverty as a compelling moral challenge requiring urgent action. The narrative has become a consensus framework for debate on international development. The MDGs are widely accepted among the key development stakeholders, including national governments, donor agencies, NGOs, and local civil society groups, regardless of their views about the MDG relevance as a development strategy. The importance of this new awareness and consensus should not be underestimated considering that the pursuit of development priorities in the globalized and democratically governed world requires the public at large to share commitments to these priorities as a matter of ethical imperatives of a common humanity. The MDGs are associated with an increase in social sector investments, notably in aid allocations, but this is the continuation of a trend that started prior to the introduction of the MDGs. If there is causation, we might ask if donor policies drove the MDGs rather than the other way round. 185

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THE CONTROVERSIES The MDGs have generated critical debates among both development practitioners and researchers, particularly when they were initially introduced. The numerous points that have been raised can be categorized into two sets of issues: (1) those that concern the composition of the goals, targets and indicators, and (2) those that relate to the development and implementation processes. With respect to the composition of the lists, critics have raised the following issues:

• Poorly designed development goals: The methodology for setting the goals has been inconsistent and apparently arbitrary (Easterly, 2009; Saith, 2006), the levels set are unrealistic for many countries (Clemens and others, 2007) and biased against countries with low starting points (Clemens and others, 2007; Easterly, 2009; Fukuda-Parr forthcoming). • Composition is too narrow and excludes important dimensions of development: The publication of MDGs led to strong reactions from many constituencies whose agendas were left out including: reproductive health rights particularly as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)/ International Development Goals (IDGs) included this agenda; gender inequality that was only reflected in the primary education goal; employment; governance; the macroeconomy and structural change; and in more recent years, climate change. In 2005, three new targets and 12 new indicators were added to the list in response to some of these criticisms. Concern for the narrow and unbalanced composition of the targets continues to be raised. While the MDGs draw on chapter III of the Millennium Declaration, they leave out the objectives of chapters IV (environment), V (human rights, democracy and good governance), VI (protecting the vulnerable), and VII (meeting the special needs of Africa). • Lack of attention to important norms and principles, in particular falling short of human rights standards: The human rights community has been highly critical of the MDGs (Alston, 2004). Although the MDGs overlap with many economic and social human rights, they lack some of the key human rights principles including: concern for the most vulnerable and the marginalized; removing discrimination and respecting the equal rights of all; participation; accountability; and standards for rights that require universal access to services (Darrow forthcoming; OHCHR, 2008). 186

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• Lack of attention to equality: the MDGs do not reflect important ethical concerns expressed in the Millennium Declaration for the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable. Similarly, the principles of equality, empowerment and participation have not been adequately reflected (Nelson, 2007; Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Saith, 2006). • Unbalanced international political economy: Goal 8 is weak and lacks hard quantitative 2015 targets. It is also narrow in scope. It is a poor reflection of the agendas advocated by developing countries, notably those related to the asymmetric rules of global trade, international investment and finance, the reduced policy space and quality of aid. From the onset, many developing countries were skeptical of the MDGs for fear they would present another set of conditionalities, while imposing a stronger accountability framework for the developed countries. • Distortion of national priorities: From the start, many civil society groups in developing countries expressed dismay with the MDGs for undermining their advocacy and policy dialogue with their Governments. For example, some of the goals such as universal primary education took the agenda backwards in countries where the challenge was to improve quality in primary schooling and advance access to secondary education. This led one activist to rename the MDGs as the “Most Distracting Gimmick” (Atrobus, 2001). Critics have raised a number of issues with respect to the process of formulation and implementation, as follows:

• Lack of broad consultation in formulation: the MDGs were introduced in the 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General, derived from the Millennium Declaration. Both documents built on the outcome documents of the UN development conferences of the 1990s, but the selection of these outcomes for these documents did not involve wide consultations. This led to criticism from civil society organizations (Bissio, 2003) and lukewarm responses from Governments of developing countries. • Global or national goals?: An important debate exists on the applicability of the goals at the country level. Some have argued that the global goals should be adapted at the national level (Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2010), while others have held that they should be achieved in each and every country (Sachs, 2005). The Millennium Declaration and subsequent UN official documents leave the question unanswered. In practice, 187

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the UN monitoring reports8 apply the goals to each country, though many countries have also adapted the goals to their national contexts. Applying them at the national level and holding Governments accountable is highly problematic, since they impose a one-size-fits-all set of 2015 targets for countries with hugely divergent starting points, constraints, financial resources and capacity (Clemens, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Fukuda-Parr and others, forthcoming). • Criteria for success and methodology of measuring progress: The methodology for assessing performance used by official national and international monitoring reports focuses on the level of achievement relative to the target. This method is biased against countries with low starting points. A more appropriate metric would be to focus on the pace of progress as discussed above (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2010). Countries are committed to doing their best, and they should be held accountable for making faster progress towards ending poverty. It does not make sense to apply a set of one-size-fits-all targets to countries of enormously divergent conditions and means, and judge their success and failure. • Aid-centric process: Development aid has been a major focus of much of the MDG debates and their use. They are applied to developing countries and not to developed countries, and the international monitoring efforts focus on the performance of developing countries, rather than the challenge of poverty worldwide.

MDGS IN CONTEXT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Much of the MDG experience can be explained by a clearer understanding of the concept of global goals as a policy instrument. Global goals are international normative instruments that differ in important ways from national economic and social policies. They draw attention to neglected global priorities. They create incentives to national governments, donors and other development stakeholders, but are not used in a system of resource allocation and legislative enforcement. They are set through a process of political negotiations rather than through technocratic economic management. The strong impact of the MDGs on narrative and their weak influence on development strategies reflect the political dynamics that 8. The annual progress reports report global and regional aggregates. Country progress is tracked in the on-line system that also rates whether countries are “on track” or not to achieving the 2015 targets. http://www.mdgmonitor.org/ accessed 28 January 2012.

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drove the consensus. The criticisms about the list and its implementation as national planning instruments reflect an incorrect interpretation.

ORIGINS OF THE MDGS: CONTROVERSIES OVER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT In an earlier article co-authored with David Hulme (2011), I have explained the motives that drove leaders of the international development community—heads of the World Bank and UN development agencies, the European development ministers and others —to create the MDGs and invest in promoting them. To summarize, their creation was motivated by the need to forge a united community to defend international development as a global project and to reverse the declining support for development aid. During the 1980s and 1990s, the development community was divided by sharp controversies over the structural adjustment lending programmes of the World Bank and IMF which were conditioned on the adoption of Washington Consensus policy reforms. These controversies not only pitted the NGOs and academics against the World Bank and IMF, but also UN agencies such as UNICEF, as well as some stakeholders within national governments, which advocated alternatives. Moreover, development agencies became internally divided as individuals took divergent positions. The MDGs/poverty narrative could help unify this divided community, since no one could argue against ending poverty as a moral concern. It was particularly important for the UN leadership and the development ministers of major bilateral donor countries to put an end to these controversies, because they faced declining support for international development within their respective constituencies. With the end of the Cold War, the geo-political interests no longer sustained support for aid budgets. These motivations led bilateral donors to introduce the IDGs, a list of six quantitative goals with timeframes for achievement, in three areas: economic wellbeing, social development, and environmental sustainability and regeneration (OECD, 1996). As Colin Bradford of the United States delegation explained, it was important to tell a story of aid that spoke directly to conditions of people’s lives to win over the “parliaments and publics”9. The IDGs were effective in articulating the meaning of international cooperation for development and had gained traction in raising awareness in the donor countries. They were a concrete articulation of a consensus donor vision of development published in the 1996 statement of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD/DAC, 1996) entitled “Shaping the 21st Century: Contribution of Development Cooperation in the 21st Century”. The statement gave three 9. Interview with Colin Bradford, New York, 16 October, 2008.

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reasons why rich countries should support development: the humanitarian purpose of ending dire dehumanizing poverty; enlightened self-interest in a world free of threats of terrorism, global disease, political instability, and uncontrolled migration; and solidarity for joint action to solve common challenges such as environmental sustainability. The IDGs developed considerable traction and demonstrated the effectiveness of a simple list of concrete goals to communicate a compelling story of development. They had already begun to pay o as the secular decline in aid commitments began to be reversed. The World Bank and UN agencies began to support them and, in 2000, published a joint document monitoring their progress using the IDG framework. They inspired the UN to include goals in the Millennium Declaration. But the IDGs could not be “owned” by all stakeholders since they were invented by the bilateral donors10. The MDGs built on the IDGs to forge a broader consensus, including the Bretton Woods institutions, UN agencies and national governments. The MDGs could build a narrative behind which dissenting stakeholders could stand united and argue for development aid. For example, Lord Mark Malloch Brown, then UNDP Administrator, who played a central role in building the Millennium Declaration into the MDGs and creating an implementation plan, recounts the view that the MDGs could bridge the divide between the UN and the World Bank over structural adjustment11. The consensus on the MDGs can be attributed precisely to the fact that they allowed the protagonists in the 1980s and 1990s to exchange views over structural adjustment— IMF, World Bank, United States Treasury, UNICEF, NGO networks, and academics on both sides of the issue— and to agree on the purpose of development while disagreeing on the means. It allowed bilateral development ministers, who needed to support and were supported by all of these dissenting stakeholders, to get out of the dilemma. Why did the developing countries buy into the Millennium Declaration that included the global goals? Ambassador Rosenthal of Guatemala, who was one of leading figures in coordinating the negotiations, explains that the priority for the developing countries was to keep the development issue a high priority on the UN agenda, on par with the political issues12.

10. This was patently apparent when the NGO community vigorously protested the UN Secretary-General joining the World Bank and the OECD in signing the 2000 progress document, Better World For All http://paris21.org/sites/default/les/bwa_e.pdf accessed Jan 28, 2012. 11. Interview with Lord Mark Moloch Brown, June 27, 2008, London. 12. Interview with Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, 25 August, 2008, New York.

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THE POST-2000 AID ARCHITECTURE: NEW NARRATIVE, NEW INSTRUMENTS, OLD POLICIES The divisions over structural adjustment programmes centred around the issues of conditionality as an aid modality, liberalization and privatisation as economic growth strategies, while the “social dimensions” of the process focussed primarily on the consequences of fiscal austerity and stabilization measures on the poor and the vulnerable and on social investments. While economic arguments over macroeconomic policy choices drove the controversies, the social dimensions commanded a moral high ground. In this context, the narrative of poverty as the “overarching” purpose of international development provided a way out for all sides of the controversies. Consensus could be reached on the ends without resolving differences over the means. It is therefore not surprising that the Millennium Declaration and MDGs define the ends, but not the means. The Washington Consensus policies did not need to disappear, but continued as a part of a broader agenda, and behind the headline of the MDGs. It is also not surprising that the last decade has seen little by way of new proposals by the World Bank and on new policy strategies to foster economic growth combined with social justice that addresses poverty, inequality and the fulfilment of human rights. MDGs are thus a key feature of the new aid architecture that was put in place in the late 1990s. The MDG narrative justifies aid on humanitarian grounds. The consensus defines the relationship between donors and recipients as a partnership, constructed in pursuit of a shared commitment to end poverty. For this purpose, donors would support national strategies that would integrate the MDGs and be elaborated in the national PRSPs. The partnership is to be guided by principles of mutual accountability and respect for national ownership. Donor support would be provided to implement the PRSPs through the IMF new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) along with other multilateral and bilateral support and debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt reduction initiative. These elements, introduced towards the end of the 1990s, retained the core policy elements of the instruments of the controversial structural adjustment lending programmes of the 1980s and had also replaced them. The PRSPs and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) replaced the Policy Framework Papers that spelled national policy agendas, including key economic policy reform measures. While these reform agendas are not found consistently in the PRSPs, they are included in the PRGF and HIPC agreements and condition the release of financing under these arrangements. The principles of ownership and mutual 191

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accountability expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness13 would guide partnership between donors and the Governments of developing countries. But the policy space for aid dependent countries remains limited under financing conditionalities. The underlying economic/development strategies continue to be driven by the Washington Consensus agenda aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization. To this end, the MDGs added a basic needs agenda, emphasizing priorities for social investments and commitments for partnership.

A normative instrument, not an economic and social policy Many of the criticisms of the MDGs reflect an incorrect interpretation of MDGs as economic planning instruments which is not their intended purpose. The MDGs are derived from the Millennium Declaration, which is a normative document that defines how the world should look. Applied to development policy making, the Declaration offers a framework for evaluating progress and assessing priorities. The 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 indicators, are best interpreted as benchmarks for monitoring implementation, not as hard planning targets. According to UN officials involved in drafting the Millennium Declaration14, the original idea behind including some quantitative targets in the Declaration was to give concreteness to the development agenda. And, as officials who were involved in formulating the MDGs have pointed out, the MDGs were not intended to apply to each and every country, but rather to monitor global progress and to encourage donors and national governments to make greater efforts to end poverty (Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2010). In this regard, it is not surprising that they are considered overambitious for many countries since they did not originate from a technocratic planning process based on consideration of economic variables necessary for achievement of social and economic outcomes. The same misinterpretation has led to confusion about whether the MDGs should be applied at the country level. Understanding the MDG concept as a normative instrument also explains at least in part their success in influencing debates and their weakness on policy thinking. Norms define ends not the means. Accordingly, it is erroneous to interpret them as a new development paradigm or a policy strategy since that was not the purpose for which they were intended. 13. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/46874580.pdf 14. Interviews with John Ruggie, former Assistant Secretary-General in the Oce of the SecretaryGeneral, 6 August, 2008, Cambridge Massachusetts; with Andy Mack, former Director in the Oce of the Secretary-General, 11 September, 2008 by telephone. Ruggie and Mack were principal authors of the Secretary-General’s report, We the Peoples to the General Assembly. The last chapter of this report was transformed, with modifications, into the text of the Millennium Declaration.

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GLOBAL GOALS AFTER 2015 NEW DIRECTIONS With the expiration of the MDGs in 2015, the promises of the Millennium Declaration remain unrealized, and the extent of global poverty and the slow pace of progress remain unacceptable in today’s world of prosperity. The benefits of global economic integration have been as unevenly distributed since 2000 as in the previous decade—the gaps between the rich and poor within and between countries remain considerable. It may be argued that global goals would not be worth setting after 2015, because the MDGs did not have adequate impact on shifting policy. Nonetheless, the MDGs have demonstrated the power of global goals and the value of comprehensive development goals in raising awareness, maintaining political support for development, and in coordinating policy debates. Without the MDGs, it is likely that the Millennium Declaration would have been shelved soon after its adoption along with numerous other decisions by the General Assembly. For these reasons, new global goals should be set to advance the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, but they need to be pursued with the institutional weight of the UN Secretary-General and with the UN investing in efforts to promote and mobilize support for them. The UN has set many global goals since the 1960s, but none has had the reach—or the investment—of the MDGs. What should be in the new goals? The expiry of the MDGs in 2015 presents an opportunity to correct the deficiencies of the current list and emphasize new priorities, which are becoming clearer as the 21st century advances. It is also an opportunity to build goals consistent with their function as normative instruments to promote inclusive and equitable development, rooted in the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration.

ETHICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION: SHARED VALUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA In setting out a vision for the 21st century, the Millennium Declaration expresses shared social objectives based on universal values. The first chapter of the Declaration states the “fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century” (UN, 2000, paragraph 1): freedom; equality; solidarity; tolerance; respect for nature; and shared responsibility. The Declaration commits Governments to pursue a particular pattern of growth and development— one that is equitable and human rights-based. The core theme of equality is 193

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articulated throughout the document and reflects not only equality within countries, but also between countries. This includes gender equality (paragraph 6), equitable and non-discriminatory trading and financial systems (paragraph 13), with special attention to the poorest and vulnerable people (chapter 6) and the needs of Africa that face multiple challenges (chapter 7). And most importantly, it includes the ideal notion of inclusive globalization, the central theme which is articulated in paragraph 5 as follows: “We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For, while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed”.

