A peripheral port in a peripheral port system. La Coruña, 1914-1960

A peripheral port in a peripheral port system. La Coruña, 1914-1960 XVth World Economic History Congress, Utrecht, 2009 Session: ‘Networked port cities’: mediating the movement of commodities between the local and the global, 1850-1914

Jesús Mirás University of La Coruña (Spain)

Introduction Spain stands out for its considerable coastal perimeter. Despite this, historically, the volume of maritime traffic has not achieved the levels that one would expect. Probably for that reason, ports and port cities in Spain have not received intense study. Although there 1 have been several chief ports, no one has emerged as dominant . The prevailing regularity along the coast has boosted competition between ports, distorting the formation of a more 2 unbalanced hierarchy . In addition, maritime studies have tended to concentrate in the period prior to World War I, and have analysed ports mostly in isolation. Besides, large ports have been more prominent in the literature, leaving small ones aside. Notwithstanding, and following the argumentation of Jackson, small ports were a crucial part of economic 3 development, above all if we keep to the domestic scene . As the aggregate flow of goods is an important topic in the economic history of any port, this paper aims to analyse the commercial traffic of a secondary port in the Spanish ranking during a period relatively neglected by the literature. As ports are linked to a regional and/or to a national economy, the cycles and characteristics of the goods traffic are critical variables that allow us to evaluate the impact of a port. Therefore, we also aim to determine what was the most significant commercial traffic of the port of La Coruna. The period that has been selected is between the end of a port model, the one of the nineteenth century, which (based in industrialization) brought the modernization of some Spanish ports, and the beginning of a new model, which was consolidated from the so-called Franco development 4 years . At the international level, this period was characterized by several different junctures, which had notorious influence in port traffic: World War I, inter-war instability, and the economic crisis of the 1930s, and World War II and its post-war period, with the addition of Spanish particularities (Civil War, and autarky of the 1940s and 1950s). World War I marked a breaking point. The volume of cargo flows had increased since the later part of the nineteenth century, and this together with the scaling-up of sea-going 1

Ramón Alvargonzález, “Los puertos españoles desde una perspectiva geográfica. Modelos portuarios de los siglos XIV y XX”, in A. Guimerá and D. Romero, D. (eds.), Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos XIX y XX) (Madrid, 1996), 167-184. 2 José M. Serrano, “Evolución del tráfico marítimo de mercancías y red básica de puertos en España durante los últimos decenios”, Papeles de Geografía, No. 32 (2000), 170. 3 Gordon Jackson, “The Significance of Unimportant Ports”, International Journal of Maritime History, XIII (2001), 7, 17. 4 Agustín Guimerá, “Los puertos españoles en la historia (siglos XVI-XX)”, in J.M. Delgado and A. Guimerá (coords.), Los puertos españoles: historia y futuro (siglos XVI-XX) (Madrid, 2000), 54-57.

2 5

vessels had stimulated technological innovations in European ports in those years , in such a way that by the early twentieth century a new vision of a port city was arising around the 6 world . But the outbreak of the war brought to an end the former period of trade and port 7 expansion . 8 Yet the relative neglect of the interwar years is remarkable . The effects of the post9 war situation on international shipping heavily influenced this period . War and inter-war trade depression reduced the volume of traffic and reduced the pressures for change in the 10 majority of the world ports . The end of the period is justified by the changes that took place 11 in international trade and navigation in the 1950s and 1960s , and by the turn to liberalization in the Spanish economic policy of the late 1950s. 12 The 1950s saw significant changes . Deep technical changes took place in the shipping industry. Besides, advancements in transport technologies, the massive enlargement 13 of infrastructure, and falling transport costs changed the entire role of transport . The result was the beginning of a new phase in port and maritime history, characterized by significant 14 functional changes , and by fast-growing international sea borne trade in the 1950s and 15 1960s , with a rapidly increasing degree of differentiation between seaports in terms of 16 17 equipment, technology and throughput . This stage lasted until the mid-1970s . Finally, at the local level, it was not until the early 1960s when La Coruna began to consolidate its importance at the national level. Although probably the most important fact which closed the period in the 1960s is the installation of an oil refinery (in 1962), which roughly coincided in time with another significant construction; the building of a new breakwater. This, coupled with the creation of an industrial growth pole in the city at the 5

Hugo Van Driel, “The First Mechanization Wave in Coal and Ore Handling as an Example of Patterns of Technological Innovation in the Port of Rotterdam”, in R. Loyen, E. Buyst and G. Devos (eds.), Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Heidelberg/New York, 2003), 299. 6 Josef W. Konvitz, “Spatial Perspectives on Port City Development, c. 1780-1980”, Urbanism Past and Present, 7 (1982), 27. 7 Sarah Palmer, “Current Port Trends in an Historical Perspective”, Journal for Maritime Research (December 1999), 5. 8 David M. Williams, “Recent Trends in Maritime and Port History”, in R. Loyen, E. Buyst and G. Devos (eds.), Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Heidelberg/New York, 2003), 15. 9 Jesús M. Valdaliso, “Entre el mercado y el Estado: la marina mercante y el transporte marítimo en España en los siglos XIX y XX”, TST. Transportes, Servicios y Telecomunicaciones, No. 1 (2001), 60. 10 Reginald Loyen, “Functional Shifts in the Port of Antwerp: a Throughput Model”, International Journal of Maritime History, XIII (2001), 79. 11 Palmer, “Current Port Trends”, 5. 12 Sabine Janssens, Hilde Meersman and Eddy Van de Voorde, “Port Throughput and International Trade: Have Port Authorities any Degrees of Dreedom Left?”, in R. Loyen, E. Buyst and G. Devos (eds.), Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Heidelberg/New York, 2003), 92. 13 P.V. Hall, M. Hesse and J-P. Rodrigue, “Guest Editorial: Re-Exploring the Interface between Economic and Transport Geography”, Environment and Planning A, 38 (2006), 1401. 14 Reginald Loyen, “Throughput in the Port of Antwerp (1901-2000): an Integrated Functional Approach”, in R. Loyen, E. Buyst and G. Devos (eds.), Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Heidelberg/New York, 2003), 34. Loyen, “Functional Shifts”, 82. 15 Yehuda Hayuth and David Hilling, “Technological Change and Seaport Development”, in B.S. Hoyle and D.A. Pinder (eds.), European Port Cities in Transition (London, 1992), 41. 16 Brian S. Hoyle and David Hilling, “Seaports and Development Strategies”, in B.S. Hoyle and D. Hilling (eds.), Seaport Systems and Spatial Change: Technology, Industry and Development Strategies (Chichester, 1984), 465. 17 Sarah Harcombe and David Pinder, “Oil Industry Restructuring and its Environment Consequences in the Coastal Zone”, in B.S. Hoyle (eds.), Cityports, Coastal Zones and Regional Change. International Perspectives on Planning and Management (Chichester, 1996), 83.

