Cartagena de Indias: A Spanish Port an English Prize

Cartagena de Indias: Spanish Port an English Prize By Jorge Garcia-Herreros, RPA, CRD Gulf Coast Archaeology Group, LLP

Paper presented at the Symposium Borders Without Boundaries: Maritime Links Between the Caribbean and North American Colonies in the Chain of Commerce Organizer/Chair: Marco Meniketti. Society for Historical Archaeology Annual Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia 2007.

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Cartagena de Indias: Spanish Port an English Prize

Introduction Cartagena de Indias, was one of the major Spanish ports in the Caribbean. Due to its importance, great effort and monies were spent on building its defenses. When war broke between Spain and England, the English saw this city as a great prize and made several attacks in order to take this port. One of these attacks was lead by Admiral Edward Vernon, with one of the largest fleets assembled at that time. The English attack failed. The efforts of the Spanish to fortify and defend the city are examined as a cause for the failed attack. The basis of this paper is based on personal observation, when the area was visited in the late 1980’s and 1990’s and secondary records.

Founding (SLIDE 2) Cartagena de Indias (Cartagena of the Indies), began as a Spanish port founded in 1533 by Don Pedro de Heredia, it was named after the port of Cartagena which was located in Spain's Murcia region. This port was founded in a bay that was discovered in 1501 by Rodrigo de Bastidas, which he named Cartagena Bay. The advantages of building a port on this location was a bay that was naturally protected from the currents and winds of the area (SLIDE 3). At the same time the natural defenses of the bay could be utilized to construct an impressive array of fortifications that would protect this port and the treasures that were destined for the Spanish crown.

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Originally the area where Cartagena was founded was inhabited by the Mocanáes, a subgroup of the Caribes (SLIDE 4). At the time there were four tribes living in the bay area; the Carex which inhabited the island known as Tierrabomba, the Bahaire which inhabited the island known as Baru, and the Cospique which inhabited the area now known as Mammonal. The most important of these tribes were the Calamari, their name meaning crab, which inhabited a sandy island (Lemaitre n.d.). The Mocanáes where described in the accounts by the Spanish as fierce and warlike, and point out that even women fought side by side with the men. After Don Pedro de Heredia pacified the tribes around the bay of Cartagena he founded the City of Cartagena where the village of the Calamari had stood. As per Spanish tradition, he proceeded to develop plans for the city, determining the location of important government buildings, plazas, and the naming of the streets.

After founding the city, Heredia proceeded to explore the interior region. There he found tombs which had large amounts of gold in the area called by the natives, Finzenu, which was located around the Sinu River. This area was a sacred burial ground to the Native Americans of the region, who buried their dead with gold offerings and precious jewels. Don Pedro de Heredia plundered the tombs and temples of the area and tried to go further inland, but due to the lack of supplies he had to return back to Cartagena. These initial finds would be an indicator of the riches that Cartagena would hold and pass through as one of the main ports for the Spanish crown. Eventually the founding of this Spanish colony was the starting point of a long history of conflict and perseverance.

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Growing economic and military importance of the city The location of Cartagena made it into a principal port and it began to grow. The location, safety, and size of the bay conferred the ideal location for the Spanish treasure fleet to drop anchor (SLIDE 5). Within twenty years of Cartagena being founded it had become the focus of the Spanish Main (Grahn 1992). Most importantly, Cartagena became the first stop where the Spanish fleet coming to Terra Firme would unload their trade goods to their colonies in Nueva Granada and the Viceroyalty of Peru, and would pick up the treasures coming from Nueva Granada, Peru, Panama, Quito, and Chile (Irigoin and Grafe 2006). These trade goods greatly influenced the growth of Cartagena, and in 1574, just 41 years after being founded, King Felipe II gave the title of “City” to Cartagena. The growth of the port into a city is based on being the main Caribbean port for the Spanish Main in South America.

The Spanish Fleet would arrive twice a year to deliver merchandise from the Old World and pick up the treasures of the New World. Vast amounts of gold, silver and jewels would be moved to Cartagena when the Spanish Fleet arrived. This would also include other products such as hides, pearls from Panama, cacao from Ecuador, and sugar (Irogoin and Grafe 2006). Some of the goods were stored for shipment in Cartagena, but usually Spanish colonies would be notified of the arrival of the Spanish Fleet and they would begin to send their goods to Cartagena. When the Spanish fleet arrived, the city would become alive, and so did many of the Spanish colonies that would send their goods for shipment.