Human rights principles The ethical framework of the document derives from the consensus international norms set out in the UN Charter that have evolved over the decades and been codified in international law. The framework goes beyond the economic concept of development “with equity” and seeks a world that is not only more peaceful and prosperous but “just” (paragraph 1). It draws explicitly on international human rights norms and principles, which are reflected throughout the document; to the core principle of “human dignity and freedom, equality and equity” (paragraph 1), the respect for economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights (paragraph 25). It rearms commitment to the UN Charter (paragraph 1), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (paragraph 25), to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (paragraph25), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (paragraph 26). Interestingly, it also refers to the right to development (paragraph 24), the only international human rights concept that addresses development as a process. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development arms development as a fundamental human right, and is important for two reasons. First, it defines development as a “constant improvement in the wellbeing of individuals” (UN, 1986, Preamble). Second, it articulates responsibilities for development as involving not only individual, but collective actions of states. It not only states desirable development objectives, but also the obligations of states; “as leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable” (paragraph 2). The Declaration commits to strengthen international cooperation (paragraph 26). For these reasons, the development strategy that the Declaration commits to is “human rights based”, characterized by the realization of all human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) as its objective; the well-being of the individual as the focus and unit of assessment; and the application of core 194

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principles of equality and non-discrimination, empowerment and participation in the development process, and rooted in the norms of international human rights law. This contrasts with the concept of development that focuses more narrowly on economic growth and the improvement of living conditions, including meeting basic (material) needs. This conceptual framework for evaluating the development process is closely related to and overlaps signicantly with the capability approach to development, or human development, which is based on the concept of development as expansion of the capability of individuals to lead lives they value developed by Amartya Sen15.

The UN development agenda These ethical values, and the theme of human centered, equitable and sustainable development, have been reflected in the origins of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs in the UN conferences on topics ranging from environment to children to habitat held throughout the 1990s. The Internationally Agreed Development Goals (IADGs) and the UN Development Agenda are comprised of the full set of goals emerging from the 34 summits and conferences held up to 2005. Taking place in an era of active debates about structural adjustment and liberalization, these conferences were particularly concerned with the consequences of this policy shift on poor people and poor countries. These meetings raised the common concern that reflected a strong voice of the civil society and the Governments of developing countries16 that the benefits of globalization were not broadly shared. The major commitments of these conferences were combined in a single package in the 2000 Millennium Declaration, while the MDGs are a select list from the broader list. As highlighted in the The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All (UN DESA, 2007, p. iii) which reviewed UN conferences in the 1990s, the resulting UN development agenda is strongly embedded in the UN ethical values and fundamental purpose—namely, human freedom and dignity, solidarity and burden-sharing, equality, and tolerance, and can be seen as a concrete means to implement the UN Charter. According to José Antonio Ocampo, “Two elements 15. Both Sen (2004; 2011) and Nussbaum (2011) have written about the close connection between capabilities and rights. See also UNDP (2000) Human Development Report that explores the theoretical overlaps between capabilities and rights, and the policy implications for development. See Vizard and others (2011). 16. These conferences were also noteworthy for their unusually open processes (UN DESA, 2007). Unlike most UN debates that involve only Governments, these conferences opened up to broader involvement of civil society groups. They were involved in the preparatory meetings organized by national Governments and UN agencies at country and regional levels. Civil society groups were often included in official national delegations and involved in intergovernmental negotiations.

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have permeated the content and character of the Agenda since its inception. First, a fundamental concern for equity and for equality of all persons, as human beings and as citizens ... [And] the second essential element [is] partnership. The conference process has engaged all the key stakeholders: Governments, UN system organisations, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society, and the private sector” (UN DESA, 2007, Preface, p. iii).

SETTING NEW GOALS, MEASURING PROGRESS Like the MDGs, the purpose of the goals, targets and indicators beyond 2015 would be to harmonize reporting and to facilitate monitoring of progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Declaration. But a new approach is needed to setting the goals, targets and indicators. To begin with, in order to redefine progress in alignment with the vision of the Declaration for development as inclusive, equitable and sustainable, there is need to expand beyond the current focus of the MDGs on poverty and chapter 3 (development and poverty eradication) of the Declaration, to reflect chapter 1 (values and principles) and to acknowledge the important ways in which development and poverty eradication are intertwined with the challenges of peace and security (chapter 2), environment (chapter 3), human rights, democracy and good governance (chapter 4). Moreover, goal setting needs to be framed with a methodological coherence. Finally, the new approach should include some critical means as well as ends considering the drawbacks of the MDGs.

Monitoring progress in human well-being The new approach to setting goals should also build on a coherent framework in development thinking about the nature of progress and what we have learned from development economics research in the 1990s. The following essential considerations are worth highlighting here. First, the multidimensionality of human well-being needs to be fully acknowledged. The work of Amartya Sen is particularly helpful in defining progress as the expansion of capabilities and freedoms—or human development approach— and in emphasizing the multidimensionality of essential instrumental freedoms to encompass economic facilities, social opportunities, political freedoms, transparency guarantees and security (Sen, 1999). Sen’s capabilities approach to development is closely related to human rights-based development and essential capabilities overlap considerably with the core human rights, including economic, social, cultural, civil and political areas (Sen, 1999; Vizard and others, 2011). 196

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Second, there is need to promote security from downside risks. The work on human security (Ogata and Sen, 2003; UNDP, 1994) and on vulnerability and poverty (World Bank, 2000) has highlighted the importance of protection from threats of sudden changes in core life conditions. The recent crises in the global financial, fuel and food markets have highlighted these threats as important challenges of the 21st century as global market integration proceeds and expose the risks of instability and their contagious effects across countries. Third, sustainability implications need to be considered and addressed. The threats to sustainability arising from environmental deterioration have become acute as global warming increases. Sustainability is an overriding challenge, where failure is likely to threaten all dimensions of human development, and requires major shifts in policy as well as in international cooperation. Fourth, there is need to pursue equality of opportunities and rights. For all the reasons already elaborated, equality is a principle that is central to the normative framework of the Millennium Declaration. In practical terms, policy strategies that respect equality provide for equality of opportunity and non-discrimination in the fulfilment of human rights. Fifth, means—both at the global and the national level—to ending poverty need to be identified. The MDGs include one set of means to ending poverty in goal 8, but they need to be strengthened and set into clear quantitative targets. They should also be broadened to incorporate objectives of stable market environment necessary for human security, and agendas for systemic reform consistent with the principles of democracy and equity. Sixth, while goals should be set as global targets, countries should be encouraged to adapt the goals to their national contexts, through a process of democratic consultation. Without such adaptation, the goals are both biased against countries with low starting points and under-ambitious for those with high starting points. They would distort not only government priorities, but also the efforts of civil society to hold authorities accountable for their development performance. Previous global goals set by the UN followed this approach, and the MDGs were the first goals whose applicability to country levels was left ambiguous. Seventh, goal setting should involve a participatory process of consultations with national governments worldwide, and with civil society organizations at national, regional and global levels. The MDGs drew on the goals already adopted by the UN development conferences that in themselves involved widespread consultation among civil society and government in the national and regional preparatory conferences. In the absence of such process, it is all the more important to set in place a process of broad consultations at national, regional and global levels. The implementation process will be as important as the 197

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composition of the goals; the new goals should build on the increasing use of the MDGs by civil society to demand more of Government. Furthermore, formal structures would strengthen accountability. At the national level, one approach would be to set up national commissions that would work out the implications of policy goals, and monitor implementation. Finally, the new goals should apply not only to developing countries, but to all countries, since human poverty, inequality and exclusion are challenges facing developed countries as well.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The recent history of the MDGs reveals much about the history of development thinking and policy in the first decade of the 21st century. It highlights the reconceptualization of development as reconceptualised as poverty reduction, opening up to a concept applicable regardless of the stage of industrialization and diversification, and levels of income and technological capacity. It further underscores the role of ideas in shaping political support for “development” locally and globally as well as in shifting economic and social policies. The MDGs were the first comprehensive development goals and were effective in drawing attention to poverty eradication as a global norm and priority, and provided a common framework for debate and action. They encouraged and, no doubt, contributed to greater support for social investments in sub-Saharan Africa, but did not lead to changes in policy strategies or to addressing systemic issues that create unequal opportunities for people and countries. The corollary to these policy trends has been the failure to address the systemic problems of protecting developing countries from the consequences of global market integration. A leading example of these trends is the inadequate response of international cooperation to protect the poor against the consequences of climate change, and the crises of the global financial, fuel and food markets. Seen in this light, the MDGs could arguably have provided a convenient “cover” behind which the economic model of the 1990s could be pursued. The MDGs perhaps co-opted the language of human development, and the social impact of adjustment while “defanging” critical debates about the impact of the liberalization agendas on poverty and inequality. The need for alternative macroeconomic policies that would favour distribution, job creation for the unskilled, and reduce inequality no longer resonates with policy-makers as urgent issues. The impact of the MDGs brings home the importance of narratives, and the power of quantitative indicators as a communications tool that can have 198

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far-reaching impacts on how to reshape the definition of terms with positive and perverse consequences. The staying power and the reach of the term “MDGs” in framing international development policy debates can only be explained by the power of numbers to communicate complex ideas by simplification, and abstract ethical values by reification, and to convey (misplaced) scientific precision and certitude. The definition of development is ambiguous, fraught with controversies over definitions, measurement and strategies. The process is complex involving human creativity and effort, social cooperation and mobilization, economic investments and political commitments. The challenges are complex and location specific, requiring high-risk solutions. But the magic of quantification renders such a complex challenge into a single number, intangible factors into concrete goods and outcomes, and risk prone processes into a predictable technological solution. But sociologists who study indicators as “technologies of governance” point out that it goes further. Quantification is “not merely a strategy for describing the social and natural worlds, but a means of reconfiguring them. It entails the imposition of new meanings and the disappearance of old ones” (Porter, 1994: 338). By articulating the complex challenges of development in 8 goals and concrete targets for 2015, the MDGs have had unprecedented success in drawing attention to poverty as an urgent global priority. But the simplification and quantification have reduced the development agenda to meeting basic material needs, stripped of the Millennium Declaration’s vision for development with social justice and human rights. It has left out any mention of equity, empowerment of people, sustainability, and building sustainable productive capacity for economic growth. The simplified narrative has no room for understanding poverty as related to the underlying power relations within and between countries and the asymmetries in the global economy. It leaves no room to draw attention to the issues that have long been and remain on the agenda of developing countries and in international economic negotiations, such as the lack of voice in the World Bank, WTO and other institutions of global governance. It similarly remains silent on the issues that have long been and remain on the agenda of critics of standard macroeconomic frameworks for their distributional consequences. The new global goals thus need to use the power of numbers to recapture the ethical principles and norms of the Millennium Declaration. The MDG experience also highlights the limited reach of ethical norms or normative ideas and technocratic knowledge or positive ideas in international policy making. The MDGs were powerful and convincing to people—“the parliaments and publics” around the world—because they conveyed a compelling case for ending poverty as an ethical priority. Yet, for the development policy professionals, ethical norms and principles are not convincing arguments to change policy 199

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behaviour. They mobilized and invested in implementing the Millennium Declaration by interpreting the MDGs as economic policy tools as if they were technocratically constructed. Entrenched in the tradition of a “positivist” science driven by quantification and evidence, development economists incorporated only chapter 3 of the 8 chapters of the Declaration in the MDGs, picking out only those objectives which were measurable and for which data were available. The ethical principles laid out in chapter 1 of the Declaration were forgotten in the spirit of “only what can be counted counts”.

REFERENCES ALSTON, Philip (2005): “Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 27, nº 3, pp. 755-829. ATROBUS, Peggy (2005): “Critiquing the MDGs from a Caribbean Perspective”, Gender and Development, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 94-104. BISSIO, Roberto (2003): “Civil Society and the MDGs”, Development Policy Journal, vol. 3, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, pp. 151-160. CLEMENS, Michael; KENNY, Charles and MOSS, Todd (2007): “The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success”, World Development, vol. 35, nº 5, pp. 735-751. EASTERLY, William (2009): “How the Millennium Development Goals Are Unfair to Africa”, World Development, vol. 35, nº 5, pp. 735-751. FINNEMORE, Martha and SIKKINK, Katherine (1998): “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, vol. 52, nº 4, pp. 887-917. FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko (2008): “Are the MDGs Priority in Development Strategies and Aid Programmes? Only Few Are!”, Working Paper number 48, International Poverty Centre. — (2010): “Reducing Inequality-The Missing MDG: A content review of PRSPs and Bilateral Donor Policy Statements”, IDS Bulletin, vol. 41, nº 1, pp. 26-35. FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko and HULME, David (2011): “International Norm Dynamics and the ‘End of Poverty’: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals”, Global Governance, vol. 17, nº 1, pp. 17-36. FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko and GREENSTEIN, Joshua (2010): “How should MDG Implementation be measured: Faster Progress or Meeting Targets?”, Working Paper 63, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. Available from http:www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper63.pdf. — (forthcoming): “Monitoring MDGs: Human Rights Critique and Alternative”, in The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights, M. Langford, A. Sumner, and A. Yamin (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. GORE, Charles (2010): “The MDG Paradigm, Productive Capacities and the Future of Poverty Reduction”, IDS Bulletin, vol. 41, pp. 170-79. MANNING, Richard (2009): “Using Indicators to Encourage Development: Lessons from the Millennium Development Goals”, DIIS Report 2009:1, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. MELAMED, Claire (2012): “After 2015: contexts, politics and processes for a post-2015 global agreement on development”, ODI Research Report (January). Available from http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details. asp?id=6231&title=millennium-developmentgoals-mdgs-post-2015. Accessed June 14, 2012. NELSON, P. J. (2007): “Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals and the Future of Development Cooperation”, World Development, vol. 35, nº 12, pp. 22041-2055. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT/DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (OECD/ DAC) (1996): Shaping the 21st Century: Role of Development Cooperation. OECD, Paris. Available from www. oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR) (2008): Claiming the MDGs: A Human Rights Approach, OHCHR, Geneva. PORTER, Theodore (1994): “Making Things Quantitative”, Science in Context, vol. 7, nº 3, pp. 389-407. SACHS, Jerey D. (2005). The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin Press, New York. SAITH, Ashwani (2006): “From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation”, Development and Change, vol. 37, nº 6, pp. 1167-1199.

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SEN, Amartya (2004): “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 32, nº 4, pp. 315-356. STEWART, Frances, SAITH, Ruhi and HARRIS-WHITE, Barbara (eds.) (2007): Dening Poverty in the Developing World, Palgrave Macmillan, London. UNITED NATIONS (2000): United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/res/55/2). Available from http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. — (2001): Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Report of the Secretary-General (A/56/326). New York, 6 September. Available from www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares.552e.htm. — (2007): The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All. UN, New York. Available from www. un.org/esa/devagenda/UNDA_BW5_Final.pdf — (2011a): Global Partnership: Time to Deliver, MDG Gap Task Force Report 2011. Available from http://www. un.org/ en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/index.shtml. — (2011b): Millennium Development Goals: 2011 Progress chart. Available from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ pdf/(2011E)_MDReport2011_ProgressChart.pdf. Accessed Jan 8, 2012. — (2011c): The Millennium Development Goals Report. Available from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ pdf/. Accessed Jan 8, 2012. VANDEMOORTELE, Jan (2009): “MDGs Conundrum: Meeting the Targets without Missing the Point”, Development Policy Review, vol. 27, nº 4, pp. 355-371. VANDEMOORTELE, Jan and DELAMONICA, Enrique (2010): Taking the MDGs beyond 2015: Hasten slowly. IDS Bulletin, vol. 41, nº 1, pp. 60-69. VIZARD, Polly; FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko and ELSON, Diane (2011): “Introduction, Human Rights and Capabilities: An Interdisciplinary Conversation”, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, vol. 12, nº 1, pp. 1-22. WEISS, Thomas; JOLLY, Richard and EMMERIJ, Louis (2009): UN Ideas that Changed the World, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

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Lectura 3

An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa*17 Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson and Nicolas van de Walle**18

The importance of public revenue to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes of accelerated progress. Nicolas Kaldor, Foreign Affairs, January 1963.