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beginning of that decade, drastically changed commercial port traffic. Port traffic in Spain during the first half of the twentieth century According to Hilling “the changing fortunes of individual ports must be appreciated within a broad framework”, and the success of ports are closely tied to the fortunes of their 18 hinterland and forelands . These include social, economic, technical, and political conditions in the immediate hinterland and also nationally and worldwide. For that reason, examining the behaviour of the global trends of Spanish port traffic can provide some clues to explain the cycles of the port of La Coruna. During the second half of the nineteenth century a remarkable transformation of shipping and ports took place worldwide, responding to the need to transport higher volumes of goods and people with lower unit costs. Important technical improvements were initiated in shipbuilding, as well as profound changes in navigation as a means of transportation, which can be summarized into three elements: increasing speed of vessels, larger size, and specialization. These changes led to a growth in service areas, the construction of new docks systems, the storage of a growing volume of products, and new ways of handling of cargoes 19 and the shipment of goods . Since the mid-nineteenth century, the responsibility for organizing Spanish ports has fallen on the State. Up until then, and since 1781, the ports were considered a military installation. But the Royal Decree of 17 December 1851 enabled the ports to be managed through consulates or boards whose responsibility lay with the General Office of Public 20 Works of the Ministry of Public Works . From the moment the Ministry took over the construction of ports, several plans of action were put into motion throughout the country, 21 especially intensified from the last quarter of the century onwards . However, there was still a legal vacuum. On 7 May 1880 the first Law of Ports was enacted, as the culmination of many former regulations that were adopted since 1851. Thanks to it, and the subsequent royal decrees of 18 March 1881 and 23 March 1888, the Juntas de Obras de Puertos (Boards of Port Works) were developed as a system of centralized management that enjoyed autonomy from local and provincial administrations. The Boards were mandated three main objectives: one technical, which was aimed at the implementation of projects, management of construction and maintenance; another function of control and surveillance of maritime traffic; and finally, the economic administration of the taxes and grants collection from the Ministry. In addition, the law of 1880 classified ports into two st nd categories: general interest ports (1 and 2 category), where repairs construction was paid from the state budget, and the local interest ports, were repairs were financed by local 22 bodies . The next milestone was the promulgation of a new Port Law, in 1928, which was the legal standard by which they were guided until the Financial System Law of the Spanish Ports of 1966. The law of 1966 accommodated a previous law from 1898 to the passage of time, 18

David Hilling, “The Restructuring of the Severn Estuary Ports”, in B.S. Hoyle and D. Hilling (eds.), Seaport Systems and Spatial Change: Technology, Industry and Development Strategies (Chichester, 1984), 257. James Bird, “Ports then and later”, in J. Charlier (ed.), Port et mers. Mélanges maritimistes offerts à André Vigarié (Caen, 1986), 168. 19 Joan Alemany, El puerto de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1998), 108-111, 120. 20 Alemany, El puerto de Barcelona, 115. 21 José R. Navarro, “La Ciudad Portuaria: Entre el mar como paisaje y el mar como medio de transporte”, Revista de Obras Públicas, No. 3252 (1986), 860. 22 CEHOPU, Puertos españoles en la historia (Madrid, 1994). In 1929 the Junta Central de Puertos scheduled 59 ports as general interest ports. Libro de Puertos (Madrid, 1929).

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but without substantial changes . During the period analysed here, the transformations of the economic system led to an intensification of the role of ports in the world economy. However, it was necessary to wait until the years following World War II to enter a new stage of structural transformation of the larger ports, characterized by the appearance of new goods, the transportation of large 24 volumes of raw materials and fuels and the construction of larger vessels . These traits were the result of the changing needs of the economies that were derived from large-scale use of raw materials, fuel and goods of various kinds, which demanded the building of larger stores and warehouses, as well as the establishment of processing industries of those raw materials. These changes were crucial to port morphology, but naturally meant a dramatic increase in tonnage and led to a strengthening of the role of the sea as a passageway, which Vigarié 25 called “maritimization” of the contemporary economy . In Spain, port traffic also followed an upward trajectory, relatively well-defined in terms of freight traffic, and even the movement of passengers and fishing, although the trend is not as defined by the number of ships and the tonnage of those vessels (Figure 6, Figure 7 26 and Figure 8) . However, the majority of Spanish ports have played an insignificant role at the international level. This apparent contradiction with the notable extension of our coast is explained by the lower level of economic development and by the Spanish penalty imposed 27 by the physical environment of the Peninsula . This has impeded the formation of vast, continental-type, hinterlands although there have been other factors of great significance: institutional features, including the role of the state and the role played by the dominant groups in ports; economic conditions, which include maritime factors (transport technology and the organization of shipping services), and port customers, namely the maritime lobby; 28 technical, sociocultural factors, etc . But ports have had a greater importance at the national level. Maritime traffic played a fundamental role in Spanish transport system, at least prior to the 1950s, because the difficulty of access between the Spanish regions facilitated the movement by sea. In addition, maritime traffic accounted for the vast majority of foreign trade. Hence state intervention, providing the legal and institutional framework and financing to undertake the modernization (albeit fairly modest) of the port system and to upgrade the infrastructures to the growth of trade and navigation. 29 As a city port subsystem that forms part of a global city port system , a common feature of the Spanish port network with other countries is the polarization of the trade into a 30 few ports , both at geographical and goods levels, due to the marked significance of coal transport from the ports of Asturias. This port concentration starts at the end of the Ancient Regime, due to a combination of diverse technical and economic factors that allowed the growing involvement of ports such as La Luz, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Barcelona, Bilbao, 23

Manuel Santos and Francisco Enríquez, “Puertos”, Revista de Obras Públicas, No. 3388 (1999), 137. Hayuth and Hilling, “Technological Change”. 25 André Vigarié, “Les tendances d'évolution des transports maritimes (1955-1985)”, Annales de Géographie, No. 509 (1985), 53-72. 26 Joaquín Bosque, “Las actividades portuarias en España”, Estudios Geográficos, No. 93 (1963), 602-610. 27 Antonio Gómez, “Light and Shade in Spanish Coastal Shipping, 1855-1931”, in J. Armstrong and A. Kunz (eds.), Coastal Shipping and the European Economy 1750-1980 (Mainz, 2002), 113. Agustín Guimerá, “El sistema portuario español (siglos XVI-XX): Perspectivas de investigación”, in A. Guimerá and D. Romero (eds.), Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos XIX y XX) (Madrid, 1996), 125. Ramón Alvargonzález, “Funciones y morfología de los puertos españoles”, Ería, No. 8 (1985), 6. 28 Guimerá, “El sistema portuario”. 29 Brian S. Hoyle, “Cities and ports: Concepts and Issues”, Vegueta, No. 3 (1997-98), 264. 30 Alvargonzález, “Los puertos españoles”, 169. 24

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Gijon or Huelva . However, that concentration has been less marked than in other countries because of the excessive proliferation of general interest ports, since there was a high number of ports with commercial activity (regardless of its small size). Figure 1. Coastal and foreign trade in Spain, 1901-1960 (value and tonnage) 1.200

20.000 18.000

1.000

16.000

million pts

12.000 600

10.000 8.000

400

thousand tons

14.000

800

6.000 4.000

200

2.000 0 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959

0

Coastal (value) Foreign (cargo tonnage)

Coastal (total tonnage) Foreign (cargo download)

Source: Antonio Gómez and Elena San Román, “Transportes y comunicaciones”, in A. Carreras and X. Tafunell (coords.), Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX (Bilbao, 2005), 550-552.