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Besides Cartagena being one of the main ports for the Spanish treasure fleet, it was also one of the principal ports for the slave trade. For example, records show that 60% of the slaves that were destined for the Viceroyalty of Peru passed through Cartagena (Grahn 1993). During the early and middle colonial period, only two Spanish ports, Cartagena (Colombia) and Veracruz (México), were large enough and had the authorization from the Spanish crown to participate in the slave trade. The slaves that arrived in Cartagena would then be sent to Nueva Granada, the Viceroyalty of Peru, Quito, Panama, Havana and other Spanish colonies (Irigoin and Grafe 2006). The slaves that were sent to Veracruz were mainly for the sale and distribution in New Spain. The majority of the slaves that were sent to Cartagena were to be put to work in mining operations. With the decline of the native populations the Spanish colonies were in need of a new labor force that would work the mines of Terra Firma.

Originally, the first slaves that arrived to the area came with Pedro de Heredia and worked as cane cutters to open roads, in the desecration and looting of tombs of the native population of Sinu, and in the construction of buildings and fortresses.

Cartagena

de Indias became the principal trade portal for the inland settlements of Nueva Granada and Peru. Initially, the importance of this port was due to the exportation of the gold found in the interior regions of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Later, it became the principal port for the introduction of African slaves to the interior of South America.

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Cartagena enjoyed a monopoly on foreign trade in the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada and all revenues from levies on imports and exports were spent locally (Meisel 2000). Typical of European powers at that time, Spain monopolized trade with their colonies, making the colonies dependant on their respective European powers. The Spanish crown only authorized intercontinental trade to Veracruz (Mexico), Nombre de Dios (Panama), and Cartagena (Colombia). Direct trade with other colonies was prohibited; and as a result, items from one colony had to be sent to Spain for reshipment to another colony, or colonies would utilize smugglers in order to directly trade with other colonies. The crown also established the routes of transport and the number of ships which were allowed to trade with other colonies. Merchants involved in intercontinental trade had to be Spanish nationals. Also, the crown circumscribed the type of merchandise that could be traded. The colony could export to Spain only precious metals, gold in particular, and some agricultural products. In return, the Spanish crown exported to the colonies most of the agricultural and manufactured goods that the colonies needed for survival.

Cartagena de Indias became prominent due to the amount of wealth that passed through its gates and its rise from a small port to a city. The Spanish recognized this and King Felipe II conferred the title to the city of “being very noble and loyal” (Lemaitre n.d.). The importance of Cartagena is seen by the appearance of the Inquisition. The Holy Office of the Inquisition arrived in 1610 and made Cartagena its headquarters. The jurisdiction of the Inquisition extended not only to Nueva Granada, but to most of the

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Caribbean including Venezuela, Panama, and the Antilles, excluding the western part of Cuba (Lemaitre n.d.).

Since its early years, as with many of the ports, they became a target of pirates and privateers. This was the case with Cartagena de Indias. A few years after it had been founded, the Spaniards designed a defense plan in which the main strategy was the construction of a walled military fortress to protect the city against the plundering of English, Dutch and French pirates. Although a defense plan was made, the city was attacked multiple times while the Spanish continued to strengthen its defenses.

The first attack conducted on the city was by the French pirate Robert Baal in 1551. He forced Governor Pedro de Heredia to flee and to give him gold to avoid being at the mercy of the invaders. Nine years later in 1559, the Frenchman Martín Cote also plundered the city. In 1568, the Englishman John Hawkins arrives in Cartagena with four ships carrying slaves and cargo. He wished to unload his goods and his requests to Governor Martín de las Alas to hold a commercial fair in the city were refused. Once the governor refused, Hawkins proceeds to siege the city for seven days. Hawkins fails in subjugating the city and eventually leaves. He swears to return with reinforcements, but he never does.