I have made revenue collection a frontline institution because it is the one which can emancipate us from begging, from disturbing friends… if we can get about 22 percent of GDP we should not need to disturb anybody by asking for aid….instead of coming here to bother you, give me this, give me this, I shall come here to greet you, to trade with you. Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda (which collects 11% of GDP in taxes and receives a further 11% of GDP in aid), Washington DC, September 21, 2005.

INTRODUCTION After a crisis of legitimacy throughout the 1990s, aid is popular again in the policy community. Several new studies have suggested that at least a doubling of overseas development assistance (ODA) from 2000 levels is necessary as a precondition for meeting international development targets (Zedillo Panel 2001; Devarajan et al., 2002). The Commission for Africa (2005) chaired by British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for an immediate $25 billion increase in aid to sub-Saharan Africa, with an additional $25 billion to come by 2015. This would constitute roughly a tripling of aid to the continent. Further, the UN’s Millennium Project (2005) has * Working Paper, nº 74, Center for Global Development, January, 2006. ** Todd Moss ([email protected]) is a Research Fellow and Gunilla Pettersson ([email protected]) is a Research Assistant at the Center for Global Development. Nicolas van de Walle ([email protected]. edu) is Associate Dean for International Studies and Director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell University. We thank Michael Clemens for his invaluable insights on data analysis, Scott Standley for research assistance, and Adrian Wood, Stephen Nelson, Erwin Tiongson and John Hicklin for comments on an earlier draft. All opinions and errors are those of the authors alone.

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estimated that global ODA will need to rise even further than the previous estimates, reaching at least $195 billion by 2015 from current levels of some $79 billion in 2004. These calls for more ODA are echoed in various parts of the United Nations system, the World Bank, many NGOs, recipient countries, and even some European governments. Many of the low-income countries targeted for substantial increases in aid already receive historically unprecedented flows. For instance, ODA to sub-Saharan Africa was the equivalent of 11.7 percent of the continent’s GNI in 2003 (excluding Nigeria and South Africa)1. Exactly half of the region’s 46 countries with data for 2003 received in excess of 10 percent of GNI in ODA, and 11 received more than 20 percent. Globally, there is a core set of roughly three dozen countries that have received a tenth of GNI or more in aid for at least the last two decades. This is a lengthy time period for receiving sizeable aid with few historical precedents. The large flows to Europe during the Marshall Plan lasted only a few years and never exceeded 3 percent of GDP of any receiving country (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991; O’Connell and Soludo, 2001). While substantial US support during the early Cold War to allies such as Korea and Taiwan tapered off within a decade, contemporary aid ratios in these three dozen countries have tended not to recede, but to grow larger over three decades. Moreover, if the large increases in aid proposed actually materialize, aid ratios will rise substantially further and the number of countries crossing the 10 percent threshold will grow significantly (Moss and Subramanian, 2005). Skepticism about the desirability of such aid increases has tended to emphasize economic and management issues. Some observers have expressed concerns about the capacity of low-income states to absorb large new flows in addition to the flows they already receive, and have pointed to the weak management capacities of governments, the dearth of good new projects and programs to fund, or the ambiguous association between aid and measurable development outcomes (White, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Other observers have worried about the macroeconomic impact of large aid increases; they have pointed to “Dutch disease” effects on small economies (see for example Heller, 2005, Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Relatively less critical attention has been paid to the potential effects of large increases in aid on public institutions in low-income countries. Yet institutional issues have recently returned to the foreground in debates on economic development. The critical importance of sound public institutions to the development process has become an article of faith, not only among political scientists (for example, Herbst, 1990, Haggard, 1990; Evans 1995), who could be 1. Including South Africa and Nigeria, two large economies that receive very little aid, brings this proportion down to 5.7 percent of GNI (WDI, 2005).

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supposed to have professional reasons to argue for the importance of institutions, but also has emerged more recently as a consensus among economists (for example, Rodrik, 2003; Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2004). Sachs (2005) view that good institutions are entirely a result of development, rather than their cause, is now a minority view. Aid is thought to work best in environments with high quality public institutions, presumably as part of a capable “developmental” state (among a large literature see Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1998). Increasingly, measures of institutions are an explicit factor for aid disbursement and allocation. Thus, “institutional development” is frequently an independent variable thought to affect the efficiency of aid, and thus a legitimate factor in selecting aid recipients and determining allocation strategies. This suggests that aid should be “selectively” focused on countries that are thought to most effectively use resources to engage in poverty reduction. Such logic underlies IDA’s performance-based allocation process and the Millennium Challenge Account, a new US aid program that explicitly targets assistance to countries that are thought best able to use additional resources (Radelet, 2003). In many respects, this new approach is at odds with the more traditional argument that one of the primary purposes of aid (if not its most important) should be to build effective indigenous public institutions. By this formulation, institutional development is thought to be a dependent variable, affected by targeted aid. In contrast to the ‘selectivity’ philosophy, this older doctrine has been to channel aid instead to places with the greatest need for improved public institutions with the idea that aid itself will help to improve the institutional environment. This approach underlies growing donor efforts at so-called ‘capacity building’ and the ‘big push’ on aid first popular in the 1950s and 1960s and now advocated by the UN and others (Easterly, 2005). The Commission for Africa report wavers back and forth between these two views of aid and institutions. It recognizes the importance of good institutions to making aid effective, in part because it argues that improved institutions will allow absorption of the much larger aid flows it advocates. But it also believes that these large increases can serve to leverage a much greater commitment on the part of African governments to improving the domestic institutions important to growth and poverty reduction. Does aid necessarily help to develop public institutions and state capacity, or can there be an aid-institutions paradox? In this essay, we review an emerging literature that explores the potential effects of large amounts of aid on institutional development, including some of the most basic functions of the state such as the ability to collect revenues. Given the current debates regarding large new infusions of additional aid, an analysis of the institutional effects of aid is particularly timely. 204

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Because Africa presents the greatest challenges to development, and is the region most aid dependent, we especially look at the aid-institutions relationship in that region. Many political scientists now argue that public institutions in the region are poorly suited to promote economic development because of neo-patrimonial tendencies (Callaghy, 1988; Sandbrook, 1992; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001). In the poorly integrated and fragmented states of the region, political leaders have relied on systematic clientelism and the private appropriation of state resources for political ends. As a result, government resources have not been utilized primarily to promote economic development, as political elites have acted in a predatory fashion to maintain themselves in power. There are other reasons for which the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have failed to gain economic development, but it is now widely conceded that these political dynamics have constituted a significant brake on growth. As a result, it is thus possible that inflows of external resources like aid could be a disincentive to state transformation. Does aid, and the manner in which it is given, encourage the transition from patrimonialism and predation to rational developmental states? It is far from impossible that certain types of aid could undermine long-term institutional development, despite donors sincere intentions. Such a paradox is, of course, not new to the development literature. The so called “resource curse” has long posited that unearned income undermines incentives to build local institutions and perhaps a social contract with the population (see Ross, 1999 for an excellent review; Karl, 1997; Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004). Natural resources represent an unearned rent accruing to governments; it is argued that this rent can have a negative and anti-developmental effect on the economy, public institutions, and even on the government’s relationship with the citizenry. We will argue that aid can have many of the same dysfunctional effects as natural resources; that is, there can be an “aid curse” as well that might create perverse incentives and lead to antidevelopmental outcomes. To analyze these issues, this review essay seeks to integrate two disciplinary literatures that have too long ignored each other. On the whole, political scientists have been remarkably oblivious to the political dynamics created by foreign aid, particularly in low-income countries where it is today the leading sector of economic activity and might thus be thought to have a significant impact on the local political economy. For their part, economists have mostly ignored a long tradition in the political science literature which establishes a historical link between the state’s revenues and its political and institutional attributes. The following section lays out the context for these questions, and explains why they are particularly relevant for today’s debates about aid and development. Section 3 reviews the wellknown macro-economic effects of large volumes of aid, and focuses on the 205

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institutional implications of these effects. Section 4 explores the potential negative effects of large aid flows on institution building through its effect on local bureaucratic and policy-making dynamics. Section 5 then examines the literature on state revenues and its relationship to foreign aid. The historical linkages between state revenue collection and state-building are considered in Section 6. A theme that emerges in the second half of the essay is the low quality of the available data on state revenues, particularly for Africa. At present, data deficiencies unfortunately prevent the formal empirical testing of many of the hypotheses developed in the essay. Nonetheless, the possibility of the existence of an “aid-institutions paradox” is significant, and Section 7 discusses the policy implications of our findings before concluding.

AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATES Aid clearly can be useful and has certainly contributed to economic development and improvements in quality of life variables in many countries. Evidence for successful aid is particularly strong in targeted programs with defined objectives (see Levine 2004 for examples in global public health). But, at the same time, and especially at very high levels over a sustained period, aid could also have distorting effects on some of the very outcomes donors hope to encourage through aid, such as policy ownership, fiscal sustainability, institutional development, and, ultimately, autonomous long-term economic growth. One way to consider this problem is to think of aid as a subsidy. As such, aid is supposed to provide temporary financial assistance in order to encourage certain long-term behaviors: revenue collection, investment in physical and human capital, and the establishment of the institutions of a developmental state. There are clearly some cases where aid-as-subsidy has played this role, for example in South Korea or Botswana, where foreign assistance supported local efforts to do these things and the country gradually was weaned off aid. At the same time, there are many, indeed dozens, of other cases where aid is neither temporary, nor seeming to assist countries in fulfilling these roles. Instead, it could be argued that the subsidy has in fact discouraged revenue collection, distorted expenditure decisionmaking, and undermined the incentives to build state capacity. In these cases, aid could be viewed as not only a crutch delaying institutional development, but as potentially undercutting those efforts. This possibility of harmful aid dynamics seems particularly acute in subSaharan Africa, where some countries have now entered into their third and fourth decades of receiving substantial volumes of aid. Much of this aid has also included 206

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explicit capacity building technical assistance from donors. The World Bank alone provided Africa with 70 civil service reform projects between 1987 and 1997, for instance (Levy and Kpundeh, 2005, p. v), while a recent internal Bank evaluation estimates that over a quarter of all Bank credits to the region is explicitly devoted to capacity building (OED 2005, p. 9). Technical assistance to central banks seems to have been successful in building institutional capacity, but such examples appear more the exception than the rule. Many experts argue that state capacity has improved little during this period, and point to specific cases of clear decline (see Van de Walle, 2001; 2005). In some cases, the lack of progress on capacity building can be attributed to political instability. After all, at any given time in the last three decades, over a dozen economies in the region have been subject to violent civil conflict (see for example Collier, 2005) and the emergence of warlord rule in the context of the collapse of the central state (Reno, 1998). Long periods of political stress, conflict and state collapse, continue to have a significant impact on state capacity, even after the return to political stability because of their long-term institutional effects, notably on the supply of trained manpower. Perhaps more striking is the slow pace of institution-building in relatively stable political systems. Indeed, a substantial literature has documented the pervasive weakness of the central state in subSaharan Africa, which often exercises weak if any effective sovereignty over much of its territory, and has less legitimacy than a variety of sub-national and private governance structures that compete with it for popular support (Herbst, 2000; Englebert, 2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 1982). It has become fashionable in the donor community to blame this surprisingly slow pace of state capacity building on the nature of African bureaucracies, which are argued to be patrimonial and corrupt, and thus not particularly interested in the provision of public goods essential to development (Levy and Kpundeh, 2005; OED, 2005). But even if one accepts this diagnostic, the question remains, why has the large volume of aid devoted to capacity building not had a bigger impact on improving these public institutions, and transforming them into, using the Weberian terminology, more “rational-legal” bureaucracies?

AID, FISCAL POLICY, AND MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES A number of potential negative effects of large aid volumes on institutional development can be identified. Much of the focus from economists has been on macroeconomic imbalances caused by large volumes of aid. One central issue has been the possibility of large ODA inflows affecting the real exchange rate and 207

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undermining the competitiveness of the export sector— the so called “Dutch disease” (most recently, see Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Management of the real exchange rate is arguably rendered even more difficult by ODA volatility, which also is thought to have negative effects (see below). Dutch disease-type effects have been noted in a number of African aid recipients (see Younger, 1992 on Ghana; Adam and Bevan 2003). Experiences from Uganda (Atingi-Ego, 2005; Nkusu, 2004) and other countries suggest that an active central bank can manage these exchange rate appreciations and, for the most part, mitigate pernicious effects on competitiveness, but nonetheless, a number of country episodes suggests that in fact a large volume of aid can and does undermine competitiveness. Another set of economic concerns emphasize the role of aid within the budget process itself, with most studies suggesting that foreign aid can undermine the ability of recipient governments to budget appropriately. Several have implicated the volatility of aid flows as the source of distortions. In a 37-country survey, Bulir and Lane (2002) found that aid is more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and that this volatility lessens any potential positive benefits of aid on recipients. McGillivray and Morrisey (2000b) found the volatility of aid often leads to poor budgeting and underestimation of revenues, particularly since aid commitments tend to overestimate actual disbursements. Similarly, Heller and Gupta (2002) argue that the fiscal uncertainty of dependence on external assistance makes longterm planning extremely difficult. Beyond volatility, there have also been some questions about perverse incentives of aid on the process of economic policymaking. Brautigam and Knack (2004), for example, found that high levels of aid serve as a “soft budget constraint”: the access to foreign resources convinces decision makers that budgets are flexible and encourages fiscal indiscipline. Two case studies looking at Ghana found that as donor financing increased, so did disparities between budgeted expenditures and actual spending, suggesting that the budget process was increasingly directed toward satisfying external donors rather than reflecting actual public spending preferences. Killick (2004) thus described Ghana’s “budgetary façade” and Pradhan (1996) similarly called the budget a “deceptive mirage”, in which aid was distorting both the budget process itself and the government’s “ownership” of the country’s purported development agenda. A number of observers have examined the impact of large volumes of aid on the mix of public expenditure and the overall spending levels. A number of papers suggest that aid results in excessive and unsustainable levels of government consumption, also leading potentially to macro-imbalances. Khan and Hoshino (1992) found aid to be generally treated as an increase in income leading to higher government consumption, but that the some public investment is also financed by aid. In 208

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a broad literature review, McGillvray and Morrissey (2000a) found that aid tends to be associated with government spending increases in excess of the value of the aid, although there is no clear answer on the impact of aid on consumption versus investment. This was reinforced in McGillvray and Morrissey (2000b) where they concluded that aid leads to increases in expenditure not financed by the corresponding increase in revenue. More recently, Remmer (2004) also found that aid leads to overall increases in government spending. How might these possible macro effects of aid negatively impact public institutions? The potential loss of competitiveness means lower exports and economic growth, fewer jobs, and increased dependence on external assistance. Resource volatility contributes to macro-economic instability, which complicates public policy making in vital areas such as budgeting and planning, and tilt public spending toward consumption rather than investment. These can exact a negative effect on the quality of the civil service, public services, and infrastructure, all indirectly undermining the ability of the state to transition from patrimonialism to a more ‘developmental’ path. The rest of this paper addresses more direct and, we argue, more significant but less well-documented negative institutional effects of large volumes of aid. Much of the literature cited in this section describes dysfunctional economic outcomes but does not really explain them. To do so, we need to turn to institutional factors, which we begin to do in the next section.