The two main chapters of maritime traffic were coastal (cabotage) and foreign trade. Coastal trade experienced a continued growth during the second half of the nineteenth century, similar to what happened to foreign trade, although this was more rapid from the 1890s onwards. This trend continued during the first half of the twentieth century, while experiencing the vicissitudes characteristic of the most important economic, political... events 32 of the period. The result was the increasing prominence of this type of navigation , to the point of being dominant until the 1960s. One of the factors that allowed this development was the complementarities between maritime and rail traffic. In practice, neither transport systems competed with each other, 33 allowing them to share internal and external markets . But coastal trade mobilized low volumes as compared with railways. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, coastal shipping never exceeded 15% of the tonnage moved by railways, while road transport accounted for a tiny fraction of the 34 railways . At that time, foreign maritime trade was overwhelmingly the majority trade 35 representing 99% of the total tonnage of the three systems mentioned . However, by the 1950s land transport already accounted for two thirds of the total. The unfavourable factor 31

Guimerá, “El sistema portuario”, 133. Gabriel Tortella, El desarrollo de la España contemporánea. Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX (Madrid, 1994), 102-104. 33 Jesús M. Valdaliso, Los Navieros Vascos y la Marina Mercante en España, 1860-1935. Una historia económica (Bilbao, 1991) holds an opposite position. 34 Gómez and San Román, “Transportes y comunicaciones”, 516. 35 Tortella, El desarrollo, 105. 32

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would be the “massive form and the weak development of the Spanish coast” . This meant that only goods of higher volume, lower prices and coming from coastal areas could be attractive to coastal traffic. Quite the opposite is true for foreign trade, which continued using the sea as a means of transportation almost exclusively. Four stages in the evolution of coastal trade can be distinguished: 1857-1890, 189137 1913, 1913-1935, and 1941 to today (Figure 1) . The period 1891-1913 was marked by a 38 strong expansion of cabotage, in value, and especially in volume . Growth was sustained, with slight fluctuations. The most significant was traffic between the ports on the Atlantic and 39 the Mediterranean, followed by trade among the latter , probably coinciding with the launch 40 of the narrow-gauge coastal railways . World War I meant a sharp drop in the volume and value of cabotage. The subsequent recovery was rapid, although, with the Treaty of Versailles, cabotage registered a sharp fall in connection with the return to normalcy. This decline lasted until the beginning of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30), but in 1923-35 the cumulative annual growth of coastal trade was revived once more, coinciding with an improvement of public works as of 41 the mid-1920s when the Spanish ports began to benefit from state investments . The asphyxiating economic conditions of the immediate Spanish post-war were not 42 favourable to a development of port traffic . However, from 1941 on, a very rapid expansion took place, which lasted until 1980, when it reached its peak. Besides, cabotage always remained a small minority activity within the domestic trade. Between 1950 and 1970 (years of maximum growth) cabotage multiplied its activity by 2.9, while road transport achieved an increase of nearly ten fold. This hides from view an increasing specialization of coastal shipping in the transportation of minerals and oil, and a gradual loss of the cargo before the 43 competition of the railways, firstly, and the road transport since the late 1950s . The weakness of coastal traffic shows a high port concentration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, more than half the traffic was mobilized only through eight ports: Barcelona, Gijon, Bilbao, Cadiz, Aviles, Valencia, Sevilla and Santander. If we increase the 44 number of ports up to 17, the percentage of traffic rises to 80% , clearly highlighting Barcelona, with a volume close to a quarter of the total in the years 1857-1935, and the last 45 big port (Santander), falling well short of these figures . The series of foreign and coastal trade present a divergent profile for most of the twentieth century. Cabotage trade maintained a regular trend, growing slowly but surely. By 46 contrast, foreign trade was closely linked to the fate of the world economy . Foreign trade statistics show a steady growth since 1883, achieving a maximum tonnage loaded on the eve of World War I, not to be exceeded until 1969. During this stage, the situation of Western trade was dominated by the emergence of a new international pattern, which was linked to the industrialization that came with the second major European 36

Juan López, “El puerto de Alicante”, Estudios Geográficos, No. 60 (1955), 533. Gómez and San Román, “Transportes y comunicaciones”, 516 38 Valdaliso, Los Navieros Vascos, 233. 39 Gómez, “Light and Shade”. 40 Valdaliso, “Entre el mercado y el Estado”, 36. 41 Marciano Martínez, “1923-1973. Cincuenta años de vida portuaria”, Revista de Obras Públicas, No. 3097 (1973), 348. 42 Joan Alemany, El Port de Barcelona i l'economia catalana (1859-1991) (Barcelona, 1993), 375. 43 Jesús M. Valdaliso, La navegación regular de cabotaje en España en los siglos XIX y XX. Guerras de fletes, conferencias y consorcios navieros (Vitoria, 1997), 80. 44 Esperanza Frax, El mercado interior y los principales puertos (1857-1920) (Madrid, 1987). 45 Gómez and San Román, “Transportes y comunicaciones”, 516-517 46 Joaquín Bosque, “Funciones económicas de los puertos españoles de la Península”, Estudios Geográficos, No. 48 (1952), 570. 37

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expansion (1870-1914). This phase was of special importance in shaping the structure of the Spanish port system. The role of Britain as the main pivot of international trade meant the opening of new 47 interoceanic trade routes . From that time some Spanish ports began to play a significant role as scale points of large economic and strategic interest. This allowed them to specialize in the 48 supply of certain basic services: charcoal, ship provisioning, water supply, repairs, etc . During the years of war in Europe, the reduction in imports surpassed exports growth, so the overall volume exchanged with other countries bottomed out in 1918-19. In return, the conflict was a golden age for Spanish shipowners who, along with the Scandinavians and 49 Greeks, mostly controlled international trade, gaining high profits . The 1920s were marked by a recovery of foreign trade, reaching a new peak in 1929. The tonnage loaded clearly prevailed over the unloaded. In 1929-35, there was a contraction, being more accentuated the drop in exports, which, however, did not fall below imports. Such contraction had no compensation in cabotage, as the latter was much lower than foreign trade. In parallel to these changes we can observe an increase in the participation of Spanish 50 merchant navy in that traffic . During the autarky of the Franco dictatorship, the sluggishness of the exchanges with the outside world continued, which enabled the cabotage trade to largely overcome foreign trade. After World War II, foreign trade began to recover, and particularly so, the exports, albeit slowly. It is instructive to note that, while imports regained their 1929 levels in 1953, exports did not until 1960. Once the levels of the pre-war period were surpassed, the most striking was the rapid growth of foreign trade, explosive in the case of the tonnage unloaded at Spanish ports. Since the definitive abandonment of autarky, as a result of the Stabilization Plan of 1959, the expansion of imported tonnage reached rates close to 9% in 1960-75. By contrast, the tonnage 51 exported experienced a lower growth . In the series of the number of merchant ships that entered in the main Spanish ports one can see several stages that essentially match the behavioural tendencies of cabotage, and above all, of foreign trade. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the trend is stalling, rising in the years before World War I. The struggle caused a sharp decline of the traffic of vessels (close to 40%). Later, during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, traffic picked up, reaching levels slightly higher than 1913, although the gap is becoming increasingly positive on the verge of the 1929 crisis. After reaching the top of the series in that year (together with 1953), the 1930s crisis, followed by the Spanish War and World War II, led to a collapse of vessel traffic in Spain, which recovered only slowly during the years of autarky, and had to wait until the first half of the 1950s to recover. The decline in the late 1950s can be explained by the difficulties of the Spanish economy, which are at the root of the change of economic model after 1959. On the other hand, the tonnage series presents a trend that was very similar, albeit with more violent drops. In contrast, the series of freight traffic exhibits a softer trend, as a result of the growing prominence of coastal trade, which partially offset the fluctuations of foreign trade, very much linked to the different external situations that conditioned the course of trade in Spanish ports. Especially significant is the growth in traffic that was recorded during the 1950s, as a result of the increased presence of cabotage in Spanish maritime shipping, still too isolated 47