Hawkins nephew Sir Francis Drake will eventually fulfill Hawkins promise. Drake performs one of the worst attacks on the city. In April of 1586 Sir Francis Drake approached the city with 23 ships and 3,000 fighting men. After a contested battle, the

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majority of the citizens fled to take refuge in the neighboring village of Turbaco and Drake takes the city. Drake burns over 200 houses and destroys the cathedral which was under construction at that time (Lemaitre n.d.). After a month of holding the city, the Spanish are forced to pay Drake a ransom of 107,000 gold ducats. When Drake leaves the city, he takes jewelry and approximately 80 artillery pieces (Lemaitre n.d.). It would take another century before Cartagena would suffer another major attack and be plundered.

In the 17th Century when war broke out between Spain, France and England, the French decided to attack the Spanish colonies which provided most of the wealth of Spain. Baron de Pointis was given 22 ships, with more than 500 cannons combined, and 5000 fighting men. On his way to Cartagena he stopped in Haiti, Jean Baptiste Ducasse joined Pointis with seven more ships and 1,200 buccaneers (Lemaitre n. d.). The combined fleet of 29 ships and 6,200 men attacked Cartagena in April of 1697. The combined attacking forces focused their attack on the fortress of San Louis de Bocachica, which guarded the entrance to the bay. After overrunning the fortress of San Louis and taking advantage of the disorganization of the defenders, the French took the fortress of San Felipe, which overlooks the city. From his fortress a bombardment begins on the city, and eventually the gate of Media Luna, the main gate to a part of the city known as Getsemani, is breached. As the battle ensues, Governor Diego de los Rios is forced to capitulate (Lemaitre n. d.). Pointis enters the city and holds it for over a month. He ransacks the city. Pointis leaves the city with jewels, gold, and even the furniture from the nobles. It is estimated that he loots approximately ten million in gold. Pointis refused

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to pay Ducasses buccaneers and so they stay a week after Pointis had left. The buccaneers extracted another million in gold before they left the city. In all, the attack by Baron Pointis is estimated in today’s dollars to have cost approximately forty million dollars; this is both in damages to the forts and the plunder that was taken. After his attack, the Spanish Crown realized the importance of improving the defenses of the city and renewed its efforts to fortify the city.

The Defenses and Fortification of Cartagena de Indias One of the primary reasons that Cartagena de Indias was built in Cartagena Bay was the safety that the bay provided, both from the weather and “man.” The bay had only two main entrances; one which would be close to the island of Calamari, where Cartagena was founded (called Bocagrande which translates as Big Mouth), and the other was a smaller opening into the bay that was called Bocachica (in translation, Small Mouth). Therefore, the topography of the bay would only have two access points, and for larger ships Bocagrande was the only alternative since Bocachica was too narrow (Segovia 1992). Due to the prevailing winds of the area, any sailing ships that would head towards the island of Calamari through the bay would be going against the wind, and therefore would have to tackle (Zig Zag) taking longer to reach Cartagena. This made the bay an ideal and defensible location. Attacking the city from the open sea was not feasible due to the sand dunes and currents of the area (Segovia 1992). The fortifications of Cartagena did not appear over night, two hundred years of fortifying the city would make it into a formidable city.

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The earliest historical maps of the city, which date to 1570, show only one fort defending the entrance to the inner bay, and a line of cannons in Cartagena facing towards the inner bay. Although these defenses deterred John Hawkins from advancing on the city when he was refused entrance; when Sir Francis Drake attacked the city in 1586 he was able to take the city. Hawkin’s attack and subsequent plundering of the city showed the Spanish crown that Cartagena would need further fortifications. King Felipe II sent the famous Italian engineer Juan Bautista Antonelli to Cartagena to create a plan to wall the city and develop other fortifications as necessary (Lemaitre n. d.).

Antonelli drew a master plan that recommended that a series of bastions be built around Cartagena. These bastions would be connected by walls which would surround Cartagena. He also recommended that a series of fortresses be built along the shores and by the entrances of Bocagrande and Bocachica. In all, a total of 22 bastions would surround Cartagena (Lemaitre n. d.). The Spanish Crown would follow Antonelli’s plans with a few changes. The complete fortification of the bay and the city would take 200 years. When the walls where completed they would total 19 kilometers in length, 15 meters thick and 12 meters high (Lemaitre n. d.).