DONOR PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE In addition to macroeconomic and fiscal effects, there are costs of aid related to the structures, practices, and procedures of the current international aid system. These include a longstanding and well-known list of common complaints about aid: volatility and uncertainty of ODA flows; fragmentation of donor efforts; project proliferation and duplication; conflicting or dominant donor agendas; competition for staff; and high administrative and oversight costs (Among many, see Cohen, 1992; Berg, 1993; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack and Rahman, 2004; Van de Walle, 2005). Birdsall (2004) lists many of these as the “seven deadly sins” of the aid business. Such practices are argued to have substantial costs for public administration. For instance, the proliferation of donors and projects constitute a substantial burden for the small number of qualified public officials, who spend much of their time attending to donor concerns and managing aid activities rather than promoting the development of the country—that is, when they do not exit altogether from the civil service to go work for better wages in donor and NGO 209

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organizations. Management of donor visits (“missions”) became such a problem in Tanzania, that the country was forced to declare a ‘mission holiday’, a four-month period when they take a break from visiting delegations to focus on budget preparation. Similarly, aid volatility and project proliferation complicate effective government control over budgets and development planning. Much, if not most, aid is not integrated into national budgets, thus posing real sustainability problems, and they are often implemented through parallel structures that cream the best staff from the civil service, and make government coordination of policy much more difficult. Far from helping to develop effective state bureaucracies, certain aid practices can in fact serve to reinforce the patrimonial element within recipient governments at the expense of the legal-rational. Projects provide for the allocation of all sorts of discretionary goods to be politicized and patrimonialized, including expensive four-wheels drive cars, scholarships, decisions over where to place schools and roads, and so on. The common practice of paying cash “sitting fees” for civil servants attending donor-funded workshops, where the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries, even turns training into a rent to be distributed. More broadly, when donor projects are poorly integrated into national budgetary processes, and not subject to much transparency or effective control, it is argued, they help sustain anti-developmental practices within the state apparatus. Because local officials are not included in policy planning, they often come to view aid projects as little more than a set of scarce private goods to be allocated. Aid dependence thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often not rewarded for focusing on their core developmental functions but rather on getting money from donors. Technocrats, who are specialized in budget management and/or planning, say, are less rewarded than bureaucrats who are adept at interacting with donor organizations and accessing their resources. If these two are not part of the same skill set, the wrong kind of individual expertise may be rewarded and over time, real developmental capacities may atrophy within the administration. Particularly pernicious for state institutions in Africa has been the combination of high aid flows and economic crisis, both sustained over a long period of time. As development policy has come to be dominated by repeated fiscal crises and driven by short-term adjustment and debt management, the patrimonial attraction of aid resources has been accentuated. In countries where power means access to state privileges and rents, and political systems are sustained by complex clientelist relationships, aid and the scarce goods it provides become all the more desirable for the political management of economic crises (Van de Walle, 2001). In short, states who find it difficult to meet 210

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civil service payrolls are more likely to politicize aid funded sitting fees, per diems and scholarships to study abroad. Indeed, they will endeavor to turn aid into a mechanism to increase government consumption rather than public investment. It also seems reasonable to surmise that the larger the relative aid flows, the more these problems are likely to be exacerbated. In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, aid flows are such that aid dynamics simply dominate local development efforts. Moss and Subramanian (2005) identify 22 low-income countries, 16 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa where ODA inflows are equivalent to at least half of total government expenditure. In twelve poor countries, of which ten are African, the ratio of ODA to government expenditure was 75 percent or more. Looking at a slightly earlier period, Brautigam and Knack (2004) find roughly similar numbers of aid intensity. Because most of the concerns listed in this section are directly related to the way in which aid is delivered and administered, in theory at least, many of these are fixable through changes on the donor side. These shortfalls have long been identified and some efforts are underway to address them, such as donor pooling or using budget support instead of project aid (Eifert and Gelb, 2005). There are also several large institutional attempts to improve the efficiency of aid delivery, such as various programs by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee or the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Harmonization and Alignment. In practice, however, these inefficiencies exist because of very real political or bureaucratic constraints, and progress in reducing them has proven to be slow and uneven. In many ways, these problems seem to be actually getting worse; for instance, the number of distinct projects funded by donors has nearly tripled since 1995 (Roodman, forthcoming). Perhaps most worrying, there appear to be few incentives for either donors or recipients to change their practices. As Brautigam and Knack (2004) argue, “political elites have little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid provide exceptional resources for patronage and many fringe benefits” (2004, p. 263). Moreover, until very recently, the government’s performance did not appear to affect whether or not it received aid, so there appeared to be little or no cost to misusing aid. Alesina and Weder (2002) actually find that high levels of corruption within recipient countries were positively correlated with aid flows through out the 1990s. On the other hand, incentives to improve aid effectiveness appear less important within donor organizations than other concerns, related to bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies, and to the importance of commercial, foreign policy and ideological objectives on the part of donor governments (Easterly, 2003). 211

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THE AID-REVENUE RELATIONSHIP A third institutional effect of aid that has been posited in the literature concerns its impact on state revenues. This is an important issue since the ability of the state to collect revenues is critically linked to state capacity, while the central role of revenue collection in political development and state-building has long been accepted. Schumpeter was perhaps the first to argue that a country’s tax system fundamentally reflects its political institutions (Schumpeter, 1918/1991). Reliance on citizens for raising public revenues, as opposed to unearned income via offshore extraction or external assistance, is considered an essential ingredient to establishing accountability between the state and society. The contemporary literature suggests that taxation is a useful indicator of state capacity. Because revenues are necessary to fund the state’s activities in a sustainable manner, the size and consistency of government revenues can tell us a lot about the level of capacity that exists within the state apparatus. This has long been argued in the aid literature. According to Kaldor (1963), the key determination of whether a state moves from aid dependency to economic self-sufficiency is the degree to which the state learns how to tax, thereby leading to a lessening of the need for aid. According to Bauer (1976), foreign aid displaces the processes of institutional maturation essential to development, including the capacity of the state to collect revenue. Azam et al. (1999) arrive at a similar conclusion, claiming that the ability of a state to remove itself from reliance on aid will depend on the degree to which the state engages in learningby-doing in the public sector, a process that is greatly affected by the level of aid in relation to overall revenue and the initial institutional conditions. Early empirical tax effort studies focused on a small set of variables considered the main determinants of tax effort, most commonly measured as tax revenue as a share of GDP (Lotz and Morrs, 1967; Celliah, 1971, Celliah et al. 1975; Tanzi, 1981). The tax effort literature typically considers the level of development and the economic structure as primary determinants of tax shares: GDP per capita, the degree of openness of the economy, the agricultural and/or industrial share of GDP, and in some cases population growth (Tanzi, 1992; Leuthold 1991; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura 1998). In the tax effort literature, foreign aid is generally expected to reduce tax shares since aid provides an alternative, non-earned source of revenue for governments in addition to tax revenue (Ghura, 1998; Remmer, 2004; Brautigam and Knack, 2004). Consequently, a government that receives significant amounts of aid is thought to have less incentive to tax and improve its tax administration. That is, foreign aid may be used as a substitute for domestic revenue mobilization whilst allowing the same level of expenditure (Heller, 1975; Kimbrough, 1986). Not only may aid inflows lead to 212

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lower tax effort, but they may also slow down the development of domestic institutions such as the tax administration in recipient countries (Brautigam and Knack, 2004). A negative relationship between tax revenue and aid is certainly suggested by Figure 1 that shows the four-year averages of tax revenue (excluding trade taxes) as a share of GDP against the four-year averages of aid as a share of GNI for 55 low and lower middle income countries for 1972-1999, using the standard IMF data on government finances. The point of this figure is merely to show the simple correlation between tax collection and aid receipts. There are many cases of low aid and low tax (those toward the bottom left). There are also a moderate number of high aid and low tax (bottom right) and low aid-high tax countries (upper left). However, there are no incidences at all of high aid (>10% of GNI) and high tax (>18% of GDP). These thresholds are of course arbitrary and the figure does not imply any causation, but it does indicate that based on historical experience, high levels of both do not occur at the same time. What is the econometric evidence on behalf of this relationship? It is actually more ambiguous than one might think. Leuthold (1991) examines the effect of the standard variables, controlling for the economic structure and the level of development, and aid on tax revenue using panel data. All the standard variables are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs, whereas foreign aid has the expected negative sign but is not significant. Using data from Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Brautigam (2000, p. 48) found that 71 percent of the African countries with aid/GDP above 10 percent in 1995 had lower than expected tax effort. Ghura (1998) examined the determinants of tax revenue for 39 sub-Saharan African countries between 1985 and 1996 and found foreign aid to have a significant, negative impact on tax shares. Teera and Hudson (2004) use data for 116 developed and developing countries for 1975-1998, but find aid to be insignificant. A panel study of 120 middle- and low-income countries over the period 1970-1999 by Remmer (2004) finds that aid dependency reduces tax revenue mobilization. The dependent variable is the change in tax revenue as a share of GDP, and the explanatory variables include the standard variables and three different measures of aid dependency (aid/GNI, aid/government expenditures, and aid/imports). All three aid dependency measures are negatively related to tax shares although only aid as a share of imports is significant. When reducing the sample to the period 1980-1999, both the aid share in imports and the aid share in government expenditures have a significant negative impact on tax effort. One of the most recent studies focusing on the revenue response to foreign aid inflows separates total net aid into grants and loans to test if the impact of grants on domestic revenue is different from that of (concessional) loans (Gupta et al. 2004). This study suggests that some governments may consider grants to be a free substitute 213

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for tax revenue. By contrast, loans must be repaid, which provides incentives for governments to at least maintain tax revenues at current levels if not to increase them (Brautigam, 2000). Gupta et al. use the standard variables controlling for the economic structure and level of development in a panel of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, but augment the model by adding grants and loans separately and a corruption variable (the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index), to test their separate impact on the aid-revenue relationship. In their baseline regression the overall effect of total aid (grants and loans) on domestic revenue is negative and significant. When total aid is split into grants and loans, grants have a significant, negative effect on revenue while loans have a significant, positive impact. In their extended model, corruption is found to reduce revenue. To further test the negative effect of corruption on revenues, Gupta et al. rank countries according to their score on the ICRG corruption index and test the impact of grants versus loans on revenues in a sample consisting of the relatively corrupt countries. Their results suggest that countries with weaker institutions are likely to suffer a larger negative impact of grants on revenue than countries with better institutions. In addition to the cross-sectional time-series studies there are several country case studies for which the results are more mixed. A negative relationship between aid and domestic revenue mobilization was found in Pakistan (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998), Zambia (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a) and Cote d’Ivoire (McGillivray and Outtara, 2003). By contrast, a positive relationship between aid and revenue collection was found in Indonesia (Pack and Pack, 1990), Ghana (Osei et al., 2003), and Uganda and Malawi (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004b, 2004c). Generally, thus, the literature finds a negative relationship between aid and revenue collection, but this is not a conclusive result. For all of the studies, there are considerable concerns about the quality of the data and also the sensitivity of the results to specification changes, which make firm causal conclusions about the aid-revenue relationship impossible. Nevertheless, the typical explanatory channels are the replacement of tax with aid in the short term and the disincentives and moral hazard faced by aid-dependent governments to build tax administration and institutional capacity over the long-term. To further test the hypothesis that there is a negative causal relationship between high levels of aid and domestic tax effort, we would need reliable revenue data for a broad range of countries over an extended time period. Ideally, we would also have disaggregated revenue data to be able to strip out the possible differential effects of aid on trade taxes versus direct taxation and other forms of revenue collection. This would allow us to isolate the revenues which require more state capacity to collect. Unfortunately, much of this data does not exist, especially for the set 214

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of countries that have been highly aid-dependent (indeed, the lack of data itself suggests capacity gaps). In addition to data shortages, much of the existing fiscal data is of extremely poor quality, particularly among low-income countries. This limits our ability to empirically analyze the hypothesis with any degree of confidence and of course also raises caution about drawing firm conclusions from any of the data-driven assessments2. To summarize this section: a clear bivariate relationship appears to exist between high levels of aid and low levels of taxation. Poor data quality do not, however, allow us complete confidence that this relationship is not confounded by other factors that high aid-dependent countries have in common, such as low levels of economic activity and industrialization, that are also associated with poor revenue extraction. In addition, it is very hard to establish the exact nature of the link between state capacity and levels of state revenue. Intuitively, revenue generation is so central to state survival that one would think that states would not voluntarily abstain from collecting revenues it was able to collect. However, it is not completely possible to reject the alternative hypothesis that states choose not to seek revenues they have the capacity to collect because they are able to receive the equivalent revenues from foreign aid. To gain insights into this issue, it is perhaps useful to turn to an older political science literature on state building, which explores the impact of revenue collection on regime type.

AID, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE POLITICAL REGIME A political regime can be defined as the set of institutions which determine the nature of political power, and which structures the relationship between the government and the citizenry. A third and perhaps most critical set of negative institutional effects of aid can be identified as those that influence the political regime in a way that discourages the establishment of rational developmental states. The hypothesis here is that large sustained aid flows fundamentally alter the relationship between government elites and local citizens. Any kind of external financial flow changes the incentives faced by recipient government officials and their citizens, regardless of the precise nature of donor practices. That is, aid flows themselves, separate from particular inefficiencies in the aid system, can affect the evolution of state-society relations. If donors are providing the majority of public finance and governments are primarily accountable to those external agencies, 2. Including the data used in Figure 1. Some of the studies cited above appear to have benefited from access to privileged data from within the IMF that is presumably of higher quality but is not publicly available. Repeated attempts by the authors to gain access to internal IMF data were unsuccessful.