De la Puerta, “Management and finance”, 42. Guimerá, “El sistema portuario”, 133. 49 Valdaliso, “Entre el mercado y el Estado”, 59. 50 Valdaliso, “Entre el mercado y el Estado”, 60. 51 Gómez and San Román, “Transportes y comunicaciones”, 517. 48

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from the outside. The irregular long-term behaviour of trade at the port of La Coruna In northwestern Spain, there is a region, Galicia, which is characterized by a winding and irregular coastline. Its coast has a large number of very scattered ports and facilities. In addition to its striking physical characteristics, the historical lack of land communications has been a strong conditioning factor. Hence the traffic of the Galician ports of greater movement have been conditioned by its geographical position, its relationship with the international 52 freight traffic, port and industrial facilities, and inland communications . The traffic of goods in the port of La Coruna underwent a mild but continuous growth from the late nineteenth century until World War I. There are hardly any fluctuations worth mentioning, unlike in other ports of northern Spain, more connected with the outside or 53 54 55 dependent on exports of mineral raw materials, such as Santander , Aviles , Pasajes or 56 Bilbao , which endured a more irregular evolution. In contrast, Vigo, in the midst of industrialization process, which was linked to the complex fish-canning shipbuilding, 57 presents a trend of strong growth . On the other hand, Southern and Eastern coastal ports maintained a more stable pattern, most notably Barcelona and Valencia, with diversified

52

Juan R. Acinas et al., El futuro de los puertos comerciales gallegos (A Coruña, 2003), 1. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a boom in mining (mainly of iron) took place in the province of Santander. Since 1895, the exports of minerals were already dominant, surpassing the traditional flour exports. That production could have represented an alternative to the depleted business model of the city. However, mines were mostly in the hands of foreign companies that exploited minerals for exportation to England. This mine development reached its climax by 1910, and substantially changed the ratio of exported goods through the port. Julio Pozueta, “Santander. El puerto y la ciudad en la historia”, in J. Pozueta et al., Santander. El puerto y su historia. Bicentenario del Consulado del Mar (Santander, 1985), 40-41. 54 In the late nineteenth century Aviles was presented as a potential rival to oust Gijon as the first port of the Asturias region, thanks to its connection with the Northern Railway. Francisco Quirós, “El puerto de Gijón”, Ería, No. 1 (1981), 181. Guillermo Morales, “Industrialización y crecimiento urbano en Avilés”, Ería, No. 1 (1980), 151-178. 55 This port was adversely affected by its proximity to San Sebastian. In this context of hegemony of San Sebastian, the port of Pasajes was simply a “branch” and a complement, but it was increasingly forming part of a whole that was the same city of San Sebastian. Later, San Sebastian became obsolete because of its deficiencies and physical limitations, as it was unable to respond to maritime trade of the province of Gipuzkoa (where it was located), and to face the new demands raised by the incipient industrialization of the province. Therefore, the bourgeoisie of the city became actively involved in promoting the port of Pasajes, which during the 1920s became the second Basque port and one of the main in the northern peninsula. Rafael Ossa, “El puerto de Pasajes”, Itsas. El mar de Euskalerria: la naturaleza, el hombre y su historia, No. 5 (1988), 124-125. 56 The port of Bilbao was affected by its development during those years by the need to create an infrastructure that would allow crossing the physical barriers arising from its location in an estuary. At the beginning of the twentieth century the construction of new dams in Santurtzi was completed; as a result, Bilbao finally turned into a major port. Manuel Santos, “El puerto de Bilbao, desde 1939 hasta el umbral del siglo XXI”, Itsas Memoria, No. 4 (2003), 474. In any case, between 1899 and 1921, although there was consolidation of the industrial development process, in parallel was the crisis in Biscayan mining. The participation of the general cargoes shipped to other ports grew significantly, and the volume of goods decreased gradually, while increasing its value. The record high for the export of iron ore was recorded in 1899 and it then declined to have a small presence from the 1930s. Natividad de la Puerta, “Cien años del comercio en el puerto de Bilbao, 1860-1960”, Itsas Memoria, No. 4 (2003), 451. 57 Jaime Garrido, El puerto de Vigo. Síntesis histórica (Vigo, 1996), 328. Between 1860 and 1920 the port of Vigo took off and stood as the first Galician port after World War I. The beginning of the twentieth century marked a new stage of recovery and growth of several imports, which remained until the war, while exports grew at a steady rate. Raúl Jácome, “La configuración del puerto de Vigo como principal puerto gallego: 1860-1920”, VIII Congreso de la Asociación Española de Historia Económica (Santiago, 2005). 53

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traffic , although they were not free of some cycles of recession that were linked to the behaviour of the urban and regional economies they served, and which suffered a difficult time in those years, as was the case of Malaga and Cadiz. Table 1. Rank of major Spanish ports, depending on the number of vessels entered, 1900-1960 Las Palmas Barcelona Algeciras Bilbao Gijon Sta.Cruz de Tenerife Ceuta Valencia Cadiz Vigo Malaga Balearic Is. Sevilla Alicante Pasajes La Coruna Huelva Santander AlmeríaMotril Tarragona Melilla Vilagarcía Castellón

1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 6.170 3.923 5.890 5.093 3.276 3.363 6.035 3.793 3.794 3.723 3.587 4.040 4.841 5.191 5.134 2.670 2.904 3.792 2.713 3.706 3.420 3.092 4.441 3.195 3.218 2.684 2.562 3.007 3.677 2.330 1.945 1.665 1.989 1.941 3.948 4.761 3.579 3.167 2.558 3.875 4.013 3.715 2.385 2.365 4.526 2.879 2.405 2.731 2.870 3.124 2.531 3.173 3.511 3.753 2.909 2.418 1.777 1.686 1.901 2.181 2.363 2.313 2.623 2.160 1.644 1.244 1.344 1.399 1.883 2.028 1.504 1.947 1.910 1.964 1.087 2.322 1.349 1.306 (6º) (14º) (15º) 1.330 1.933 2.038 1.910 1.799 1.604 795 929 960 979 1.397 1.453 1.705

886

981 456 130

1955 1960 4.530 5.159 5.001 4.790 5.701 5.776 5.890

3.466 2.014 2.382 3.500 5.656 3.163 1.726 2.001 2.990 2.640 2.629 2.415 2.417 2.117 2.906 1.119 1.240 1.804 1.869 1.080 1.114 1.959 1.173 1.787 864 944 1.452 999 988 1.694 1.853 1.105 947 886 972 (12º) (12º) (14º) (16º) 957 615 556 800 992 1.033 1.969 1.304 615 1.265

978

723 1.397 1.147 1.392 1.329 1.354 567 171 151 239 489

510

475 766 241 416

2.546 2.202 2.530 1.947 1.620 2.115 1.643 (10º) 1.142 949 1.633 1.213

690 1.002 1.440 1.582 813 908 218 345 548 701 163 240 284

Source: Elena Ruíz, Historia de la navegación comercial española tráfico de los Puertos de Titularidad Estatal desde la antigüedad a la conclusión del siglo XX (Madrid, 2005). Table 2. Rank of major Spanish ports, in thousands of tons, 1900-1960 Bilbao Barcelona Huelva Gijon Sta.Cruz de Tenerife Cartagena Las Palmas Valencia Sevilla Aviles Santander Pasajes Melilla 58