A strategic threat to the city was the hill of San Lazaro. This hill faced the gate of Media Luna and was in close proximity to the city. If this hill was taken, it could be used by attackers to bombard the city. The Spanish had only two options; to level the hill or build a fort on it. Governor Pedro Zapata de Mendoza, with the backing of the citizens of Cartagena, decided to build the fort (Lemaitre n. d.). The uppermost structure of the

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fort was completed in 1654 and was named San Felipe de Barajas. This fort would continue to be improved until the 18th century. During Vernon’s attack, this fort would play a very important role.

At the time that the city was attacked by Admiral Vernon, a great portion of the fortification of the city and bay had been completed (SLIDE 6). In 1640 three Spanish galleons, Capitana, Buensuceso, and Concepcion, sank while entering the bay through Bocagrande (Segovia 1992). The hulls eventually retained silt and by the time that Vernon attacks the city, the entrance of Bocagrande has been obstructed and is basically impassable by large ships. Therefore, the only entrance to the bay at this time is Bocachica (SLIDE 7). The Spanish crown decides to build a fort by the entrance of Bocachica in Tierrabomba. This fort is named San Luis de Bocachica. This fort is destroyed by Pointis, but it is rebuilt in 1719. The engineer Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor also recommends that a second fort be built across the channel of Bocachica. Construction of this fort is accomplished in 1725. This fort is named San Jose. Now in order to enter the bay, a ship would come across fire from the port and starboard sides. The batteries of the forts were at an angle so one of them would be firing at the water line and hull, and the other at the rigging of the ship attempting to cross. Also, a chain floating on barrels would run from fort San Luis to fort San Juan, crossing the channel and preventing any ships from attempting to make a run through the channel (Lemaitre n. d.). In order to protect San Luis from a land-based attack coming from Tierrabomba, three batteries where built facing the open sea in Tierrabomba. These batteries were named the San Felipe, Santiago, and Chamba.

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The defenses in the interior bay had declined since the entrance to this bay was no longer seen as the primary line of defense. The primary line of defense had become the forts at Bocachica. The secondary line of defense was the fort Santa Cruz, also known as Castillo Grande, and the fort of San Juan de Manzanillo, which in reality is not a fort, but a small battery (Segovia 1992). These two fortifications guarded the entrance to the interior of the bay.

But no great importance was given to these two fortifications by the

Spanish. This lack of importance is seen when they convert one of these, San Juan de Manzanillo, into an ammunition depot that was to supply the fort of San Felipe of Bocachica.

The third and last line of defense was the wall that surrounded the city and the fort of San Felipe de Barajas. The city walls completely enclosed the city, and with its 22 bastions it had no apparent weak point with the exception of the gate of Media Luna. With the construction of the fort of San Felipe de Barajas, the gate of Media Luna is guarded. Regardless, strategically if the fort is taken, as it happened with the attack by Pointis, it would open the city to a possible bombardment on the gate and the city itself.

Vernon’s attack In 1739 a major conflict between Spain and England broke out, the “War of Jenkins Ear” as it was known. During this time, Sir Edward Vernon, a member of parliament, offered to lead an attack on Portobello (SLIDE 8). He was granted command of nine Men-of-Wars and one sloop. With these ships Admiral Vernon proceeded to

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attack Portobello, which was lightly defended, and mostly by militiamen. Admiral Vernon managed to quickly take over Portobello. This victory caused enthusiasm and support in England for the war. Vernon was aware that a counter attack could come at any moment from Cartagena. Therefore, he withdrew after destroying the major defenses of Portobello and retreated to Jamaica. With the success at Portobello, Admiral Vernon had support for a greater feat. He was given the largest fleet assembled at that time, which was not surpassed until D day and the invasion of Normandy (SLIDE 9).

Admiral Edward Vernon was given the command of 58 warships, 36 of which were ships of the line and 12 frigates (Martinez 1997). Vernon’s fleet also included 130 transport ships, for a total of 188 ships (Segovia 1992, Lemaitre n. d.). At the same time, the fleet had approximately 29,000 sailors and fighting men, of which 2,763 were Colonial Marines under the command of Lawrence Washington, step brother of George Washington (Lemaitre n.d., Martinez 1997).