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then it may simply not be possible to also expect a credible social contract to develop between the state and its citizens. Using the current terminology, aid may undercut the very principles the aid industry intends to promote: ownership, accountability, and participation. Large aid flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability because governing elites no longer need to ensure the support of their publics and the assent of their legislatures when they do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, as long as they keep the donors happy and willing to provide alternative sources of funding. Although governments typically complain about conditions, it is still easier to manage donor demands than the slow and politically difficult task of building or improving domestic revenue collection. A reliance on aid as a substitute for local resources means the flow of revenues to the state is not affected by government efficiency, so there will be a tendency for governments to under invest in developmental capacity. This moral hazard effect of aid dependence is borne out empirically, as high aid is associated with decreased quality of governance (for example, Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2000). Heller and Gupta (2002) also argue that aid creates moral hazard because it reduces the incentive to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions, and thus weakens the government’s developmental performance and encourages rent-seeking. The link between the loss of accountability and aid is particularly striking in Africa since the region combines sharp economic decline with a relatively high level of political stability, at least if the latter is defined as the ability of office holders to remain in power. Thus, since 1980, the average African leader has remained in power just under 12 years, more than three times longer than democratically elected leaders in the prosperous democracies of the West (Van de Walle, 2001). The absence of accountability is then not a manner of speech, but a practical reality: it is literally true that African governments avoid accountability for their performance. A long-term decline in governmental accountability also appears to have a direct impact on the degree of democracy prevailing in the system. Qualitatively, Moore (1998) has argued that countries which rely on a greater proportion of ‘unearned’ income will tend to be less democratic and have less effective institutional mechanisms and accountability. Simply put, the actions of such governments typically indicate they do not have to worry as much about maintaining legitimacy because they do not collect revenues from their own population. Guyer (1992) and others have made exactly such an argument about Nigeria, while more recently the negative links between aid dependency and low levels of democratic rule have been argued in a number of country case studies (see Hoffman and Gibson, 2005 on Tanzania; Hanlon, 1991 on Mozambique). In these dynamics, aid can be compared with a natural resource, such as oil, that provides unearned rents 216

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for the government. An earlier literature on ‘rentier’ states in the Middle East had indeed argued that oil resources have allowed governments to resist pressures to democratize (Anderson, 1987; Chaudhry, 1997). Of course, it might be argued that aid comes with more strings attached than oil, and that donors can affect governmental behavior by setting conditions on their aid. However imperfectly, donors do not condone government corruption, incompetence or authoritarianism. Though inconsistently, donors have promoted democracy and better governance in Africa, at least since the end of the Cold War (Van De Walle, 2001). Donors have also sought to explicitly promote accountability and participation, using intensified oversight of accounts and conditionality, such as the insistence on a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) process, which subjects the national budget to multiple rounds of consultation with civil society groups. But the PRSPs and conditionality, and other donor processes (even if better enforced), cannot fundamentally replace government accountability towards its citizens in an equally legitimate way, no matter how well-intentioned or vigilant the donors. A large flow of aid over a sustained period also can undermine popular participation. On the one hand, the assent of the population is less important to governments that receive large amounts of external support. They will devote less time and resources to explaining and defending policy decisions to their citizens, and will underfund the kinds of public institutions that encourage popular participation. On the other hand, the decline in ownership brought about by the externalization of decision-making necessarily results in departicipation. If citizens believe that their leaders respond to pressures from London, Paris or Washington, they will not devote as much time pressing demands on the local legislature and executive. More to the point, they may view the local legislature as the place to press for favors and patronage, rather than for policy outcomes, and this will once again tend to reinforce the patrimonial elements in the local political economy. The African contemporary record is certainly compatible with such an interpretation. The region is characterized by strong presidential rule, as well as weak and pliant legislatures (Van De Walle, 2001; Joseph, 2003; Barkan and Gibson, 2005), and frail civil society organizations. The absence of participatory checks on the executive branch of government in the region can tentatively at least in part be ascribed to the high volume of aid governments receive. Indeed, the relationship with the donors may well have served to reinforce tendencies which other structural factors were already creating. Many early observers had noted the low levels of participation in African political systems following independence (Kasfir, 1971; Collier, 1982), while the tendency of these countries to produce highly presidential political systems, with powerful executives and impotent legislatures has also long 217

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been related in the literature (Schatzberg, 2001; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997). The weakness of civil society in the region has also been described by numerous observers (Ndegwa, 1995; Harbeson et al., 1994). To be sure, political systems with stronger traditions of both vertical and horizontal domestic accountability might have been affected differently by a large volume of aid. But in Africa’s post-colonial regimes, these aid flows inevitably enhanced an evolution already under way. Poorly integrated political communities with substantial ethnic fragmentation, and a small (or non-existent) middle class to buttress democratic rule were more likely to fall prey to authoritarian rulers relying on clientelism to remain in power. A small number of countries, such as Botswana, avoided the worst of these pitfalls (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Lewis, 1993), in part thanks to unusual leadership. But for most the post-independence period was characterized by the emergence of regimes that enjoyed little popular legitimacy and needed a combination of systematic clientelism and various repressive political instruments to remain in power. These types of regimes were comforted in these tendencies by steady increases in aid that seemed automatic throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Governments could undertake profoundly anti-developmental actions and not threaten their relationship with the western donors. Thus, the move to authoritarian and military government in the 1960s did not reduce aid. The replacement of independent civil service commissions and merit-based promotions by politicized presidential control of the civil service was similarly condoned, not least because donors found it convenient to rely on a large number of foreign experts, to palliate weaknesses in the civil service (Berg, 1993). Disastrous nationalization of private firms owned by foreigners for the benefit of political cronies close to the president in countries as diverse as Nigeria and Zaire did not prevent aid to continue its upward trajectory (See Rood, 1976; Callaghy, 1984 on Zaire; Biersteker, 1987 on Nigeria). A comparison with the historical experience in the West is instructive here. Much scholarly work has closely linked democratic development to the evolution of taxation (see Ross, 2004 for an excellent overview). Historians of the emergence of strong democratic states in the West emphasize the link between the progressive growth of democratic and accountable government, on the one hand, and the emergence of a state apparatus that had both the capacity and the legitimacy to extract an increasing amount of revenue from society, on the other. In an influential essay, North and Weingast (1989) showed that the emergence of Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 dramatically increased the ability of the British government to raise taxes, and ensured the country’s military and economic success in the 18th and 19th century. 218

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Ardant (1975) showed that the European states that were able to finance and then win wars were the states that were able to build their extractive capacity, but also to gain the assent of their populations, often by extending political rights. In Tilly’s famous aphorism, “the state made war and war made the state”, the need to finance wars motivated states both to build their extractive capacity, but also to maintain their own legitimacy (Tilly, 1975, 1985). In short, taxation is important because it is essential to democratic governance, but also because it holds the key to state building and state survival. The comparison with the low income countries in Africa is instructive, since they did not have to fight international wars to ensure their survival (Herbst, 2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 1982). In the 20th and 21st centuries, the basic functions of a developmental lowincome state are to raise revenues and make effective expenditures in order to promote development. Successful developing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Botswana— have typically been solidly extractive states, with above average tax effort ratios. Not all of these states have enjoyed democratic governance during the early phases of their development, but almost invariably, their governments enjoyed substantial political legitimacy, and none were highly repressive. Of course, most of the low– income states of Africa typically have low tax effort ratios. In recent years, donors have financed a sharp increase in social services provision in sub-Saharan Africa, notably in health and education. Historically, such increases in provision have been the hallmark of democratic governments, or at least of governments facing substantial participatory pressures. Thus, in the West, the rise of public education coincided in general terms with the introduction of the electoral franchise. Pressures from below encouraged governments who wanted to remain in power to provide more services to its citizens. In most African countries, however, the pressures have been external. In fact, a substantial proportion of the national development effort is not integrated into the national budget and does not concern the government. It is not uncommon for donors to fund over half of the country’s public investment budget, while foreign NGOs with their local partners can be providing from a third to half of the social services available to African citizens in some countries (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995). Indeed, somewhat ironically, African governments have found it politically convenient to blame the donors and NGOs for unpopular sectoral policies, poor social services and negative economic outcomes, as if these were not among their core responsibilities. There are similar differences in the rise of civil society. In the West, an emerging middle class sought to build a counter-weight to the state and its organizations, and the result was a wide variety of membership organizations, unions and clubs with an independent basis of power, that with time were able to increase the accountability of the central state (Hall, 1995). In Africa, the 219

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absence of economic growth long undermined the development of an indigenous independent civil society. In recent years, there has been a flowering of small non-state actors and some of them were instrumental in the emergence of democratic movements that did topple some authoritarian governments in the early 1990s (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997; Harbeson et al., 1994). Yet, there remain very few membership organizations in the region, and many of the bigger NGOs that have emerged are mostly funded by the donors, typically to help undertake donor initiatives in the social sectors. Because these organizations receive funding from the donors, they are less likely to seek to build up their own memberships, or autonomy. Because they help donors implement projects that governments fail to undertake, they actually help governments escape accountability for their developmental failures. As a result of these different dynamics, governments have escaped accountability and have been allowed to focus their resources on non-developmental expenditures that help them remain in office. Van de Walle (2001) shows that there have been substantial increases in the size of defense expenditures in the region for instance, and the number and size of public offices such as parliamentary bodies, ministerial cabinets, national commissions, and provincial governments have steadily risen through two decades of economic crisis, even as the share of aid in the funding of development has sharply increased. Paradoxically, as a result, in Africa, the extension of social services has often been accompanied by a decline of participation, low governance quality and an increase in clientelistic behavior. If we agree with Fox (1994) and others that the process of democratic consolidation in low-income states requires a transition from clientelism to citizenship, in which governments engage in participatory contractual exchange relationships with the population, then donors efforts may have paradoxically negative effects on citizengovernment relations in the region.

CONCLUSIONS Our review of the literature suggests that there are reasons to believe that a large and sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of good public institutions in low income countries. We have reviewed different bodies of literature that suggest that the current aid system may have undercut incentives for revenue collection and negatively affected public governance in Africa. In addition, we have examined a political science literature that finds both anti-development governance patterns across most of sub-Saharan Africa and strong historical evidence that revenue generation is central to the idea of accountability and the 220

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establishment of state institutions. Combined, they suggest that aid may undermine the development of effective state structures. There are many gaps in the data needed to prove these tentative claims. Also, state revenues are an imperfect indicator for state capacity, since states are able to get revenues in many different ways, only some of which involve much extractive capacity. Nonetheless, the analysis does suggest that an aid-institutions paradox, whereby high levels of aid can have a negative effect on local institutions, is a potentially serious concern. Given the possibility for substantially more aid flowing to Africa in the near future, scope for such a harmful dynamic is likely to be exacerbated. A quarter of a century ago, the World Bank issued its so-called Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), which called for a doubling of aid to address its many economic and social problems. It must be particularly distressing to the development community how many of those problems persist, despite the fact that increases in aid were considerably higher than those hoped. This fact alone should encourage skepticism about the current proposals that a sharp increase in aid volume will have the intended effects in the region. It is not at all clear that the current aid practices–with the negative effects on institutions described above–will or can be reformed. But, as we have argued, there are good reasons to believe that high levels of aid over a prolonged period is likely to have negative institutional effects, at the very least, if the current aid delivery modalities are not substantially reformed. How much is too much aid? We have studiously avoided this difficult question until the end of the paper. The same Berg (1997, 2000) suggested that aid starts to have negative effects on local institutions when aid flows reach 5 percent of GDP, which would mean that the overwhelming majority of states in the region are negatively affected. A more recent and thorough review of aid absorption (Clemens and Radelet, 2003) find the ‘saturation point’ (where additional aid would produce zero economic impact) highly dependent on local conditions, but ranging from 15-45 percent of GDP. Surely, the incentive dynamics raised by this easy come into play well before such an extreme level is reached. Our analysis is in no way meant to disparage the desirability of general increases in aid flows, however, or suggest that additional aid could not necessarily be spent without producing the negative institutional effects. Our findings do not cover a range of activities that might be donor financed which could have positive institutional effects, such as debt relief, peacekeeping, and regional security arrangements. Similarly, we join other analysts who have advocated substantial increases in funding for regional and global public goods, such as agricultural research or anti-malaria research. All the available evidence on the likely impact of 221

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the eradication of endemic diseases in the region suggest current funding levels to be inadequate (Ferroni and Mody, 2002), and a substantially larger flow of resources would be unlikely to have the kinds of negative institutional effects described here. In sum, it seems likely that the extra public dollars now being proposed for traditional development assistance might well be better spent for other types of assistance that would in the long run have a greater impact on the development of the region. However, an historical view of the complex evolution of state institutions suggests that not only are they critical to producing developmental outcomes, but that donors should be unambiguously aware that their assistance can have perverse effects on some of the very outcomes they hope to encourage.

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BRAUTIGAM, Deborah and KNACK, Steven (2004): “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in SubSaharan Africa”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, January. BULIR, Ales and LANE, Timothy (2002): “Aid and Fiscal Management”, in Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (eds.), Helping Countries Develop, The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. BURNSIDE, Craig and DOLLAR, David (2000): “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Economic Review, 90(4). CALLAGHY, Thomas M. (1988): “The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical and Comparative Reflections”, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. CALLAGHY, Thomas M. (1984): The State Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, Columbia University Press, New York, NY. CELLIAH, Raja J. (1971): “Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries”, IMF Staff Papers 18(2), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. CELLIAH, Raja J.; BAAS, H. J. and Kelly, Margaret R. (1975): “Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing Countries, 1969-1971”, IMF Staff Papers, 22(1), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. CHABAL, Patrick and DALOZ, Jean Pierre (1999): Africa Works, James Currey, London, UK. CHAUDHRY, Kiren Aziz (1997): The Price of Wealth: Economics and Institutions in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, New York, NY. CLEMENS, Michael and RADELET, Steven (2003): “Absorptive Capacity: How Much Is Too Much?”, in Steven Radelet, Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker’s Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. COHEN, John (1992): “Foreign Advisors and Capacity Building: the Case of Kenya”, Public Administration and Development, 12. COLLIER, Paul and HOEFFLER, Anke (2004): “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers, 56. COLLIER, Ruth Berins (1982): Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (2005): Our Common Interest. Report of the Commission for Africa. In http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/thereport/english/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf> DE LONG, J. Bradford and EICHENGREEN, Barry (1991): “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program”, NBER Working Paper 3899, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. DEVARAJAN, Shantayanan; MILLER, Margaret J. and SWANSON, Eric V. (2002): “Goals for Development: History, Prospects and Costs”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2819, World Bank, Washington, D. C. NORTH, Douglass and WEINGAST, Barry (1989): “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, Journal of Economic History, 49(4). EASTERLY, William (2005): “Reliving the ‘50s: the Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in Economic Development”, CGD Working Paper 65, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. EASTERLY, William (2003): “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid”, Policy Reform, 5. EIFERT, Benn and GELB¸ Alan (2005): “Improving the Dynamics of Aid: Towards More Predictable Budget Support”, Paper presented at Practitioner’s Forum on Budget Support, Cape Town, South Africa, May 5-6. ENGLEBERT, Pierre (2000): State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO. EVANS, Peter (1995): Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. FAGERNAS, Sonja and ROBERTS, John (2004a): “The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Zambia”, ESAU Working Paper, 10, Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. — (2004b): “The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi”, ESAU Working Paper, 7, Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. — (2004c): “The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Uganda”, ESAU Working Paper, 9, Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. FERRONI, Marco and MODY, Ashok, (eds.) (2002):. International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement and Financing, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA. FOX, Jonathan (1994): “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship”, World Politics, 46(2). FRANCO-RODRIGUEZ, Susana (2000): “Recent Advances in Fiscal Response Models with an Application to Costa Rica”, Journal of International Development, 12(3). FRANCO-RODRIGUEZ, Susana: MCGILLIVRAY, Mark and MORRISSEY, Oliver (1998): “Aid and the Public Sector in Pakistan: Evidence with Endogenous Aid”, World Development, 26(7). GHURA, Dhaneshwar (1998): “Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of Economic Policies and Corruption”, IMF Working Paper, 98/135, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C.