1900 5.807 1.693 1.741 238

1905 5.530 2.102 2.113 235

1910 4.386 2.182 2.929 641 500

1915 3.681 2.572 2.532 1.143 455

1920 3.428 2.003 1.868 1.235 447

826

787

429

650

807 961 1.239 1.264 1.314 691 878 1.254 970 825 258 393 476 461 839 855 1.174 1.410 749 796 225 403 376 263 488 16 72 202 523

1925 3.582 2.623 2.577 2.963 493

1930 3.773 3.624 3.359 2.417 647

1935 3.039 3.396 2.360 2.017 920

1940 2.732 2.052 1.228 2.664 1.035

1945 2.129 2.446 960 2.923 520

1950 3.244 2.605 1.764 3.204 2.257

1955 4.017 2.884 2.409 3.570 3.754

1960 4.367 3.712 2.686 4.385 5.893

545 676 432 281 327 659 1.051 993 1.039 630 377 1.696 1.647 1.802 1.503 855 900 1.200 1.126 1.331 889 826 767 1.163 1.000 1.037 779 1.007 1.175 957 859 950 451 400 420 847 541 819 725 697 820 960 541 864 1.076

4.425 2.374 1.463 1.421 1.371 1.154 1.101 1.199

8.267 2.707 1.942 1.713 3.591 1.520 1.872 1.700

Valencia and Barcelona are ports with a long mercantile tradition, which already at the end of the Middle Ages played a leading role in the Mediterranean maritime traffic. During the modern and contemporary period they continued to play that role in the Spanish port system. Alemany, El Port de Barcelona, 573.

10

Alicante Malaga Almería-Motril La Coruna Tarragona Cadiz Ceuta Balearic Is. Vigo Vilagarcía Castellón Ferrol Algeciras Marín-Pontevedra

413 383 389

521 466

322 535

168

261

247 506 32

39

83

193

55 41

91 54 29

352

201 415 61 189 161

320 123 (19º) 357 215 72 178 276

81 49 14 18

85 53 35 16

597 664 584 440 412 798 783 935 564 653 631 637 642 900 880 538 728 631 231 285 565 766 1.287 194 244 245 328 312 595 855 1.342 (21º) (20º) (20º) (17º) (20º) (16º) (16º) (14º) 364 570 559 305 372 484 722 951 316 256 260 465 330 431 665 635 207 208 457 219 457 489 973 1.039 358 449 251 326 315 462 579 584 270 328 360 519 299 400 656 1.181 145 163 108 114 84 122 175 165 160 201 149 90 39 79 98 58 67 94 80 72 71 104 110 292 64 68 75 68 103 187 11 23 33 40 24 48 69 107

Source: Ruíz, Historia de la navegación.

At the level of the Iberian Peninsula, the port of La Coruna was in an intermediate position within the Spanish port hierarchy, and therefore played a secondary role, compared with the largest ports of the country, led by Las Palmas, Barcelona, Algeciras, Bilbao, Gijon, etc, in the case of the number of ships in transit (Table 1) and by Bilbao, Barcelona, Huelva, Gijon, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, etc. in the case of the tonnage of freight transported (Table 2). During the first decade of the twentieth century, the freight traffic went through a prosperous period. Just as had occurred during the nineteenth century, the main factor responsible for the growth was the entry of goods, either via exterior and, especially, via cabotage. In fact, the aggregate series has always showed a strong dependence on unloads. Only in special situations, such as World War I, did shipments grow. The commercial traffic increased from approximately 155,000 tons in 1904 to 307,000 tons in 1913, with a final increase of 97.73 per cent (Figure 2). This is equivalent to the larger growth throughout the whole first third of the century, surpassing the favourable conjuncture of the central years of the 1920s. The biggest increases were seen in the final years of the 1910s, as the culmination of an exceptional period of growth at the international level, which also yielded positive results for Spanish and Galician economies. Unloads grew at a rate of 109.57% in 1904-13, with the same peaks in global traffic. Meanwhile, cargoes increased by only 68.26%, with several years of significant declines (1905, 1907, 1911), which reveals a strong irregularity and a reduced ability to control this type of traffics. This is a symptom of the low competitive capacity of the urban and regional economy in extra-regional markets, including foreign markets. After the outbreak of war in Europe, port activity, as well as the whole of the urban economy of La Coruna underwent a decline. The most critical period elapsed between 191416, when port activity diminished by 71.29%, although the responsibility of the sharp drop is attributable to cargoes, which fell more than unloading. Therefore, La Coruna was not one of those places that took advantage of the benefits made available by the war. In general, the ports that had a continental situation benefited from the availability of terrestrial communications and the profitability of the shipping industries. This is the case of 59 Bilbao, whose intense shipping activity was developed during the war , and Gijon, where coal shipments experienced a remarkable growth, and for whom the war was a period of

59

Luis V. García, “Ría, puerto exterior y superpuerto. Tres etapas en la proyección de Bilbao hacia el Mar”, Lurralde, No 4 (1981), 131.

11 60

enormous activity . The case of Barcelona is different. The war caused a decline in traffic, 61 whose 1913 levels were not regained until 1927 . But what the war really determined was a halt in the growth of imports traffic, although this was accompanied by an increase in exports, 62 due to the demands of belligerent countries . Figure 2. Commercial traffic through the port of La Coruna, 1904-1957 (tons) 1.400.000 1.200.000 1.000.000 800.000 600.000 400.000 200.000

1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956

0

Total

Unloading

Cargoes

Source: For 1904-15, Antonio Valcárcel, “La Coruña y su puerto”, in Catálogo de La Coruña. La Coruña a través de un siglo. 1923-1924 (Vigo, 1923), 56-62. For 1916-57, Reports of the Junta de Obras del Puerto de La Coruña. It does not include fishing.

However, ports such as Santander or Huelva suffered a sharp downturn. In Santander, that decrease can be explained because the city was experiencing a process of industrialization based on the construction of merchant ships to replace those sunk during the 63 war, thus curtailing exports and imports of iron ore and coal . In Almería, the war encouraged exports, but hit the urban and regional economy hard as a result of the decline in 64 imports, the consequent shortages of goods, and the increasing cost of living . The statistics for the port of Vigo shifted under similar circumstances, where there was a sharp drop in the number of vessels and tonnage, but the demand for certain exports increased, which revived the industrial sector of the city (and even of Galicia), although imports had to suffer a 65 considerable volatility . For the port of La Luz-Las Palmas, the impact of the outbreak of the war was actually serious, and revealed the extreme fragility of a port that was excessively international market-oriented. As the foreign markets closed for exports the Canary Islands 66 were forced to look to the peninsular market as an alternative . A somewhat similar effect 60

Quirós, “El puerto de Gijón”, 207. Alemany, El Port de Barcelona, 369. 62 Rosa Castejón, “El movimiento comercial del puerto de Barcelona”, Revista de Geografía, VIII (1974), 130. 63 Jean Sermet, “El puerto de Santander”, Estudios Geográficos, No. 33 (1948), 643. 64 Andrés García, El puerto de Almería (Almería, 1990), 111, 157. 65 Jácome, “La configuración”. 66 Miguel Suárez, “El tráfico de mercancías por el puerto de La Luz y de Las Palmas”, in XIII Coloquio de Historia Canario-Americana. VIII Congreso de la Asociación Española de Americanistas (Las Palmas, 2000), 61