Spies had informed the Spanish of the impending attack. In order to defend the city the Spanish crown placed the defense under the command of the viceroy of Nueva Granada, Sebastian de Eslava. The Spanish ships defending bay and city were under the command of Don Blas de Lezo (SLIDE 10). Blas de Lezo was one of the greatest naval heroes of the Spanish Crown at that time. He was known as the “half man” having lost his left leg, left eye, and right arm in previous battles. The total forces defending Cartagena were approximately 3,000 men and six ships (Martinez 2003) [SLIDE 11].

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In March of 1741 the English fleet came into view of the city, and in two days the bay and the city were surrounded. Vernon began the attack by landing troops in Tierrabomba. They quickly captured the batteries of San Felipe, Santiago, and Chamba. From these positions and from the fleet, a bombardment begins on the forts guarding Bocachica. The Fort of San Luis de Bocachica was the primary target since the capture of this fort would render the fort of San Jose ineffective. In addition to the forts of Bocachica, Blas de Lezo had three of his ships of the line help defend fort San Luis from inside the bay. The battle for fort San Luis lasted for 15 days. The majority of this battle consisted of heavy bombardment (Segovia 1992).

After the fall of the forts at Bocachica (Forts San Luis and San Jose), viceroy Salas orders Blas de Lezo to sink the three ships assisting on the defense of Bocachica, before the English can capture them. With only three ships left to defend the inner and outer bays, and with objections of Don Blas de Lezo, these three ships are to be sunk to block the access of the inner bay. The Galicia is captured before it can be scuttled. The Conquistador is towed away from the entrance to the inner bay by the English before it sinks; therefore, leaving only the Dragon as an underwater barrier into the inner bay (Segovia 1992). By April 5th, the English have control of the outer bay. Although, it appears that the sinking of these ships failed in their main objective, they help in delaying the English from attacking the city. They prevent the English from bombarding the entire city from inside the bay.

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Having blocked the entrance to the inner bay, the fort of Castillo Grande is abandoned by the Spanish during the attack. This is a tactic which was also used during the attack of Pointis. The English landed in the area known as Isla de Manzanillo and completely ignored the fortification of San Juan de Manzanillo. During this attack, 24 Spanish militia men under the command of Captain Baltazar Ortega will remain trapped inside San Juan de Manzanillo without the ability to truly contribute to the defense of Cartagena.

Although from outside the inner bay, partial bombardment of the city could be made, no solid attack could be made on the gates of the city. The English moved forward and captured the highest point which is called la Popa. From this point, the Fort of San Luis de Barajas could be attacked which overlooks the gate of Media Luna and the city. On the early dawn of April 20th the English conducted a frontal attack on the Fortress of San Luis de Barajas which is under the command of the engineer Carlos Desnaux (Segovia 1992). By this time, Don Blas de Lezo had been wounded and no longer was leading the defense of the city.

The attack on fort San Luis de Barajas was supposed to be the last major defense before taking the city. If the English had control of the fort they could bombard the gate and the city. The English attacked the fort of San Luis de Barajas with 3,500 troops (Segovia 1992) [SLIDE 12]. Desnaux had 500 soldiers defending the fort. The English, fully confident that they could take the fort, conducted a frontal attack. The Spanish taking advantage of this performed a bayonet charge routing the English. After four

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hours of combat, approximately 800 English troops lay dead, including the majority of the commanders, and 1,000 to 1,500 English troops were captured (Lemaitre n.d., Martinez 1997). Vernon blamed the failure of the attack on General Woort, who was in charge of all the English troops. Further attacks on the fort are made until April 25th, but they all failed. With the loss of most of the officers, and diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera, and scurvy affecting the remaining troops, Admiral Vernon conceded defeat. In all, the English had lost over 18,000 men and most of the officers, and half of the men lost were due to disease.

The English only managed to capture 200 prisoners. With so

many men lost, there were not enough men to sail all the ships back to Jamaica and five ships were burned.