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GUPTA, Sanjeev; CLEMENTS, Benedict; PIVOVARSKY, Alexander and TIONGSON, Erwin (2004): “Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does the Composition of Foreign Aid Matter?”, in Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements and Gabriela Inchauste (eds.), Helping Countries Develop, The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. GUYER, Jane (1992): “Representation Without Taxation: An Essay on Democracy in Rural Nigeria, 19521990”, African Studies Review, 35(1). HAGGARD, Stephan (1990): Pathways from the Periphery, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. HALL, John, A. (ed.) (1995): Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK. HANLON, Joseph (1991): Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?, Indiana University Press. HARBESON, John W.; ROTHCHILD, Donald and CHAZAN, Naomi (eds.) (1994): Civil Society and the State in Africa, Lynne Rienner Press, Boulder, CO. HELLER, Peter S. (1975): “A Model of Public Fiscal Behaviour in Developing Countries: Aid, Investment, and Taxation”, American Economic Review, 65(3). HELLER, Peter S. and GUPTA, Sanjeev (2002): “Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance”, IMF Policy Discussion Paper 02/5, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. HELLER, Peter, S. (2005): “Pity the Finance Minister: Issues in Managing a Substantial Scaling Up of Aid Flows”, IMF Working Paper 05/180, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. HERBST, Jeffrey (1990): “The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa”, World Development, 18(7). — (2000): States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. HOFFMAN, Barak, D. and GIBSON, Clark C. (2005): “Fiscal Governance and Public Services: Evidence from Tanzania and Zambia”. In http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/wgape/papers/9_GibsonHoffman.pdf JACKSON, Robert H. and ROTBERG, Carl G. (1982): “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood”, World Politics, 35(1). JOSEPH, Richard A. (1997): “Democratization in Africa After 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives”, Comparative Politics, 29(3). — (s. f.): “Africa: States in Crisis”, Journal of Democracy, 14(3). KALDOR, Nicholas (1963): “Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?”, Foreign Affairs, January. KAPSTEIN, Ethan (2004): “Behavioral Foundations of Democracy and Development”, CGD Working Paper, 52, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. KARL, Terry Lynn (1997): “The Paradox of Plenty. Oil Booms and Petro States”, Studies in International Political Economy, 26. KASFIR, Nelson (1971): The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in Africa Politics, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. KHAN, Haider Ali and HOSHINO, Eiichi (1992): “Impact of Foreign Aid on the Fiscal Behavior of LDC Governments”, World Development, 20(10). KILLICK, Tony (2004): “What Drives Change in Ghana? A Political-Economy View of Economic Prospects”, Mimeo. KIMBROUGH, Kent P. (1986): “Foreign Aid and Optimal Fiscal Policy”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 19(1). KNACK, Stephen (2000): (s. f.): “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: a Cross-Country Empirical Analysis”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2396, World Bank, Washington D. C. KNACK, Stephen, and RAHMAN, Aminur (s. f.): “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients”, World Bank Policy Research Working 3186, World Bank, Washington, D. C. LEUTHOLD, Jane H. (1991): “Tax Shares in Developing Countries: A Panel Study”, Journal of Development Economics, 35(1). LEVINE, Ruth and THE WHAT WORKS WORKING GROUP WITH MOLLY KINDER (2004): Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. LEVY, Brian and KPUNDEH, Sahr (eds.) (2005): State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, World Bank Institute, Washington, D. C. LEWIS, Stephen (1993): “Policy Making and Economic Performance: Botswana in Comparative Perspective”, in Stephen John Stedman (ed.), Botswana: the Political Economy of Democratic Development, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO. LOTZ, Jorgen R. and MORSS, Elliott R. (1967): “Measuring ‘Tax Effort’ in Developing Countries”, IMF Staff Papers, 14(3), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. MCGILLIVRAY, Mark and OUTTARA, Bazoumana (2003): “Aid, Debt Burden and Government Fiscal Behaviour in Cote d’Ivoire”, CREDIT Research Paper, 03/05, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. MCGILLVRAY, Mark and MORRISSEY, Oliver (2000a): “A Review of Evidence on the Fiscal Effects of Aid”, CREDIT Research Paper, 01/13, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. — (2000b): “Aid Illusion and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour”, CREDIT Research Paper, 00/9, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK.

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MOORE, Mick (1998): “Death Without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity, and Aid Dependence in the Fourth World”, in Gordon White and Mark Robinson (eds.), Towards a Democratic Developmental State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. MOSS, Todd and SUBRAMANIAN, Arvind (2005): “After the Big Push? Fiscal and Institutional Implications of Large Aid Increases”, CGD Working Paper, 71, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. MUSGRAVE, Richard A. (1969): Fiscal Systems, Yale University Press, London, UK. NDEGWA, Stephen (1995): The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, CT. NDULU, Benno J. O’Connell, and Stephen A. (1999): “Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(3). NKUSU, Mwanza (2004): “Financing Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy: Is Aid Causing More Pain than Gain?”, IMF Working Paper, 04/170, International Monetary Fund, Washington D. C. O’CONNELL, Stephen, A. and SOLUDO, Charles C. (2001): “Aid Intensity in Africa”, World Development, 29(9). ODEDOKUN, Matthew (2003): “Economics and Politics of Official Loans versus Grants. Panoramic Issues and Empirical Evidence”, WIDER Discussion Paper,. 2003/04, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland. OECD-DAC DATABASE (2005): http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm OED (2005): Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of Bank Support. World Bank, Washington, D. C. OSEI, Robert; MORRISSEY, Oliver and LLOYD, Tim (2003): “Modelling the Fiscal Effects of Aid: An Impulse Response Analysis for Ghana”, CREDIT Research Paper, 03/10, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. PACK, Howard and PACK, Janet (1990): “Is Foreign Aid Fungible? The Case of Indonesia”, The Economic Journal, 100(399). PRADHAN, Sanjay (1996): “Evaluating Public Spending: A Framework for Public Expenditure Reviews”, World Bank Discussion Paper, 323, World Bank, Washington D. C. RADELET, Steven (2003): Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymakers Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. RAJAN, Raghuram G. and SUBRAMANIAN, Arvind (2005): “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth?”, IMF Working Paper, 05/126, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. REMMER, Karen (2004): “Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?”, American Journal of Political Science, 48(1). RENO, William (1998): Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO. RODRIK, Dani (ed.) (2003):In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. ROOD, Leslie L. (1976): “Nationalization and Indigenization in Africa”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 14. ROODMAN, David (forthcoming): “Aid Project Proliferation: Theory and Evidence”, Draft. ROSS, Michael (1999): “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse”, World Politics, 51. — (2004): “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?”, British Journal of Political Science, 34. SACHS, Jeffrey (2005): The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time, Penguin Press, New York, NY. SANDBROOK, Richard (1992): The Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. SCHATZBERG, Michael (2001): Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. SCHUMPETER, Joseph, A. (1918/1991): “The Crisis of the Tax State”, in Richard A. Swedberg (ed.), Joseph A. Schumpeter. The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. SEMBOJA, Joseph and THERKILDSEN, Ole (eds.) (1995): Service Provision Under Stress in East Africa, James Currey, London, UK. STOTSKY, Janet G. and WOLDEMARIAM, Asegedech (1997): “Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa”, IMF Working Paper, 97/107, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. TANZI, Vito (1981): “A Statistical Evaluation of Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa”, IMF Occasional Paper, 8, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. — (1992): “Structural Factors and Tax Revenue in Developing Countries: A Decade of Evidence”, in Ian Goldin and Alan L. Winters (eds.), Open Economies: Structural Adjustment and Agriculture, Cambridge University Press, New York. TEERA, Joweria M. and HUDSON, John (2004): “Tax performance: A Comparative Study”, Journal of International Development, 16(6). TILLY, Charles (1975): The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press., Princeton, NJ. — (1985): “War Making and State-Making as Organized Crime”, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. VAN DE WALLE, Nicolas (2001): African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

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— (2005): Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries, Center for Global Development, Washington, D. C. WHITE, Howard (1998): Aid and Macro-Economic Performance, Macmillan, Basingstoke. WORLD BANK (1981): Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington D. C. — (1998): Assessing Aid-What Work, What Doesn’t, and Why, World Bank, Washington, D. C. — (2005): World Development Indicators, Washington, D. C. YOUNGER, Steven (1992): “Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves You”, World Development, 20(11). ZEDILLO, Panel (2001): Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development, United Nations, New York, NY.

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Lectura 4

21st

Shaping the Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*

VALUES AND INTERESTS As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the time is ripe to reflect on the lessons of development co-operation over the last 50 years and to put forward strategies for the first part of the next century. This report sets forth the collective views on these matters of development ministers, heads of aid agencies and other senior officials responsible for development co-operation, meeting as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development1. In the year 2000, four-fifths of the people of the world will be living in the developing countries, most with improving conditions. But the number in absolute poverty and despair will still be growing. Those of us in the industrialised countries have a strong moral imperative to respond to the extreme poverty and human suffering that still afflict more than one billion people. We also have a strong selfinterest in fostering increased prosperity in the developing countries. Our solidarity with the people of all countries causes us to seek to expand the community of interests and values needed to manage the problems that respect no borders—from environmental degradation and migration, to drugs and epidemic diseases. All people are made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in the world. Development matters. The record of the last 50 years, from Marshall Plan aid to the network of development partnerships now evolving, shows that the efforts of countries and societies to help themselves have been the main ingredients in their success. But the record also shows that development assistance has been an essential complementary factor in many achievements: the green revolution, the fall in birth rates, improved basic infrastructure, a diminished prevalence of disease and dramatically reduced poverty. Properly applied in propitious environments, aid works. Co-operation within the United Nations, the international financial institutions, the OECD and other global and regional fora has greatly enhanced these * In Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 1996, http://www.oecd.org/ dac/2508761.pdf 1. This report was adopted at the Thirty-fourth High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee, held on 6-7 May 1996.

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efforts and shaped an evolving multilateralism in which all countries hold a vital stake. We have learned that development assistance will only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners. We have seen the results in countries which have grown, prospered and achieved industrialisation; they no longer depend on aid but stand on their own feet and participate in the global economy. We have seen, on the other hand, the countries in which civil conflict and bad governance have set back development for generations. And we have learned that success takes time and sustained international and local effort. As we look ahead, we see an overwhelming case for making that effort. As a crucial part of this undertaking, the international community needs to sustain and increase the volume of official development assistance in order to reverse the growing marginalisation of the poor and achieve progress toward realistic goals of human development. Domestic preoccupations in Member countries should not jeopardise the international development effort at a critical juncture. Today’s investments in development co-operation will yield a very high return over the coming years. We believe that ways must be found to finance multilateral development co-operation that are adequate, efficient, predictable and sustainable. The full implementation of current agreements to pay arrears and create workable financing systems is an essential part of efforts to ensure that the United Nations and the multilateral development banks avoid severe crisis and continue to play their vital roles. We also recognise that those responsible for public money are accountable for its effective use. We have a duty to state clearly the results we expect and how we think they can be achieved. It is time to select, taking account of the many targets discussed and agreed at international fora, a limited number of indicators of success by which our efforts can be judged. We are proposing a global development partnership effort through which we can achieve together the following ambitious but realisable goals. Economic well-being:

• A reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. Social development:

• Universal primary education in all countries by 2015. 228

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• Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. • A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015. • Access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015. Environmental sustainability and regeneration:

• The current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015. While expressed in terms of their global impact, these goals must be pursued country by country through individual approaches that reflect local conditions and locally-owned development strategies. Essential to the attainment of these measurable goals are qualitative factors in the evolution of more stable, safe, participatory and just societies. These include capacity development for effective, democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. We will also continue to address these less easily quantified factors of development progress. Effective international support can make a real difference in achieving these goals. This is far from saying that they can be achieved by aid alone. The most important contributions for development, as in the past, will be made by the people and governments of the developing countries themselves. But where this effort is forthcoming it needs and deserves strong support from the industrialised countries. We commit ourselves to do the utmost to help:

• First, by a willingness to make mutual commitments with our development partners, supported by adequate resources. • Second, by improving the co-ordination of assistance in support of locallyowned development strategies. • Third, by a determined effort to achieve coherence between aid policies and other policies which impact on developing countries. 229

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These approaches were set out in broad terms in the statement of policy that we adopted in 1995 entitled Development Partnerships in the New Global Context2. The report that follows builds on this statement and proposes specific new practical measures to achieve the vision of partnership for development. We intend our report to be a contribution to the broad contemporary effort to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation. A rich process of dialogue and decisions is underway—within the OECD, in the Interim and Development Committees of the World Bank and IMF, in the regional development banks, in the G7, and in the United Nations system. This heightened international focus on development co-operation reinforces our conviction that development matters. The success or failure of poor people and poor countries in making their way in an interdependent world will have a profound influence in shaping the 21st century. We offer our proposals in this report with confidence that international co-operation can be effective in supporting development, and that the results will be well worth the effort they will demand of our societies. The stakes in a stable, sustainable future for this planet and all who will inhabit it are far too high for us to forego that effort.

A VISION OF PROGRESS NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A TIME OF GLOBAL CHANGE The management of global issues in the 21st century will require the active participation of all members of the international community. The developing countries, with 80% of the world’s population, must be part of a shared vision for this new century. Their future will be ever more tightly linked to that of our own societies. Their role in preserving peace and stability, expanding the global economy, combating poverty, increasing choices and opportunities and respect for human rights, and achieving sustainable environmental and population balances will be more significant than ever before. The new opportunities and challenges are coming into clearer focus:

• Globalisation is helping certain developing countries achieve the highest rates of economic growth in the world. Well before mid-century the present developing countries will account for half of global economic output. 2. The text of the statement is an annex to this report. It is analyzed and discussed in the 1995 DAC report Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 1996).

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• Population growth in the developing countries will account for virtually all the increase in the world’s population, from 5 billion in 1990 to about7.5 billion in 2015. This increase over 25 years is roughly equal to the total size of the human population in 1950. With growing economic interdependence, global competition and vigorous private sector activity are encouraging greater similarity in the policies of industrialised and developing countries. On the other hand, there is growing diversity within countries and among countries. Some developing countries are achieving considerable rates of growth and impressive reductions in poverty, although significant concentrations of poverty remain. Other countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been increasingly marginalised from the global system and suffer continuing deterioration in already deplorable living standards. Growing strains on the quality of water, soil and air, loss of biodiversity, depletion of fish stocks, current patterns of production and consumption and global climate change all raise questions about the continued capacity of the Earth’s natural resource base to feed and sustain a growing and increasingly urbanised population. It is now clear that not only environmental, but also social, cultural and political sustainability of development efforts are essential for the security and well-being of people and the functioning of the complex, interdependent global system now emerging.

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There is a compelling need for development co-operation strategies that will help the international community to manage these emerging challenges and opportunities into the next century. The choices before us involve far more than just the relevance and effectiveness of aid programmes. Decisions about international support for development will play a part in defining our societies’ overall vision for the future. What can development do to help create a stable global order in which people can live secure and productive lives? How can it help to avoid a future of conflict and chaos, of poverty and environmental devastation? How will development co-operation adapt to the changing global context?

THE VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE The Member countries of the Development Assistance Committee spend about $60 billion dollars each year for official development assistance. There are three principal motivations for their efforts. 231

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The first motive is fundamentally humanitarian. Support for development is a compassionate response to the extreme poverty and human suffering that still afflict one-fifth of the world’s population. The people who live in extreme poverty, for the most part, lack access to clean water and adequate health facilities; many do not receive sufficient nourishment to live a productive life; the majority do not possess basic literacy or numeracy skills3. Their deprivation is unnecessary and its continuation is intolerable. The moral imperative of support for development is self-evident. The second reason for supporting development is enlightened self-interest. Development benefits people not only in poor countries, but also in the industrialised donor countries. Increased prosperity in the developing countries demonstrably expands markets for the goods and services of the industrialised countries. Increased human security reduces pressures for migration and accompanying social and environmental stresses. Political stability and social cohesion diminish the risks of war, terrorism and crime that inevitably spill over into other countries. The third reason for international support for development is the solidarity of all people with one another. Development co-operation is one way that people from all nations can work together to address common problems and pursue common aspirations. Sustainable development expands the community of interests and values necessary to manage a host of global issues that respect no borders—environmental protection, limiting population growth, nuclear non-proliferation, control of illicit drugs, combating epidemic diseases. In a changing world, old distinctions between “North” and “South”, as well as between “East” and “West”, are becoming blurred. Issues can no longer be divided into “domestic” and “international”. Risks of social disintegration and exclusion affect all countries, as do opportunities to benefit from participation in a growing global economic system. As underlined in the DAC’s 1995 Development Partnerships policy statement, the basic notion of security is being redefined, placing much more weight on the needs and concerns of human beings and the quality of their environment. Everyone is made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in this world.