12 67

occurred in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where the war nearly paralysed exports . The influence upon La Coruna was relative, because it was a port with a peripheral situation and possessed an insignificant level of external relations, although having an 68 important coastal trade . We can only observe a recovery towards the end of the conflict, which was due to the growth in the traffic of coal along the shoreline, bound for the fishing fleet. But the war had a negative impact on the business of the city, which depended heavily on port traffic. Hence, certain activities of the tertiary sector (consignment, representation, agencies, business agents, etc.) went through a precarious situation, but also some industrial activities were affected as well. In addition, shortages of goods and inflation deteriorated the social situation significantly. On the other hand, the difficulties for the movement of passengers to America multiplied, because of the naval blockade in European seas, and the economic difficulties that the countries of emigration were facing. This caused a decrease in the outflow of emigrants, and negatively affected the maritime business that exploited the benefits of this traffic. Until the Spanish Civil War a stage of splendour extends, which is framed within the period of economic growth that accompanied the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The result was a considerable increase in commercial exchange. Yet, the nationalist turn that characterized the Spanish economic policy of the first third of the twentieth century did not facilitate the commercial communication with the world economy; despite that, the port experienced a revival of relations with other national ports, through coastal trade (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The growth of port activity broke down with the advent of the Second Republic (1931) and the crisis of the 1930s, despite the fact that already by the end of the 1920s traffic showed a decline, but whose cause was only the drop-off of certain shoreline cargoes (coal, ice, water), associated with the fishing crisis of those years. Initially, the depression did not have an immediate impact. The relative isolation of the Spanish economy and the government distributive policy helped moderate the first manifestations of the crisis, paving the way for the national maritime activity. However, when it was felt, by 1931 and more pronouncedly in 1933, the port traffic suffered the consequences, both in cargoes and in unloading. The depression strengthened the protectionist attitudes of many countries, obviously affecting foreign trade. Around 1934 the port of La Coruna was in a critical moment, which only worsened in the following two years. The cause, according to local entrepreneurs, was the disadvantaged position of La Coruna in relation to other ports on several points: 1) in terms of costs, as it was the most 69 expensive port of northern Spain ; 2) in terms of port infrastructures endowment; 3) in the organization of work, which was carried out inefficiently, in particular the charcoal 70 operations ; 4) the consular taxes that were paid were high and the relatively small volume of cargo carried could not face such costs; 5) the development of road transport after World War I brought a decline of the city's role as a major distributor of the Galician internal market and a progressive loss of markets along the coastline. The Civil War led to a sharp contraction, although during the final stages of the conflict port traffic began to recover quickly, allowing it to rise above the pre-war levels. Such a situation was only apparent, due to the concentration on a few sets of conditions: certain cabotage shipments and, above all, a huge increase in the water cargo to shipping. The 2184. 67 A. Cioranescu, Historia del Puerto de Santa Cruz de Tenerife (Las Palmas, 1993), 291. 68 Frax, Puertos y comercio, 132. 69 Estudio realizado para conocer las causas del decrecimiento mercantil de La Coruña (La Coruña, 1935), 8. 70 “La Coruña y su puerto”, Galicia Industrial y Comercial (March 1934), 9-10.

13

role of Galicia as a rearguard area, providing goods to the territory controlled by the insurgents of the Franco army explains the growth of 1937-39. After the war, the increase in cabotage shipments and the huge increase in shoreline unloading broke this trend (Figure 3). Both factors point to more opportunities to supply the demand from other areas, the Mediterranean coast being the one that benefited the most. Figure 3. Traffic of goods: shoreline, coastal and foreign trade. Unloading (tons) 1.000.000

100.000

10.000

1.000

Coastal trade

Foreign trade

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

1930

1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

100

Shoreline trade

Source: Reports of the Junta de Obras del Puerto de La Coruña. It does not include fishing.

Franco autarky had a negative impact on the city, in the form of a dramatic slowdown in port traffic, either via demand and supply, which accompanied the urban economic slowdown. Between 1940 and 1945 port traffic fell by 7.5% cumulative; but the decline was due more to lower cargoes, particularly to the outside, than to unloading. The external protection, still, resulted in a decline in imports, although this was partially offset by the cabotage traffic and the positive evolution of fishing, thanks in part to the recovery of fishing71 grounds . The slowdown in economic growth resulted in a sharp decline in trade (Figure 3 72 and Figure 4), that the competition of land transportation does not sufficiently explain . World War II brought further disruptions in port traffic, although its evolution was conditioned by Spanish economic policy. In fact, given the hardships of the national economy in La Coruna, we have observed a growth in food imports, goods to which production bottlenecks in the primary sector were not able to respond. The other side of the coin were the enormous difficulties for the purchase of raw materials abroad, while exports suffered a 73 blockage, as a result of the expansion of war zones in the sea . This should have led to a compensatory growth of coastal shipping. Instead, we found a relative stagnation of such traffic. The rates of economic growth slowed down in Spain (and in La Coruna), resulting in a

71

“Nuestras actividades pesqueras”, Orientación Económica y Financiera, IV (1946), 12-13. Above all, if we take into account the chronic difficulties of land communication between Galicia and the rest of the country. Although competition of land transport was beginning to be perceived during the post-war, it was especially in the emerging road transport rather than railway transport. 73 “La actual coyuntura económica”, Orientación Económica y Financiera, II (1944), 11. 72

14 74

sharp decline in this type of transport . During the second half of the 1940s, port activity was normalized, despite the autarchic framework within which economic activity was developing, and which enabled the total traffic to grow between 1946-1950, while the largest increases were in the cargoes. Figure 4. Traffic of goods: shoreline, coastal and foreign trade. Unloading (tons). Cargo (tons) 1.000.000

100.000

10.000

1.000

Coastal trade

Foreign trade

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

1930

1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

100

Shoreline trade

Source: Vid. Figure 4

Despite the fact that in the early 1950s the local and regional economies had 75 witnessed a visible recovery, port traffic did not undergo a significant growth . The explanation for the stalemate lies in cost factors. Cabotage freight rates suffered a steady increase, and besides shipping companies were reluctant to stop at La Coruna, due to deficiencies in the organization of port services, at least compared to other larger ports in the north. For that reason, many goods had to go to other ports or to be sent via railway. The hardest hit were shipments of timber, tin, canning and other similar goods to the Mediterranean. Although the port of La Coruña had been already suffering from this situation for many years, it worsened during the first half of the decade. Thus, some of the leading exports of the province (wolfram, pyrites, etc.) were redistributed through this system, something serious if we take into account the importance of the traffic of raw materials in the port, along with fuels (coal) and certain manufactured products. During the following years, the growth of traffic was not too accelerated. Many goods 76 began to move freight to railway and road, due to the continuous growth of freight rates . 74

In 1951 the shipping firm Ybarra and Cia explained the contraction of the cargoes in coastal shipping that took place since 1947 on the basis of the drop in employment in all sectors (mainly as a result of Spanish economic isolation). But also by the increasing cost of shipping, because of a “higher cost of loading and unloading operations”, even though it was recognized that shipping freight rates were well below the railway carriage (25-50% lower). Subsecretaría de la Marina Mercante, Estudio sobre los problemas actuales del tráfico de cabotaje, presentado por la Naviera Ybarra, S. en C. (Madrid, 1951). 75 Orientación Económica y Financiera, X (1952), 8. 76 “Informe sobre el desarrollo de la economía coruñesa en 1954 y situación de la misma a principios de 1955”, Orientación Económica y Financiera, XII (1955), 6.