Conclusions (SLIDE 12) The hopes of the English to break the hold of the Spanish on the Caribbean were crushed with the defeat of Vernon at Cartegna. A second attempt was made after Vernon was informed of the death of Don Blas de Lezo. However, with a smaller armada, that attack also failed. After the fall of the forts at Bocachica, Vernon had sent word to England, that he had taken Cartagena, coins were printed with Don Blas de Lezo kneeling in front of Vernon and presenting his sword to him. Regardless of the outcome, Admiral Edward Vernon was welcomed home a hero in England. King George II never allowed the details of this embarrassing defeat to be published. Even today, Don Blas de Lezo is not well known, but Admiral Edward Vernon, is a recognized name. The home of George Washington, Mount Vernon, is named after Admiral Vernon. Lawrence Washington who

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served under Vernon during the attack of Cartagena admired him so that he named their home Mount Vernon.

Throughout the years, the failure of the attack has primarily been blamed on the diseases that affected the English during the attack and siege of the city. Upon closer examination, the failure of the attack can be attributed to several factors not primarily from disease. Having been forewarned of the attack, the Spanish placed the defenses of the city in the hands of two capable leaders, Viceroy Sebastian de Eslava and Don Blas de Lezo. At the same time, the placement and continuous evolutions of the fortifications had created a series of layers which an attacker had to overcome before being able to seriously threaten the city. Last but not least, were the diseases that would affect the area.

The defense plan Viceroy de Eslava formulated was to delay and prevent the English from bringing the full force of the English warships. In order to accomplish this, he was prepared to sink all the ships that the Spanish had at their disposal. This caused disagreements between de Eslava and Blas de Lezo. Don Blas de Lezo fell confident that with his ships afloat he could delay the English more than by sinking them. Regardless, the planning of the defense and the valor that Don Blas de Lezo gave to the defenders contributed to the success of Spanish defenders.

The fortification and the defense of the city offered one main avenue of attack, this was Bocachica. A second avenue was to cross the mangrove and icacao swamps that

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were located north of the city. Admiral Vernon, counting on the superiority of their numbers, chooses to attack the city through Bocachica. Most likely he believed that he could take the fortifications easily, instead the Spanish resisted at Bocachica for 15 days. This delay, and the sinking of Don Blas de Lezo’s ships, caused the English to approach the inner bay and city 20 days after they had began the attack. Furthermore, the taking of the hill La Popa delayed the approach to the fortress of San Felipe de Barajas and the gate of Media Luna. These delays, which were planned by the Spanish, contributed to the eventual appearance of disease and then the large number of casualties caused by them. In combination with the disastrous attacks on the fortress of San Felipe de Barajas, the numbers of the English were decimated.

Today, Cartagena bears little marks from Vernon’s attack. Both forts at Bocachica were destroyed, but later they were rebuilt by the Spanish, although, at slightly different locations. The ruins of the batteries of San Felipe, Santiago, and Chamba, which were never rebuilt after the attack, were still visible during the early 1990’s, but with coastal erosion and vegetation growth they are no longer visible. An attempt was made to relocate these batteries using aerial photography, but they were not found. It is possible that archaeological evidence of the battle at Bocachica can still be found in Tierrabomba, since this island has not seen much development. Further, research could be conducted on Admiral Vernon’s attack of Cartagena utilizing a holistic approach, if possible. Hopefully, a better and clearer understanding will be shed on one of the largest, but least known battles fought in the Caribbean.

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References

Grahn, Lance 1993 Political Corruption and Reform in Cartagena Province, 1700-1740. Discussion Paper Series of the Center for Latin America,University of WisconsinMilwaukee. Irigoin, M.A., and R. Grafe 2006 Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation State and Empire Building. University of Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History Number 65, November 2006. Lemaitre, Eduardo n. d. (1982) A Brief History of Cartagena. Editadora Bolivar Ltda. Cartagena, Colombia. Meisel, Adolfo 2000 Subsidy-Led Growth in a Fortified Port: Cartagena de Indias and the Situado, 1751-1810. Paper presented at the Second LACLIO meeting, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, November 17-18, 2000. Segovia Salas, Rodolfo 1992 Las Fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias, Estrategia e Historia. Tercer Mundo Editores, Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia. Syrett, David 2002 “The Navy Board and Transports for Cartagena, 1740” IN War in History. 9 (2) 127–141. Vargas Martínez, Gustavo 1997 “Vernon en Cartagena, 1741, Nuevos Datos Sobre su Derrota” IN Historia Edicion 89 – Mayo.

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