3. The situation was described as follows in Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 139): “The number of absolute poor, the truly destitute, was estimated by the World Bank at 1.3 billion in 1993, and is probably still growing. One fifth of the world lives in countries, mainly in Africa and Latin America, where living standards actually fell in the 1980s. Several indicators of aggregate poverty—1.5 billion lack access to safe water and 2 billion lack safe sanitation; more than 1 billion are illiterate, including half of the rural women—are no less chilling than a quarter-century ago. The conditions of this 20% of humanity— and of millions of others close to this perilous state—should be a matter of overriding priority”.

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ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED Development progress over recent decades has been unprecedented in human history. In the early 1950s, when large-scale development assistance began, most people outside the developed countries lived as they had always lived, scraping by on the edge of subsistence, with little knowledge of and no voice in global or national affairs, and little expectation of more than a short life of hard work with slight reward. Since then, many countries have achieved truly dramatic improvement in overall indicators of human welfare:

• Life expectancy in the developing countries has risen by more than twenty years (from 41 to 62 years). • The percentage of the population with access to clean water has doubled (from 35% to 70%). • Adult literacy has risen from less than half the population to about twothirds. • Food production and consumption have increased at a rate about 20% faster than population growth. These impressive strides have not been uniform. In some countries poverty is increasing, and in many countries the poor have not shared in the positive global trends described above. Millions of people still die each year from preventable and treatable diseases; 130 million primary school-age children do not attend school; more than one-third of the children in developing countries are malnourished and one in ten dies before reaching the age of five years. Respect for human dignity, and in particular acceptance of the equality of women, remains an unfulfilled dream for too many. While the distance that remains is less than the road already travelled, the journey is far from over. The striking progress that we have seen in recent decades gives us confidence that poverty can be overcome and development achieved. But history has shown us that progress is not inevitable. There is no room for complacency. Special attention by the international community is needed to build on the economic, social and political improvements underway in Sub-Saharan Africa, and to help counter further marginalisation of the continent. It is clear that success has been achieved only where the people and the institutions of developing countries have made sustained efforts to help themselves. At the same time, the record demonstrates that international co-operation has also contributed greatly, and increasingly, to the development results we have witnessed over the past 50 years. 233

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In this review we have considered where development co-operation has made the greatest difference. This can be examined at two levels. First, at the global level, some of the basic features of the human condition have been re-shaped over the past half-century, as is documented below. Second, there is much to be learned from the performance of individual countries, where the complex factors contributing to success or failure have produced such starkly different outcomes. At the global level:

• The dramatic fall in infant and child mortality has been supported by a major international campaign to increase child survival, led by the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Children’s Fund and supported by many bilateral donors. Almost 1.4 billion people gained access to clean water during the 1980s, the United Nations International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. This impressive result is an example of developing country efforts backed by effective aid. International development agencies have sponsored research, education and immunisation programmes to control smallpox (now eliminated), polio (eliminated in almost all countries), diphtheria and measles, and have introduced simple and effective ways to combat infant diarrhea, river blindness and guinea worm disease. The success of these efforts can be measured in millions of lives saved and billions of dollars of economic benefits. The “green revolution” that has contributed so much to the 20% increase in calorie consumption (and an accompanying decline in malnutrition) was given substantial impetus from international support for agricultural research, development of new crop varieties, extension services, irrigation and assistance to production and marketing, in addition to development co-operation in support of sound agricultural and other economic policies. Development co-operation has helped expand access to family planning and related education that have resulted in sharp falls in fertility rates and in desired family size in many developing countries. Contraceptive use in developing countries has risen from 10% of couples in 1960 to 50% in the 1990s. Development assistance has financed numerous projects to extend and improve energy, transportation and communications infrastructure as well as to strengthen capacity for the management of these systems. That physical investment and institutional capacity have been important to bring more people and more nations into the modern economy.

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• Development co-operation can now also claim significant contributions to a broad range of less quantifiable factors of importance to sustainable development. These range from improved capacity for managing economic and social policies to heightened attention to issues of accountability, the rule of law and human rights, expanded participation and the accumulation of social capital, and appreciation for environmental sustainability. These aspects of development, more complex than some earlier challenges, are basic to international co-operation today. At the country level, we see even more clearly that development co-operation is one factor among many affecting development results. In the course of this review, DAC Members contributed more than 60 country-specific examples, together with many regional and generic lessons. In recent years, we have examined the overall experience of countries to try to assess the impacts of aid. Academics have also attempted to make statistical associations between the volume and types of aid and total economic and social progress achieved by countries. While the sceptical analyses have usually received more attention, some new work has pointed to more positive associations4. Isolating any single factor as the cause of development success or failure is usually impossible. When aid works best, it is as a catalyst or reinforcement of other factors. At the same time, the record shows that it has indeed contributed, in just these ways, to a wide range of development successes in a great many countries facing radically different circumstances. Independent evaluations and our own reexamination in this exercise show a solid and rising score of successful contributions in the economic and social performance of many individual countries, as well as at the global level. Development and development co-operation reflect human experience. They never provide neat and simple stories of progress. Set-backs have occurred, resources have been wasted, and ill-conceived or poorly-managed aid has even been counter-productive. Some countries have become excessively dependent on aid. Both the successes and the failures have taught us a lot about how best to achieve results. In particular, we have learned that successful development strategies must integrate a number of key elements. They require a sound and stable policy framework; an emphasis on social development; enhanced participation by the local population, and notably by women; good governance, in the widest sense; 4. See Aid Effectiveness: A Study of the Effectiveness of Overseas Aid in the Main Countries Receiving ODA Assistance (Mosley and Hudson, ODA, 1996) and Private Investment Recovery and Sustainable Growth after Adjustment: A study for the Overseas Development Administration, ESCOR, nº RS914 (Fitzgerald and Mavrotas, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, February 1996).

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policies and practices that are environmentally sustainable; and better means of preventing and resolving conflict and fostering reconciliation. These basic lessons inform our overall conclusion that development cooperation is only a complement, albeit often a vital one, to the efforts of the people, the institutions and the governments of the developing countries.

GOALS TO HELP DEFINE THE VISION We agree with the 1995 G7 Summit at Halifax that a higher quality of life for all people is the goal of sustainable development. A higher quality of life means that people will attain increased power over their own future. The pursuit of that broad vision will put the focus on many unfinished tasks, some of which have already been identified in the preceding discussion. They include overcoming extreme poverty, achieving food security, increasing the effectiveness of market economies and the efficiency of government, fostering regional co-operation, enhancing the participation of all people, and notably women, and reducing the dependency of the poorest people and poorest countries by increasing their capacity for self reliance. This daunting array of tasks needs a defining structure. We believe that a few specific goals will help to clarify the vision of a higher quality of life for all people, and will provide guideposts against which progress toward that vision can be measured. Many goals have been formulated through the series of recent United Nations conferences addressing subjects important to development—education (Jomtien, 1990), children (New York, 1990), the environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), population (Cairo, 1994), social development (Copenhagen, 1995), and women (Beijing, 1995)5. These conferences have identified a number of targets to measure the progress of development in particular fields. They reflect broad agreement in the international community, arrived at with the active participation of the developing countries. The selection of an integrated set of goals, based on these agreed targets, could provide valuable indicators of progress. We are suggesting several such indicators in the fields of economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability. The particular indicators we have chosen reflect our judgement of their importance in their own right and as meaningful proxies for broader development goals. Our selection does not indicate any diminished commitment to other goals accepted by the international community, at international conferences or elsewhere. 5. Additional major conferences on the important issues of human settlements and food security are scheduled to take place in 1996.

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These targets are aspirations for the entire development process, not just for co-operation efforts. They represent only a proposal of what we as donors consider to be helpful measures of progress to inspire effective development co-operation. Their achievement will require agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally-owned strategies. They can be realised only through concerted actions developed through a process of dialogue and agreement in a true spirit of partnership Success will depend upon the broad acceptance of a comprehensive approach, drawing on the resources, energies and commitment of institutions and individuals in government at all levels, in the private sector, in non-governmental organisations—in developing and industrialised countries and in international organisations. It will depend equally upon an individual approach that recognises diversity among countries and societies and that respects local ownership of the development process. We will need to change how we think and how we operate, in a far more co-ordinated effort than we have known until now. 1. Economic well-being: The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015. The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action set forth the goal of eradicating poverty in the world, through decisive national actions and international co-operation “as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind”. The World Bank has used the standard of $370 per capita in annual income, or about $1 per day, as the threshold of extreme poverty. Based on that standard, it has estimated that 30% of the population in developing countries—or some 1.3 billion people—live in extreme poverty, and that their numbers are increasing. This goal obviously goes only part of the way toward meeting the global poverty eradication target identified at Copenhagen. But it seeks to give that target a concrete, attainable focus for the medium term. Reductions of poverty on this order of magnitude have been achieved in individual countries; we are proposing a generalisation of those individual successes. Even if the incidence of extreme poverty can be reduced by one-half, there will still remain a human tragedy of enormous proportions. But success in achieving the 50% reduction will demonstrate both the need and the ability to continue the effort. Obviously, this target will be much harder to reach in some countries than in others. But global averages are not enough. The objective must be pursued country by country, and substantial progress must be sought in all countries. This target implies significantly increased rates of per capita economic growth. However, growth rates will vary greatly among countries and we have concluded that a global growth target would be neither feasible nor useful to the formulation of country strategies. 237

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2. Social development: There should be substantial progress in primary education, gender equality, basic health care and family planning, as follows. a) There should be universal primary education in all countries by 2015. This goal, building on the ground laid at the Jomtien Conference on Education for All in 1990, was endorsed by the 1995 Copenhagen Summit on Social Development and also by the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women as a goal for 2015. The attainment of basic literacy and numeracy skills has been identified repeatedly as the most significant factor in reducing poverty and increasing participation by individuals in the economic, political and cultural life of their societies. b) Progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women should be demonstrated by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. The Cairo and Beijing Conferences, as well as the Copenhagen Summit, recommended that the gender gap in primary and secondary education be closed by 2005. Investment in education for girls has been shown repeatedly to be one of the most important determinants of development, with positive implications for all other measures of progress. Achieving gender equality in education will be a measure of both fairness and efficiency. c) The death rate for infants and children under the age of five years should be reduced in each developing country by two-thirds the 1990 level by 2015. The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-fourths during this same period. The 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development established the goals of reducing the infant mortality rate to below 35 per thousand live births, and reducing under-five mortality to below 45 per thousand, by 2015. This target endorses those goals. Child mortality, as a measure of the availability of health and nutrition for the most vulnerable members of society, is a key indicator of the overall state of health in a society. Maternal mortality is an area of one of the greatest disparities between developing and industrialised countries, although there is great divergence among countries. The Cairo Conference adopted targets of reducing the rate in every developing country by one-half from the 1990 level by 2000 and by a further onehalf by 2015. These targets were confirmed at the Beijing Conference. The 1995 World Development Report estimates the maternal mortality rate per 100 000 live births in developing countries overall at about 350 during the 1980s. d) Access should be available through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015. This objective, agreed to at the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, is key to enabling people to make active choices on their 238

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reproductive behaviour and thus to contribute to stabilising the world population and assuring the sustainability of development. 3. Environmental sustainability and regeneration: There should be a current national strategy for sustainable development, in the process of implementation, in every country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources—forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric ozone, the accumulation of hazardous substances and other major indicators—are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015. This objective is derived from the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development. It is intended to supplement the global targets established under international environmental conventions. The national strategy for sustainable development, called for at Rio, is foreseen as a highly participatory instrument intended “to ensure socially responsible economic development while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future generations”. This goal implies that all countries will have acquired by 2015 the capacity to address environmental issues and respond to environmental problems. The Rio Conference emphasised that progress in economic and social development, including progress toward all the goals outlined in this report, depends critically on the preservation of the natural resource base and limitation of environmental degradation. Rio and other international fora have also reinforced the message that these goals can only be met if developing countries themselves drive the action, with full participation by all of their societies’ stakeholders. Sustainable development needs to integrate a number of additional key elements, not all of which lend themselves to indicators along the lines suggested here. The Copenhagen Declaration, for example, included a commitment to promote social integration by fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and based on the promotion and protection of all human rights. In the same vein, the 1995 DAC Development Partnerships policy statement identified democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law as among the key elements of integrated development strategies. Inv estment of development resources in democratic governance will contribute to more accountable, transparent and participatory societies conducive to development progress. While not themselves the subject of suggested numerical indicators, we reaffirm our conviction that these qualitative aspects of development are essential to the attainment of the more measurable goals we have suggested. Accordingly, we will continue to address them in our dialogues with partners and in our policies and programmes. 239

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NEW STRATEGIES FOR THE CHALLENGES AHEAD A CHANGING DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION We made a clear statement last year on our view of the roles of partners in development co-operation. Sustainable development, based on integrated strategies that incorporate key economic, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned. The role of external partners is to help strengthen capacities in developing partner countries “to meet those demanding, integrated requirements for sustainable development, guided by the conditions and commitments in each country”6. To give substance to our belief in local ownership and partnership we must use channels and methods of co-operation that do not undermine those values. Acceptance of the partnership model, with greater clarity in the roles of partners, is one of the most positive changes we are proposing in the framework for development co-operation. In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for developing countries and their people, but with them. It must be seen as a collaborative effort to help them increase their capacities to do things for themselves. Paternalistic approaches have no place in this framework. In a true partnership, local actors should progressively take the lead while external partners back their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own development. Partnerships are becoming more complex. Earlier aid efforts involved working almost always with central governments. Today, we are working with many more partners to meet demands for greater efficiency, respond to more pluralistic and decentralised political systems, and recognise the importance of a dynamic private sector, local ownership and participation by civil society. Our understanding of development and development co-operation has undergone fundamental change. It has expanded to take more fully into account how societies operate and how the international system functions. We now see a much broader range of aims for a more people-centred, participatory and sustainable development process:

• Reducing poverty while achieving broadly-based economic growth. • Strengthening human and institutional capacities within nations to meet internal challenges and help avert further tragic cases of social disintegration and “failed states”. • Improving the capacity of developing countries to contribute to the management and solution of global problems. 6. See the annexed Development Partnerships in the New Global Context.

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• Reinforcing the transformation of institutions and enabling environments to facilitate the emergence of developing countries and transition economies as growing trade and investment partners in the global economy. We are confident that development co-operation can make a crucial contribution toward these aims. At the same time, our expectations are now more modest about what can be achieved by development co-operation alone. We are convinced that a partnership approach is the way to meet the varied and complex challenges that we face, many of which are still quite new. Development cooperation experience is still at an early stage in working with issues such as good governance, private sector development, capacity to manage environmental issues and gender equality, which have attained their current prominence only in recent years. When development is viewed in this broad context of societal transformation it is evident that development co-operation and other policies must work together. Our crucial interests in the broad goals of peace, economic growth, social justice, environmental sustainability and democracy obviously go far wider than aid programmes. The resources devoted to development co-operation and the expertise in the development agencies need to be integrated into coherent policy frameworks in which development objectives are given their full weight. Within our governments, development is important not only to aid agencies, but also to ministries of foreign affairs, finance, trade, environment, agriculture, and defence. More broadly, our citizens have much at stake in how national policies interact to complement—or to frustrate—development.

A STRONGER COMPACT FOR EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS We have stressed throughout this paper that each developing country and its people are ultimately responsible for their own development. Thus, the developing country is the necessary starting point for organising co-operation efforts, through relationships and mechanisms that reflect the particular local circumstances. Some developing countries will need special help in building the necessary capacities. Development co-operation at the regional level, and on sectoral lines, is also important. However, these approaches should complement and enrich efforts to strengthen national capacities for sustainable development. As a basic principle, locally-owned country development strategies and targets should emerge from an open and collaborative dialogue by local authorities with civil society and with external partners, about their shared objectives and their respective contributions to the common enterprise. Each donor’s programmes and activities should 241

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then operate within the framework of that locally-owned strategy in ways that respect and encourage strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership. While the particular elements of partnerships will vary considerably, it is possible to suggest areas in which undertakings might be considered by the partners as their commitments to shared objectives. Joint responsibilities:

• Create the conditions conducive to generating adequate resources for development. Pursue policies that minimise the risks of violent conflict. Strengthen protections at the domestic and international levels against corruption and illicit practices. Open up wide scope for effective development contributions from throughout civil society. Enlist the support of rapidly-developing countries and regional development mechanisms.