15

Actually, the cost per ton and in equal distances was less than land transport. But the exoneration of the responsibilities of the ship-owners and the frequent robberies nullified that 77 advantage . Finally, since the mid-1950s, the port went through a new path of growth, following the trend of the Spanish and world economies. The increase in traffic enabled La Coruna to consolidate its position in the Spanish port ranking, as an intermediate port (Table 3), in line with the size and economic functions that the city held. Various events had a strong influence on this achievement. The 1953 signing of the first economic agreement between Spain and the United States put into motion the first imports of consumer goods, industrial raw 78 materials, and capital goods . Equally important was the occurrence of the first liberalization measures of the economy, which had positive effects on the national port economy, and constituted the advance of the Stabilization Plan of 1959. These measures temporarily contained the external deficit of the Spanish economy, which facilitated imports and industrial growth. The dynamization of port traffic resulted in a feverish activity, as manifested in the construction of several major works, whose purpose was to equip the port with adequate means to cope with the volume of traffic anticipated for the early 1960s. The most important structure, the installations of the oil refinery, made indispensable the undertaking of construction of oil dock. It was estimated that this industry would mean a considerable increase in traffic to the port, including the input and output of petroleum-based products, about 3,600,000 tons/year. It was calculated that in 1970 it would reach 6,500,000 tons. The use of other refinery by-products would also produce an increase in traffic of general cargo. If we join the industrial growth expected for La Coruna under the creation of the growth pole, port facilities were clearly insufficient. In anticipation of this, in October 1962, a general plan of works in the port de La Coruna was drafted, establishing guidelines that would serve to orient future works and installations. Table 3. List of most important ports (1958-60 averages) Port 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Barcelona Gijon-Musel Bilbao Cartagena S. Cruz Tenerife La Luz-Las Palmas Aviles Valencia Pasajes Sevilla

Traffic Port index 2.708 11. Huelva 2.469 12. Vigo 2.333 13. Santander 2.318 14. Malaga 2.318 15. Alicante 2.256 16. La Coruna 1.929 17. Melilla 1.700 18. Tarragona 1.519 19. Palma 1.413 20. Almería

Traffic Port index 1.360 21. Ceuta 1.350 22. S. Esteban Pravia 1.132 23. Cadiz 962 24. Algeciras 919 25. Ferrol 890 26. P. Santa María 815 27. Pontevedra 807 28. Vilagarcía 645 29. Castellón 645

Traffic index 627 589 539 536 304 216 203 173 127

Source: Bosque, “Las actividades portuarias”, 604.

However, the growth of exports since the mid-1950s is mainly explained by exogenous factors. The main one was the acceleration of exports of iron ore. Without their 79 contribution, the progression would have been similar to previous years . Other trades also 77

Orientación Económica y Financiera, XVI (1957), 9. Likewise, the events of Suez (1956) also had an important impact, due to the deflection of the traffic that previously used the Canal towards the Atlantic. Bosque, “Las actividades portuarias”, 603. 79 La economía coruñesa en 1957 (La Coruña, 1958). Although in 1958 there was a relative slowdown of the port traffic, which was originated in cabotage and foreign trade cargoes, because the shipments of minerals 78

16

experienced a significant boost: the unloading of pyrites, raw materials for fertilizers, coal, heavy oils for engines, gasoline and bencine, fuel oil and, and the cargoes of general cargo and chemical fertilizers. The increased number of vessels that stopped at the port explains the progression of some of these goods, in order to face the new demands of freights that gave rise to the increase in shipments. Moreover, the coastal shipping began to overcome the crisis of the early part of the decade. Shipping companies gradually started to make stops more frequently, thus avoiding former situations of bottlenecks. The Sectoral distribution of trade Traffic was broken down into three categories: foreign, cabotage (coastal) and bay 80 traffic litoral trades . The most important was the cabotage, a circumstance that was consolidated further after the Civil War. Its supremacy was questioned only by the bay traffic, as the port was exercising a function of redistributing staple inputs for the local fishing fleet (coal, and to a lesser extent, water, ice among others). External commercial relations were not significant, due to the low level of urban and regional economic development, as was the case in many Spanish second level ports. Hence the overwhelming predominance of imports, founded in purchases of manufactured goods (domestic and foreign), counting as currency exchange only with farm products and articles of a poorly consolidated metropolitan industry. We have made an aggregation into four main categories of port traffic, following the 81 methodology of de la Puerta (Figure 5) . The dominance of Food items is explained by the economic characteristics of the region: a traditional society that consumed and exported primary goods, importing manufactured goods. Numerous individual items with small individual weight integrated this group, but nonetheless were significant as a whole (olive oil, sugar, corn, flour, salt, wine, wheat), products for daily consumption, from the hinterland, or above all imported goods, which showed a weak development of local food industries. But its participation declined due to transformations in consumption patterns. The strong participation of Fuels had its origin in the importation of high volumes of coal. The main consignee was the fishing fleet, along with some urban industrial processes (e.g., gas industry), as well as the redistribution to other parts of the region. This item, along with the provision of water, totalled a very high percentage within port traffic, showing structural weaknesses of the latter. In Galicia, the shortage of coal required they obtain it through imports, Spanish or foreign, although its origin was mostly British, with heavy 82 concentration in Cardiff .

reduced, due to the low price in international markets and the decline in demand. Orientación Económica y Financiera, XVII (1959), 11. 80 The distinction between coastal (cabotage) trade and the tráfico de bahía o de litoral was originated in the late nineteenth century, when the Ordenanzas Generales de la Renta de Aduanas of 1896 regulated that the goods were due to enter into two groups: the cabotage trade, and the tráfico de bahía, in which should appear the goods shipped through the ports enabled in the jurisdiction of the Aduana. Natividad de la Puerta, El puerto de Bilbao como reflejo del desarrollo industrial de Vizcaya, 1857-1913 (Bilbao, 1994), 189. In general, when speaking of tráfico de bahía one refers to purely local traffic, that is, the movement of goods in a type of environs navigation that communicates, among others, the various ports of an estuary. Castejón, “El movimiento comercial”, 138. Within this tráfico de bahía there were two opposing currents that dominated this movement: the supplies of coal to ships, which were part of cargoes, and the unloading of materials such as sand, which were usually drawn from the estuaries or rivers flowing in them, and which were near the port. María L. Pérez and Ramón G. Romaní, Galicia y sus puertos. Pesca y tráfico marítimo (Santiago, 1983), 153. 81 De la Puerta, El puerto de Bilbao. 82 The reason, the high price of national coal, even in the transport across the Cantabrian. Sebastián Coll and Carles Sudrià, El carbón en España 1770-1961. Una historia económica (Madrid, 1987).