• • • •

Developing country responsibilities:

• Adhere to appropriate macroeconomic policies. • Commit to basic objectives of social development and increased participation, including gender equality. Foster accountable government and the rule of law. Strengthen human and institutional capacity. Create a climate favourable to enterprise and the mobilisation of local savings for investment. Carry out sound financial management, including efficient tax systems and productive public expenditure. Maintain stable and co-operative relations with neighbours.

• • • • •

External partner responsibilities:

• Provide reliable and appropriate assistance both to meet priority needs and to facilitate the mobilisation of additional resources to help achieve agreed performance targets. • Contribute to international trade and investment systems in ways that permit full opportunities to developing countries. • Adhere to agreed international guidelines for effective aid, and monitoring for continuous improvement. 242

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• Support strengthened capacities and increased participation in the developing country, avoiding the creation of aid-dependency. • Support access to information, technology and know-how. • Support coherent policies in other aspects of relations, including consistency in policies affecting human rights and the risks of violent conflict. • Work for better co-ordination of the international aid system among external partners, in support of developing countries’ own strategies.

MAKING AID WORK BETTER In the final part of this paper we propose some specific measures to help to achieve more effective development co-operation. The following suggestions reflect our collective experience; they seek to build on our strengths and correct identified weaknesses. However, one of the key lessons about development co-operation is that donor-driven initiatives rarely take root and that developing countries and their people must be at the centre of any effective system. The ideas presented here, therefore, will require broader discussion, especially with our developing country partners, and will need to be tested in practice and adapted as necessary.

Support for locally-owned strategies One of the most frequent weaknesses of past aid efforts was excessive proliferation of aid projects. Most donors have been moving beyond the project-by-project approach to reliance on explicit country strategies in working with the countries of their major concentration. These countries tend to be those that are the most aid-dependent. There are often a number of donors working in them. While each donor’s strategy seeks to respond to national priorities, the number and diversity of donor strategies raise questions about the burden they create for local institutions and the degree to which they foster or impair local ownership and participation. DAC Members, working with multilateral agencies and other donors, will help developing country partners to strengthen their own development strategies, and will encourage co-ordinated support from the donor community. One way to reinforce locally-owned strategies may be for donors increasingly to finance those aspects of the strategy calling for public expenditure through the budget of the developing country. This approach is being tested in a number of pilot efforts with a view to assuring both effectiveness and accountability by the developing country. 243

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Commitment of adequate resources Development finance is becoming more diversified. In the mid-1980s official development finance was the major part of resource flows to developing countries. In the mid-1990s private flows far exceed those from official sources. Experience has demonstrated the fundamental importance of high rates of domestic savings, efficient local financial systems and sound economic policies in the developing countries. In all the fast-growing developing economies, domestic savings are one of the main engines of growth, often supported by private foreign investment. Development co-operation needs to address these essential factors so that more developing countries will be able to compete for capital and technology. Our vision of development is one that fosters self-reliance in which countries and people are less in need of aid. However, many poorer countries simply do not yet have access to other resources sufficient to achieve the outcomes that serve everyone’s interests. Private flows are highly concentrated in a limited number of countries and sectors. The smaller and least developed countries still attract little of this potential source of development finance. Moreover, private resources generally do not flow directly to some key sectors of priority need, such as health and education. Development will depend upon the continued availability of concessional resources, while countries build the capacity to create and mobilise domestic resources and attract private capital flows. For a number of highly indebted poor countries, development will also depend upon concerted international action to alleviate an unsustainable burden of debt. In our 1995 Development Partnerships policy statement we reaffirmed our commitment to generating substantial resources for development co-operation to back the efforts of countries and people to help themselves. In endorsing that statement, the OECD Council at Ministerial Level expressed its continuing commitment “to mobilise as many public resources as possible and to encourage private flows to back the self-help efforts of developing countries”. Only four of the DAC’s 21 Member countries consistently meet the widely accepted volume target of 0.7% of GNP established by the United Nations in 1970 as an appropriate level for official development assistance7. For the DAC as a whole, ODA disbursements are now only 0.3% of GNP. Moreover, a growing portion of available ODA resources has been devoted to humanitarian needs and debt relief in recent years, placing an even greater strain on aid budgets. Among other things, these strains have created unprecedented shortfalls in financing of the 7. The four are Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. See the DAC 1995 Development Co-operation Report, Chapter IV, for analysis and detailed information concerning ODA performance of DAC Members.

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United Nations system and the multilateral development banks. These multilateral institutions remain a cornerstone in global efforts to foster development. Their difficult financial situation is a cause for concern. As recently as 1992, in the programme of action agreed at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio, developed countries reaffirmed their commitments “to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA, and to the extent that they have not yet achieved that target, agree to augment their aid programmes in order to reach that target as soon as possible...”. Other developed countries agreed at Rio “to make their best efforts to increase their level of ODA”. In this report we have focused on indicators of development progress—on outcomes rather than the volume of inputs. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, ODA is an essential investment to complement other development resources. Clearly, we need to sustain and increase official development assistance if we expect to see a reversal of the growing marginalisation of the poor and achieve progress toward realistic goals of human development. It is equally clear than an effort to build stronger compacts with developing countries on a foundation of shrinking resources and declining commitment will lack credibility. Therefore, it is necessary to express, once again, our deep concern that domestic preoccupations and budgetary pressures in some Member countries seriously jeopardise the international co-operation effort at a critical juncture.

Enhanced co-ordination in international fora and on the ground We are committed to better co-ordinate our aid efforts in line with the strategies of our partner countries. General and sectoral co-ordination among donors varies greatly from country to country. Given the variety of country situations, there is no single model that can be recommended. But methods of proven effectiveness could be given stronger encouragement. For example, the developing country should be the co-ordinator of development co-operation wherever possible. However, in cases where local interest or capability is weak, it remains for donors to encourage regular fora for co-ordination, and to assure that their own local representatives participate. Lead agencies from within the donor community (bilateral or multilateral) could be identified for particular themes or sectors, and developing country partners should be an integral part of the process. The in-country co-ordination could then be monitored in international Consultative Groups and Round Tables, as well as in DAC Aid Reviews. The objective would be to create incentives for effective co-ordination and to strengthen local capacity to lead the co-ordination process. 245

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Monitoring and evaluation We need to check continuously that planned improvements in aid co-ordination and delivery actually take place, with full feedback from the intended beneficiaries. The Development Assistance Committee already serves part of this role as a standard-keeper and co-ordination body without operational programmes of its own. More can be done in future, building on the many evaluation exercises underway (including those of the multilateral development banks), on the DAC’s peer reviews of bilateral donor programmes, and new developing country-based aid reviews, now in a pilot stage. Many specific and hard-won lessons learned are identified in the DAC Principles for Effective Aid and other policy guidance, as well as in the growing body of work on results-oriented programming, evaluations and follow-up. Guidelines for effective aid need to be continuously disseminated and tested at the field level, and the results fed back into new programmes. We shall continue to monitor the application of all these lessons to future development co-operation efforts.

Expanding the base for co-operation Aid is a scarce resource and, as we have stressed throughout this report, it must be targeted to meet priority needs and help generate other development investments. One of the most encouraging indications of progress over recent decades is that many countries have reduced or eliminated their need for aid, and some have become donors themselves. The DAC has now established a regular system for review of its List of Developing Countries and Territories with a view to identifying those that should progress from that list. Members already direct a substantial majority (some 63%) of their aid flows to low-income and least-developed countries, and they are committed to continuing that concentration as countries progress. As countries move toward a pattern of sustained growth and development, co-ordinated efforts should be made to assure that continued aid investments are directed to the sustainability of their own strategies, and that a conscious path toward a phase-out of aid is identified. Countries, institutions and individuals with recent experience in successful development can be especially effective in sharing their experience and insights with others. They also provide concrete examples of the shared international benefits of development. We need to strengthen and encourage the participation of those who can bring the experience of their own development into an expanding base of international co-operation. Such efforts are now part of our joint work in the DAC. 246

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BRINGING OUR POLICIES TOGETHER This report has described how the linkages between industrialised and developing countries extend far beyond development assistance. There are many areas where policies of the industrialised countries can complement or frustrate development efforts. Fiscal deficits of industrialised countries can influence both the cost and the availability of capital for developing countries. Environmental, sanitary and other restrictions on imports can sometimes operate as non-tariff barriers. The promotion of military exports can drain limited resources away from development priorities. On the other hand, industrialised country policies can foster trade and investment flows, can facilitate the sharing of technology, and can in many other ways advance development objectives. The ramifications and opportunities of policy coherence for development now need to be much more carefully traced and followed through than in the past. We should aim for nothing less than to assure that the entire range of relevant industrialised country policies are consistent with and do not undermine development objectives. We will work with our colleagues in the broad collaborative effort now underway within the OECD to examine linkages between OECD Members and the developing countries, building on the promising work on this theme completed in 19948. We are confident that we can do more than just avoid policy conflict. We will work to assure that development co-operation and other linkages between industrialised and developing countries are mutually reinforcing. The 21st century can be one of increased co-operation, of hope and of opportunity. We put forward these ideas to show the importance of development for the security and well-being of all who will inhabit this planet in the coming century. We are confident that development co-operation, together with other modes of international co-operation, can work to produce results that will be well worth the effort they will demand of our societies.

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS IN THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

Members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD met on 3-4 May 1995 at the level of Development Co-operation Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies. They agreed on shared orientations for their development co-operation efforts and preparing

8. The 1994 study concentrated on linkages with 15 “major” developing economies. Linkages: OECD and Major Developing Economies (OECD, 1995). In January 1996 the OECD Council authorised the initiation of a broader effort, with a planned completion date of May 1997, to be entitled “Globalisation and Linkages to 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for OECD Countries”.

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for key challenges of sustainable economic and social development into the 21st century. Members also expressed deep concern that domestic preoccupations and budgetary pressures in some Member countries could seriously jeopardise the international development cooperation effort at a critical juncture. For three decades, the highest rates of economic growth in the world have been achieved among developing countries, notably in Asia and Latin America. Many formerly poor countries have made rapid advances in standards of living, fuelled by expanded trade, capital and technology flows. Development co-operation has helped, and must continue to help, lay the foundations for their success. Yet many countries and people have not yet shared in this progress, or have even lost ground. At the same time, numerous countries, including countries in Africa, are adopting far-reaching economic and political reforms. They seek to increase opportunities for their people, and to integrate successfully into a highly competitive, interdependent world. Development and greater interdependence require high levels of domestic effort, high standards of accountability, and a strong civil society. Open, participatory economic and political systems are increasingly important factors. Meanwhile, the basic notion of security is being redefined, placing much more weight on the needs and concerns of human beings and the quality of their environment. More widespread and sustainable progress now depends on building strong capacities to achieve good governance, reduce poverty, and protect the environment. Civil conflict, terrorism, population and migration pressures, epidemic disease, environmental degradation, and international crime and corruption hinder the efforts of developing countries and concern us all. Within this new context, thriving developing country partners will contribute to greater prosperity and greater security in their own regions and globally. We therefore endorse the following strategic orientations, and commend them for active support in our own countries and throughout the international community.

1. DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IS AN INVESTMENT Support for development has contributed to extraordinary achievements in economic and social well-being. Well over two billion people have increased their incomes, life-expectancy, education, and their access to basic services. Development co-operation has also led to the emergence of new economic partners who play an increasingly dynamic role, generating new trade, investment, and jobs-as well as the need for adjustment-in our own countries. Developing country markets for OECD exports have expanded by 50% since 1990.

We regard development co-operation as a key investment in the future.

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2. COMBATING POVERTY AT ITS ROOTS IS A CENTRAL CHALLENGE Support for development reflects our enduring concern for the human dignity and well-being of others. Despite the promising trends in many developing countries, more than one billion people still live in extreme poverty. Yet, building on lessons learned, there are good prospects for significantly reducing poverty in the coming years.

We will focus our support on strategies and programmes that will work to enable the poorest to expand their opportunities and improve their lives.

3. STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS ARE NOW AVAILABLE Experience has shown that achievements in sustainable development, and effective co-operation, need to integrate a number of key elements: s !SOUNDPOLICYFRAMEWORKENCOURAGINGSTABLE GROWINGECONOMIESWITHFULLSCOPEFORA vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base. s )NVESTMENTINSOCIALDEVELOPMENT ESPECIALLYEDUCATION PRIMARYHEALTHCARE ANDPOPUlation activities. s %NHANCEDPARTICIPATIONOFALLPEOPLE ANDNOTABLYWOMEN INECONOMICANDPOLITICALLIFE and the reduction of social inequalities. s 'OODGOVERNANCEANDPUBLICMANAGEMENT DEMOCRATICACCOUNTABILITY THEPROTECTIONOF human rights and the rule of law. s 3USTAINABLEENVIRONMENTALPRACTICES s !DDRESSINGROOTCAUSESOFPOTENTIALCONFLICT LIMITINGMILITARYEXPENDITURE ANDTARGETING reconstruction and peace-building efforts toward longer-term reconciliation and development.

We will focus our co-operation on helping to strengthen capacities in our partner countries to meet these demanding, integrated requirements for sustainable development, guided by the conditions and commitments in each country.

4. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IS VITAL TO COMPLEMENT OTHER RESOURCES Developing countries themselves are ultimately responsible for their own development. Their own earnings, savings and tax revenues are the most important source of investment in their economic and social progress. For development to succeed, the people of the countries concerned must be the “owners” of their development policies and programmes. Private investment flows are mainly attracted by the most dynamic countries and sectors of the developing world, and private donations are directed primarily to immediate humanitarian needs. Official development assistance remains vital for many key investments in developing countries, especially the poorer countries.

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We remain committed to generating substantial resources for development co-operation to back the efforts of countries and people to help themselves.

5. OTHER POLICIES NEED TO BE COHERENT WITH DEVELOPMENT GOALS Expanded trade, investment and other linkages, and the growing role of the developing countries in the international economic system (notably in the World Trade Organisation) have raised the stakes for OECD countries. It is critical that other policies not undercut development objectives.

We will work with the other policy-makers concerned to ensure that our countries follow consistent, open economic policies in relations with our development partners.

6. OUR CO-OPERATION MUST BE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT Both bilateral and multilateral development assistance must be managed for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. We are confident that past achievements and lessons learned in development co-operation show clearly how best to reinforce current efforts of developing countries. The agreed principles and best practices for effective aid must be implemented with rigor. Critical evaluation must be an ongoing feature of development assistance efforts, to identify the best and most cost-effective approaches. Public accountability, based on indicators of achievement, is essential.

We will intensify our activities in aid co-ordination, the evaluation of aid effectiveness, peer reviews, and the implementation of best practices.

7. THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE WILL ADVANCE THESE PRIORITIES Co-operation for sustainable development is a fundamental concern of the OECD. Effective development co-operation helps to strengthen the multilateral system and promotes jobcreating growth and social cohesion on an international scale. OECD members commit substantial resources toward this effort, including more than $50 billion annually in official development assistance, 90% of the world’s total.

We reaffirm our commitment to work together in the Development Assistance Committee to implement the directions outlined here for this decade, to integrate the contributions of development co-operation with the other policy priorities of Members, and to help prepare strategies looking to the next century.

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