17

Figure 5. Sectoral distribution of total port traffic through the port of La Coruna, 1916-1957 (tons) 100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

Food

Raw materials

Fuels

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

1930

1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

0%

Manufactured goods

Source: Vid. Figure 4

From the late 1940s, the Reports of the port authority do not differentiate ports of origin or destination, but only countries, showing a virtual monopoly of Britain. On the eve of the Spanish Civil War, Rotterdam acquired special prominence, as it was the main supplier during the conflict. After the parentheses of World War II, which almost caused the cancellation of imports practice, the definitive normalization of port traffic took place. Since then, the main supplier continued to be England. Table 4. Main goods of the total port traffic (percentage) Merchandises Water Coal Salt Fertilizers Cements Wood-timber Tobacco Corn Iron and steel Sand Wheat Gasoline, bencine, fuel Heavy engine oils Iron ore Ice Olive oil TOTAL

1916 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1957 24,07 21,98 31,90 16,39 16,14 12,48 12,89 20,18 16,90 17,06 19,53 31,02 30,63 31,21 33,84 44,80 43,10 32,04 24,38 5,05 8,14 6,18 3,57 4,66 4,53 3,52 5,93 2,90 1,53 1,33 3,08 1,09 4,24 4,91 7,59 6,48 2,69 6,66 7,67 4,03 2,60 1,98 2,41 6,73 4,38 4,25 3,02 3,83 2,95 3,07 2,54 2,84 3,04 3,18 2,55 3,20 3,64 4,47 2,45 1,47 2,20 1,23 2,91 1,37 2,23 0,93 0,68 0,40 0,47 0,45 2,19 6,38 1,17 0,48 0,08 0,03 0,01 1,41 1,18 2,15 1,26 0,80 1,50 1,08 0,32 0,28 0,35 0,49 0,19 1,21 2,60 1,40 2,01 2,51 1,83 0,24 0,17 0,38 0,35 0,10 0,11 0,07 0,39 0,73 1,43 0,30 0,04 1,09 5,05 4,52 0,72 1,23 1,84 2,16 1,26 3,28 3,32 4,39 1,61 8,25 17,72 16,06 0,04 2,34 1,46 1,47 3,26 6,40 29,12 6,12 6,36 5,74 1,08 1,14 1,33 0,66 1,69 0,75 0,08 0,05 66,94 74,49 85,50 82,43 85,12 86,84 82,29 94,30 89,60 85,23 Source: Vid. Figure 4

18

In a economy with a low level of industrialization, the strong dependence of Manufactured goods and, therefore, the dependence of unloading coming from abroad and, above all, cabotage was very sharp. There were a large number of goods of considerable importance: cements, fertilizers, tobacco, etc. And others, less significant: heavy engine oils, ice, construction materials, iron and steel, gasoline and benzene, tin, textiles, etc. Goods for urban construction; goods that satisfied the demand of the hinterland and the process of agricultural modernization; products that covered the limitations of local industry; and goods of industries that offered inputs to urban facilities, or earmarked part of their output to the national market. In Raw materials dominated the cargoes (of minerals and agricultural goods), being composed of a few essential items. The most important of which were, water, sand, woodtimber, and iron ore, totalled a fairly high percentage. The unloading were channelled into urban construction or provided inputs for local industries, subsidiaries of fisheries and canning. Conclusions In Spain, commercial port traffic underwent significant growth, though not with sufficient intensity to transform it as a port of reference at the European level, apart from Bilbao or Barcelona, nor, due its geographic peculiarities, the Canary Islands ports. However, the role of maritime traffic within the national economy has been important, allowing the development and consolidation of certain urban economies, whose strengthening was cemented in the impact that their ports had upon the urban and regional economic base, albeit at different scales and magnitudes. Several stages can be distinguished, marked by events that presided over this long period. A first phase, which lasts until World War I, is the continuation of an increasing globalisation of the economy, to which Spain, despite its peculiarities (lower level of economic development, strong trade protectionism, and so on.) was not alien. After the war, a second stage of growth took place, which lasted up until the crisis of the 1930s, sheltered in the favourable economic juncture. From then onwards, a long period of “gloom” for traffic began, as several factors converged: the effects of the 1930s recession with the Spanish War, and World War II combined with the isolation resulting from foreign autarkic policies of the Franco regime. If the global port traffic did not undergo a stronger drop, it was due to a gradual growth of the role of coastal trade (cabotage), which partially offset the decline in foreign trade. During the 1950s, a slow normalization of trade relations can be observed, which is the prelude to the qualitative leap that occurred after the Stabilization Plan; this permitted, belatedly, Spain to match the “maritimization” that the world economy has experienced during the second half of the twentieth century. With specific reference to the port of La Coruna, commercial traffic followed a similar trend to that of the set of major Spanish ports (28). The main difference was that the pattern of response to the various junctures of the period was more attenuated, standing out as the main difference what occurred in the 1920s (with a more moderate growth) and during the 1930s Depression (with a less pronounced decline). On the contrary, after the Spanish War the trend was near that of the national port system as a whole, because the overall behaviour became closer to the series of coastal trade, precisely that which characterized the port of La Coruna. Regarding the structure of traffic, La Coruna was basically a cabotage port. The volume of international trade was relatively smaller showing typical features of peripheral economies. The region in which La Coruna is located has been characterized by its peripheral position, both economically and geographically, thereby impeding the consolidation of a more

19

harmonious growth process. This is an economy that was, in general, based on the exportation of certain raw materials and the importation of manufactured goods. Accordingly, the port presented a relationship of dependence upon industrialized countries (mostly European), maintaining a more favourable position as compared to other peripheral nations (mainly Latin America), which on the other hand were minority in terms of traffic volume. The lowest level of economic development of the city and its hinterland also had important repercussions in the structure of port traffic, heavily concentrated in a few goods, most of which were unloaded via cabotage or importation. Therefore, we can conclude that, rather than exhibit a port specialization, La Coruna showed signs of structural weakness, a fact that even given the growth of port traffic was insufficient to remedy. This has been, therefore, a long period in which the port was unable to move up through positions in the national port hierarchy. Only with the installation of the treatment plant of crude oil, port traffic underwent a significant advance, although this reveals an excessive reliance on one type of traffic that has had very little effect on the urban economy.

Figure 6. Number of merchant ships entered in the main Spanish ports (1900-1960)

60.000

50.000

40.000

30.000

20.000

10.000

Número de buques totales

5 per. media móvil (Número de buques totales)

Source: Ruíz, Historia de la navegación.

1960

1958

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

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1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

1914

1912

1910

1908

1906

1904

1902

1900

0

21

Figure 7. Traffic of merchant ships entered in the main Spanish ports Gross Register Tonnage (1900-1960)

80.000.000 70.000.000 60.000.000 50.000.000 40.000.000 30.000.000 20.000.000 10.000.000

Movimiento total de buques

5 per. media móvil (Movimiento total de buques)

Source: Ruíz, Historia de la navegación.

1960

1958

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

1930

1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

1914

1912

1910

1908

1906

1904

1902

1900

0

22

Figure 8. Total traffic of goods in the main Spanish ports, tons (1900-1960)

50.000.000 45.000.000 40.000.000 35.000.000 30.000.000 25.000.000 20.000.000 15.000.000 10.000.000 5.000.000

Tráfico total de mercancías

5 per. media móvil (Tráfico total de mercancías)

Source: Ruíz, Historia de la navegación.

1960

1958

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

1944

1942

1940

1938

1936

1934

1932

1930

1928

1926

1924

1922

1920

1918

1916

1914

1912

1910

1908

1906

1904

1902

1900

0